scholarly journals Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies

Author(s):  
Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt ◽  
Christian Wey

AbstractWe analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.

2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Glen O. Robinson ◽  
Dennis L. Weisman

This paper explores the role of the essential facilities doctrine in circumscribing the scope of network sharing obligations in telecommunications. Among other things it argues that a proper application of the doctrine of essential facilities should recognize the prominence of dynamic over static efficiency in promoting consumer welfare. Regulators may be averse to recognizing these tradeoffs because unlike the behavior of prices the welfare losses from foregone innovation may be unobservable to the regulators' constituency. Moreover, an emphasis on dynamic efficiency requires the short-term regulator to take the "long view" – fostering the competitive process rather than emulating the competitive outcome.


Author(s):  
I. V. Gagarina

Economic analysis is one of the key elements of the state competition policy system. The issue of the quality of analytical research carried out by the antimonopoly authorities has been topical and highly controversial for many years. Many scientific works have been devoted to the role of economic analysis in Russian antitrust, the most significant contributions were made by I. V. Knyazeva, A. G. Tsyganov, A. E. Shastitko, S. B. Avdasheva, A. A. Kurdin. This study proposes the stageization of the evolution of economic analysis depending on the processes of transformation of competition policy in the country, and, as a consequence, the development of the powers of antimonopoly authorities. The article outlines the prerequisites for a new stage in the evolution of economic analysis, due to the transition of traditional markets to a new business format — digital, the emergence of new markets based on IT-technologies. The new philosophy of market regulation requires fundamentally new methodological approaches to assessing the state of competition in them.


2014 ◽  
Vol 66 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 321-337
Author(s):  
Ivana Rakic

The purpose of ex ante merger control is to secure and preserve the competitive market structures by controlling concentrations which might significantly impede effective competition. All concentrations exceeding a certain turnover threshold are subject to mandatory notification under national merger control rules and such transactions shall not be implemented prior to clearance decision. In assessing a concentration, the relevant competition authority must consider the likely effects of the concentration on competition, and if the concentration is expected to be anti-competitive, it must be prohibited. The aim of this article is to explain the difficulties to properly determine the institutional framework in which the competition authority approves or prohibits concentrations. Therefore, the author analyses some of the main principles on which merger control should be based and points out that merger control rules play very important role in achieving effective enforcement of optimal competition policy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (6) ◽  
pp. 3-9
Author(s):  
Kalpana Tyagi

Purpose This paper aims to underscore how the digitization of content and the convergence in the telecommunications sector has prompted a wave of consolidation between telecom and content players. Design/methodology/approach Using interdisciplinary insights from competition policy and business strategy, the paper draws attention to the interplay between business model innovation and merger control in the converged telecoms sector. Findings Technological innovation and business model innovation led to the emergence of over-the-top (OTT) services. This innovation in turn led to two key effects, first, successful commercialization of content and the emergence of the “smart pipes” that in turn has led to the second effect, which is increased mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the converged telecommunications sector. Emergence of OTT with big data as a key advantage challenged the strategy and business models of the more established players, such as the AT&T, Time Warner, Liberty Global and Fox, which in turn led to the current trend of M&As in the sector. Originality/value This paper makes the following key contributions to the literature on M&As between the fixed/mobile and content players. First, it elucidates how the existing market players can benefit from competition policy, such as merger remedies to enter new and related markets. Second, it advocates that the US and the European competition authorities while assessing these M&As, take due account of innovation in business models, as business model innovation not only promotes innovation in the market but also enhances consumer welfare, considering that it offers the merged firm economies of scale and scope to offer better-quality goods and services at subsidized prices.


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory T. Gundlach ◽  
Diana L. Moss

Mergers may impact price as well as non-price forms of competition in the form of product quality, variety, service, and innovation. This special issue of the Antitrust Bulletin examines the increasing importance of non-price dimensions of competition in merger analysis, the challenges that non-price effects pose for antitrust merger enforcement, and approaches for enhancing the analysis and role of non-price competition in merger enforcement decisions and competition policy responses. This is a critical discussion that informs the debate over the importance and adequacy of the consumer welfare standard, which is the prevailing standard for evaluating the competitive effects of mergers and nonmerger conduct.


Author(s):  
Matthew T. Panhans ◽  
Reinhard Schumacher

Abstract This paper investigates the views on competition theory and policy of the American institutional economists during the first half of the 20th century. These perspectives contrasted with those of contemporary neoclassical and later mainstream economic approaches. We identify three distinct dimensions to an institutionalist perspective on competition. First, institutionalist approaches focused on describing industry details, so as to bring theory into closer contact with reality. Second, institutionalists emphasized that while competition was sometimes beneficial, it could also be disruptive. Third, institutionalists had a broad view of the objectives of competition policy that extended beyond effects on consumer welfare. Consequently, institutionalists advocated for a wide range of policies to enhance competition, including industrial self-regulation, broad stakeholder representation within corporations, and direct governmental regulations. Their experimental attitude implied that policy would always be evolving, and antitrust enforcement might be only one stage in the development toward a regime of industrial regulation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-600
Author(s):  
Naomi R. Lamoreaux ◽  
Laura Phillips Sawyer

Scholars have long recognized that the states’ authority to charter corporations bolstered their antitrust powers in ways that were not available to the federal government. Our paper contributes to this literature by focusing attention on the relevance for competition policy of lawsuits brought by minority shareholders against their own companies, especially lawsuits challenging voting trusts. Historically judges had been reluctant to intervene in corporations’ internal affairs and had been wary of the potential for opportunism in shareholders’ derivative suits. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, they had begun to revise their views and see shareholders as useful allies in the struggle against monopoly. Although the balance between judges’ suspicion of and support for shareholders’ activism shifted back and forth over time, in the end the lawsuits provoked state legislatures to strengthen antitrust policy by making devices like voting trusts unsuitable for purposes of economic concentration.


1985 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 314-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin J Williams ◽  
Angelo S DeNisi ◽  
Allyn G Blencoe ◽  
Thomas P Cafferty

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