scholarly journals The role of merger control rules in the enforcement of optimal competition policy

2014 ◽  
Vol 66 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 321-337
Author(s):  
Ivana Rakic

The purpose of ex ante merger control is to secure and preserve the competitive market structures by controlling concentrations which might significantly impede effective competition. All concentrations exceeding a certain turnover threshold are subject to mandatory notification under national merger control rules and such transactions shall not be implemented prior to clearance decision. In assessing a concentration, the relevant competition authority must consider the likely effects of the concentration on competition, and if the concentration is expected to be anti-competitive, it must be prohibited. The aim of this article is to explain the difficulties to properly determine the institutional framework in which the competition authority approves or prohibits concentrations. Therefore, the author analyses some of the main principles on which merger control should be based and points out that merger control rules play very important role in achieving effective enforcement of optimal competition policy.

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-23
Author(s):  
Mark Jephcott ◽  
Ruth Allen

The powers of the CMA to obtain information about a merger and to prevent (or even unwind) integration of merging businesses pending the conclusion of an investigation into the competitive effects of the merger are an extremely important part of the UK's voluntary merger control regime, which has no mandatory notification or standstill obligations. The CMA has adopted a series of decisions over the last two years which indicate that it is taking an increasingly robust approach to compliance with notices and orders issued in this context. This is line with both the global trend towards tougher enforcement of procedural merger control rules, and the CMA's increasingly strict approach to enforcement of procedural rules in other contexts, such as antitrust investigations and market studies. This article explores this trend and highlights some key lessons from recent cases for merging parties and their advisers, focussing in particular on fines imposed for breach of interim measures and non-compliance with formal information requests. It also identifies some possible reasons for the toughening of the CMA's stance including, in particular, the interplay with the anticipated impact of Brexit.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-293
Author(s):  
Geeta Gouri

The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern — that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention — that competition benefits consumers — is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest.


Author(s):  
Thomas Greaney

This chapter examines the pivotal role of antitrust law in shaping institutional and professional arrangements in American healthcare. Historically, much of what can be broadly classified as “competition policy” in healthcare is found in the application of traditional antitrust principles to the conduct and structure of provider and payer organizations rather than in any sweeping statutory enactments. Although some landmark legislation removed some important barriers to the growth of managed care, the task of dealing with unacceptable practices and problematic market structures has been left to standard antitrust law. The chapter then addresses the interplay of administrative regulation with antitrust law enforcement, noting particularly those areas where the goals of antitrust are in tension with regulation and discussing the doctrinal accommodations made to deal with that problem. It also explores the critical and delicate balance antitrust law must strike in promoting competitively structured markets while taking into account market imperfections and hard-to-measure outcome variables.


2008 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-60
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Scordamaglia

The paper first endeavors to analyze the limits within which competition rules can be applied to the situations where the addressees of the measures taken by a competition authority are located outside the territory of the State; and second, whether a concentration of undertakings, initiated in the firm in the third countries, could be subjected to the EU jurisdiction. In particular, the author deals with the aspect of extraterritorial effect of the Merger Control Rules of the EU, as ensconced in Reg. 139/2004.


Author(s):  
Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt ◽  
Christian Wey

AbstractWe analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Maier-Rigaud ◽  
Ulrich Schwalbe ◽  
Felix Forster

AbstractThis article focusses on the non-coordinated effects of minority shareholdings in oligopolistic markets. It is demonstrated that minority shareholdings even when they fall below the usual thresholds can lead to a significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC) on a purely non-coordinated basis. This is particularly likely in a market with differentiated products, when a firm partially acquires shareholdings in its closest competitor and when the next best alternative products are only weak substitutes.


Author(s):  
Paul Stoneman ◽  
Eleonora Bartoloni ◽  
Maurizio Baussola

This chapter explores the factors that affect the firm’s decision to undertake product innovation. The discussion encompasses the driving forces that encourage product innovation, for example innovation by others or the ageing of an existing product line; however, the basic rationale is the search for profits. The chapter also addresses decisions about: the extent of innovation in general; horizontal and vertical product innovations separately; and the location of innovations in product space. The role of market structures in the product innovation decision, uncertainty in the innovating environment, and issues relating to emulation and copying are also addressed. Constraints to product innovation that survey data indicate are most important—innovation costs, risk and finance, and the availability of qualified labour—are also addressed.


Author(s):  
Yugank Goyal ◽  
Klaus Heine

AbstractWhy do informal markets resist formalizing, even when the gains of doing so outweigh its costs in the long run? While a number of responses to this question have been advanced, we discover that part of the reason could be located in the tacit knowledge (attributed to Polanyi, Hayek) embedded in the marketplace, on which market institutions run. This factor is not fully explored yet. Tacit (idiosyncratic, inarticulate, nonconscious) knowledge is acquired personally through experience and cannot be transferred or conveyed to anyone. This is the knowledge we use to act without knowing it in a propositional form. We present the case of one of India’s largest informal footwear cluster, located in the city of Agra. We show that informal markets, hinged on tacit knowledge, cannot evolve easily and therefore may remain locked-in, despite external pressures or incentives to formalize. The study shows that efforts to overcome informality and reaping the benefits of formalized market structures cannot be done without taking cognizance of the sticky intangible knowledge on which these markets rest.


2021 ◽  
pp. 016344372110158
Author(s):  
Opeyemi Akanbi

Moving beyond the current focus on the individual as the unit of analysis in the privacy paradox, this article examines the misalignment between privacy attitudes and online behaviors at the level of society as a collective. I draw on Facebook’s market performance to show how despite concerns about privacy, market structures drive user, advertiser and investor behaviors to continue to reward corporate owners of social media platforms. In this market-oriented analysis, I introduce the metaphor of elasticity to capture the responsiveness of demand for social media to the data (price) charged by social media companies. Overall, this article positions social media as inelastic, relative to privacy costs; highlights the role of the social collective in the privacy crises; and ultimately underscores the need for structural interventions in addressing privacy risks.


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