International Agreement or Private Agreement? Uplift Policy in Oil and Gas Taxation in Production Sharing Contracts between Foreign Contractors and the Indonesian Government

2021 ◽  
pp. 545-560
Author(s):  
Arina N. Shebubakar
Keyword(s):  
Oil And Gas ◽  
International Agreement ◽  
Indonesian Government ◽  
Production Sharing

Minerals as an object of accounting and economic security of the oil and gas company implementing the production sharing agreement

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (11) ◽  
pp. 1291-1312
Author(s):  
N.V. Zyleva
Keyword(s):  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Economic Security ◽  
The State ◽  
Professional Judgment ◽  
Production Sharing ◽  
Security Service ◽  
Geological Information ◽  
Oil And Gas Companies ◽  
Mineral Reserves ◽  
Economic Risks

Subject. This article discusses the practice of ensuring the economic security of oil and gas companies operating under the terms of production sharing agreements, where minerals are the object of security. Objectives. The article aims to justify the need to apply professional judgment in the organization of reliable accounting of minerals, explored and extracted under the terms of the production sharing agreement implementation, to avoid various risks to the entity's economic security. Methods. For the study, I used the methods of deduction and modeling. Results. The article presents proposals to arrange accounting of intangible exploration assets (geological information on mineral reserves) and finished products (the part of the extracted minerals owned by the investor and the part owned by the State). Conclusions. As strategic minerals, oil and gas are the targets of various economic risks. Professionals familiar with the specifics of accounting operations in the implementation of the production sharing agreement should be prepared to prevent these risks. The results obtained can be used to design accounting policies and develop local regulations on the tasks and functions of the economic security service of the organization implementing the production sharing agreement.

What Hit and Miss in Indonesia CBM Project : Empirical Study Slowing Down Factors CBM Development and Propose Suitable Action for CBM Development in Indonesia by Using Analytical Hierarch Process.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
I.A. Firdaus
Keyword(s):  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Gas Production ◽  
Coal Bed ◽  
Production Sharing ◽  
High Investment ◽  
The Government ◽  
Exploration Period ◽  
Production Areas ◽  
Testing Standards

In 2008, the first Coal Bed Methane (CBM) PSC was signed in Indonesia. To date, 54 CBM PSCs have been awarded to explore and develop CBM Block in Indonesia. Twelve years later, only one PSC has submitted a Plan of Development but has not yet produced gas commercially. Most CBM PSCs have been struggling during the 10 years’ exploration period and some may receive extensions for 3 years under specific conditions. The lack of integrated authorities’ approval in the overlay of coal mining and natural gas production areas has become a great obstacle for CBM Development. Besides that, the government regulations in CBM activities have defects in PSC contract terms that may lead marginal economic value for contractors, especially due to high investment during the early development (C. Irawan, 2017). On the other hand, drilling regulations, Pipe Classing standards and Testing Standards following the Oil and Gas standards are too expensive for CBM Investment. According to our observations, CBM Regulations in Indonesia should be modified starting from the Exploration period, Production Sharing Contract Terms and Standard Operating Procedures to suit Indonesian CBM characteristics. Good coordination within government departments is a must for the success of CBM Exploration and Development.

Thai junta will defer changes to oil and gas laws

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Party Leader ◽  
Regulatory Change ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Popular Resistance ◽  
Democratic Reform ◽  
Gas Laws ◽  
Production Sharing ◽  
Term Energy ◽  
Oil And Gas Sector

Subject Prospects for regulatory change in the oil and gas sector. Significance Following stiff political opposition in February from the Democrat Party (including party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva) and individuals associated with the People's Democratic Reform Committee, interim Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha's administration cancelled a planned exploration licensing round this year. Now Prayuth faces pressure from the same group to amend the 1971 Petroleum Act itself to switch the oil and gas upstream regime from revenue-sharing contracts (RSCs) to production sharing contracts (PSCs). Impacts Popular resistance to dams on the Mekong risks Thailand's longer-term energy strategy. The next government is likely to be better equipped in countering resistance to new exploration. Low gas prices across Asia and the decline in oil prices promise fiscal relief as Thai imports rise.

Legal Safeguards in Egypt's Petroleum Concession Agreements

2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-396
Author(s):  
Minas Khatchadourian
Keyword(s):  
Host Country ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Gas Production ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Oil Companies ◽  
Production Sharing ◽  
Arbitration Clause ◽  
Legal Perspective ◽  
The Government ◽  
Oil Company

This article deals with the concession contracts for the exploration and the production of oil and gas in Egypt. Such tripartite contracts are concluded between the Government of Egypt (GOE) as the host country, a National Oil Company (NOC) as the concession holder and an international oil company (IOC) as the foreign contractor who receives a part of the oil or gas production on a production sharing agreement (PSA). From an Egyptian legal perspective, this contract is qualified as a State contract which is supposed to give the Government some exorbitant powers towards its counterparts. However, in order to attract foreign investors into this kind of agreement and encourage international oil companies to explore natural resources, several legal safeguards are incorporated in the concession agreement. Examples of this include placing the contract in the framework of a legislative act, granting the contract a supremacy on any contrary legislation, stabilization clause, adaptation of the contract through renegotiation, arbitration clause, etc.

scholarly journals PRINSIP HUKUM PERIMBANGAN DANA BAGI HASIL MINYAK DAN GAS BUMI

Yuridika ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Indah Dwi Qurbani
Keyword(s):  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Central Government ◽  
National Development ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Problem Statement ◽  
Production Sharing ◽  
Renewable Natural Resources ◽  
Basic Orientation ◽  
Oil And Gas Sector

Based on Article 18 A (2) of the amended 1945 Constitution provisions, it can be inferred that article as the filosophical and constitutional basic of the Act No. 33 of 2004 about finance relationship between central government and regional government, include finance relationship in oil and gas sector. The problem statement in this research are firstly, elaborating of law oil and gas management in Indonesia and secondly analysing the principle of law distribution finance relationship between central government and regional government in sharing oil and gas finance. Social concept of ownership is a fundamental principle in the management of oil and gas as outlined in the basic orientation of national development. Oil and gas sector as a strategic non renewable natural resources shall be under the powers of the State and shall be used to the greatest benefit of the people.Keywords: principles of law, equity, production sharing, oil and gas

scholarly journals Evaluating the Petroleum Contracts of Kurdistan Region in the Surveying and Applying the Deloitte Data (A Comparative Review)

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 236
Author(s):  
Beston Muhammed Qadir ◽  
Hazhar Omer Mohammed ◽  
Hawre Latif Majeed
Keyword(s):  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Cost Recovery ◽  
Large Contribution ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Kurdistan Region ◽  
Oil Companies ◽  
Production Sharing ◽  
Comparative Review ◽  
Oil And Gas Resources ◽  
The Cost

A production sharing contract has been chosen by the Kurdistan Regional Government as supposedly the most appropriate contract model for the oil and gas resources of the Kurdistan Region, among several other forms of contract. In general, in terms of royalty, cost recovery, and sharing the residual sales as negotiated, the Kurdish model is similar to its foreign model, although the proportions are most likely to differ. The model of the Region specified 10 percent for the Royalty: Up to 45 percent for cost recovery, often between 7-9 percent of the company's share of the profit in the agreement. Investigating Deloitte reports and then comparing the 2017 to 2019 data shows the unstable output with a fair boost and stability at the later date as for 2017. A large contribution from the Kirkuk oil fields to the production of the overall region is noted until 16 Oct 2017. Around one-third of the revenues of oil went to the production oil companies, although as agreed for cost recovery, it is still less than 40 percent. The payment of the companies of Oil production could be explained as a collective sum between 9% of the profit oil and 25-28% of the sales oil's gross values! The cost recovery payment could not have been funded in the contract, which explains the region's claim about the debts of the companies, in its agreed manner.

The Contract Regime for Unitisation and the Impact of Production Sharing Contracts on Joint Development in Nigeria

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mendos James
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Operating Cost ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Joint Development ◽  
Production Sharing ◽  
Effective Manner ◽  
Petroleum Resources ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Petroleum Drilling

Abstract Unitisation has evolved globally as the best mechanism for the joint development of hydrocarbon bearing reservoirs that straddle two or more concessions or licenses. The concept of unitisation is underpinned by the need to avoid competitive exploitation of hydrocarbon resources, maximise its economic recovery, eliminate proliferation of production facilities and reduce development and operating cost.1 The practice of unitisation in the Nigerian oil and gas landscape has gained traction over the years with several straddle fields identified as candidates for unitisation and more than ten (10) agreements for joint development (both Pre Unitisation Agreements and Unitisation and Unit Operating Agreements) executed in the industry. This has occurred under a regulatory regime for unitisation that has evolved from the concise provisions of Section 48 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation 1969 as amended, to the robust Guidelines for Unitisation issued by the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) in 2008 (revised in 2019) (Guidelines) in response to the complexities of joint development encountered by parties. While the Guidelines is an excellent attempt at providing a process for unitisation, it does not provide sufficient guidance on the contract regime for unitisation as the bedrock for joint development. A critical look at the contracts governing joint development in the light of global best practices is important to ensure that it meets in an effective manner the objectives of unitisation. A review of the contract regime for unitisation would be incomplete without recognising the impact that underlying contracts governing separate concessions have on unitisation. To this end, the posture of Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) on gas development in a unit is worth reviewing in the light of the benefits of commercialising gas to the State and the Contractor. This paper reviews the contract regime for unitisation in Nigeria as regulated by the Guidelines and the impact that underlying contracts (particularly PSCs) have on unitisation. The paper will proffer recommendations for inclusion in the Guidelines with a view to improving the process of joint development of shared reservoirs in Nigeria.

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