The research on price game model and its complex characteristics of triopoly in different decision-making rule

2012 ◽  
Vol 71 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 35-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Zhihui Sun
2021 ◽  
pp. 000203972199039
Author(s):  
Thomas Kwasi Tieku

Conventional narratives suggest that the African Union Commission (AUC), like most international public administrations and international organisations (IOs) housed in the less materially endowed regions of the world, exercises no meaningful agency on international issues. This article however seeks to show that the AUC is neither a glorified messenger and docile follower of orders of governments nor is it an empty vessel that timidly goes where the wind of governments blows. Rather, the AUC exercises significant agency on issues that affect not just the African continent but also the broader international system. The AUC is often at the heart of international agenda-setting, norm development, decision-making, rule creation, policy development, and it sometimes offer strategic leadership. The article demonstrates six pathways through which the AUC acts like a tail wagging a dog.


2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Min Wang ◽  
Fengyong Zhai

As an effective way to reduce costs and increase efficiency of EPC projects, BIM technology has drawn a lot of attention in numerous countries. Existing studies have failed to reveal the BIM decision-making mechanisms of owners and general contractors in EPC projects in a dynamic method. This study investigates the underlying logic of the collaboration application of BIM by analyzing the dynamic behaviors of owners and general contractors based on evolutionary game model. The results show that the most effective suggestions to promote the BIM collaboration application in EPC projects are “increasing the proportion of BIM application initially strategies,” “increasing incremental revenue of BIM collaborative application,” “reducing costs of BIM collaboration application,” “avoiding excessive hitchhiking,” and “establishing reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.” On the basis of numerical simulation to illustrate the influence of the different initial strategies and parameters on the final decision in different situations, five solutions were proposed for the effective BIM collaboration application between owners and general contractors. This article can facilitate researchers pondering the dynamics of collaboration among stakeholders in projects, and it can also facilitate participants picking up proper strategies for improved collaboration.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 713-724 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shi Haobin ◽  
Zhang Lin ◽  
Pan Wei ◽  
Wang Shichao

Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyungwon Kang ◽  
Hesham A. Rakha

Lane changes are complex safety- and throughput-critical driver actions. Most lane-changing models deal with lane-changing maneuvers solely from the merging driver’s standpoint and thus ignore driver interaction. To overcome this shortcoming, we develop a game-theoretical decision-making model and validate the model using empirical merging maneuver data at a freeway on-ramp. Specifically, this paper advances our repeated game model by using updated payoff functions. Validation results using the Next Generation SIMulation (NGSIM) empirical data show that the developed game-theoretical model provides better prediction accuracy compared to previous work, giving correct predictions approximately 86% of the time. In addition, a sensitivity analysis demonstrates the rationality of the model and its sensitivity to variations in various factors. To provide evidence of the benefits of the repeated game approach, which takes into account previous decision-making results, a case study is conducted using an agent-based simulation model. The proposed repeated game model produces superior performance to a one-shot game model when simulating actual freeway merging behaviors. Finally, this lane change model, which captures the collective decision-making between human drivers, can be used to develop automated vehicle driving strategies.


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