The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights on the Islamic Veil

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 531-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaella Nigro
Author(s):  
Claire Fenton-Glynn

This chapter provides a brief introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as it relates to children. Over the past 60 years, the ECtHR has developed a substantial and ever-growing body of case law concerning children, covering issues ranging from juvenile justice and physical integrity to immigration, education, and religion, as well as a code of family law which significantly expands the scope and influence of the ECHR. The chapter explains four key principles of interpretation (positive obligations, the living instrument doctrine, subsidiarity, and the margin of appreciation), as well as the Court’s use of international instruments.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 174-197
Author(s):  
Mark Hill ◽  
Katherine Barnes

Abstract The manifestation of religious beliefs under Article 9 the European Convention on Human Rights is not absolute but may be subject to prescribed limitations. This article discusses the nature and extent of those limitations, as interpreted in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights from its decision in Kokkinakis v. Greece up to the present. It contrasts the prescriptive text of the Article with its lose and inconsistent interpretation by the Court in Strasbourg. Particular attention is given to the criteria of “prescribed by law”, “necessary in a democratic society”, “public safety”, “public order, health or morals” and “the rights and freedoms of others”. It seeks to divine principles from the varied jurisprudence, particularly at its intersection with the Court’s illusory doctrine of margin of appreciation.


Author(s):  
Eva Brems

A reflection on the human rights of migrants in Europe cannot avoid the issue of racism. Resistance to immigration in Europe is fuelled to a large extent by resistance to the ‘otherness’ of migrants. More specifically, the ‘otherness’ that is most central to today’s debates on migration and integration in Europe is Islam. Thus, racism is commonly expressed as Islamophobia, and Islamophobia is both expressed in, and fuelled by, rights-restrictive rules that specifically target Islamic practices. The focus of the analysis in this chapter is on the messages the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is sending to national authorities regarding their approaches to multicultural conflicts over Islamic minority practices. This is situated in the framework of ‘positive subsidiarity’. It is argued that, even when the margin of appreciation is a wide one, the Court has a responsibility to offer guidance to states parties on three levels: substantive, procedural, and discursive. The chapter then explores the messages sent by the Court to states parties in the field of the restriction of Islamic minority practices. First it does so by comparing what is widely considered the Court’s ‘worst practice’ in this field—the face veil cases—with its ‘best practice’ in a different, but comparable field—the ‘gay propaganda’ cases. After that, the chapter continues the analysis on the basis of a broader case law corpus that includes all cases regarding the accommodation of Islamic practice in countries in which Islam is a minority religion.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 381-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Spielmann

AbstractThe doctrine of the national margin of appreciation is well established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In applying this essentially judge-made doctrine, the Court imposes self-restraint on its power of review, accepting that domestic authorities are best placed to settle a dispute. The areas in which the doctrine has most often been applied will be presented here, looking at various examples from case law. After a brief overview of the doctrine’s origin, the analysis will focus on the situations in which the margin has been allowed or denied. Does it relate merely to factual and domestic-law aspects of a case? What is the scope of the margin of appreciation when it comes to interpreting provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights? What impact does an interference (whether disproportionate or not) with a guaranteed right have on the margin allowed? Is there a second-degree or ‘reverse’ margin of appreciation, whereby discretionary powers can be distributed between executive and judicial authorities at domestic level? Lastly it is noteworthy that Protocol No 14, now ratified by all Council of Europe Member States, enshrines in Article 12—at least to some extent—an obligation to apply a margin of appreciation. One essential question remains: by allowing any margin of a certain width, is the European Court simply waiving its power of review or is it attributing responsibility to the domestic courts in the interest of a healthy subsidiarity?


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 73-99
Author(s):  
Mark Hill

The manifestation of religious beliefs under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights is not absolute but may be subject to prescribed limitations. This article discusses the nature and extent of those limitations, as interpreted in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights from its decision in Kokkinakis v. Greece up to the present. It contrasts the prescriptive text of the Article with its loose and inconsistent interpretation by the Court in Strasbourg. Particular attention is given to the criteria of ‘prescribed by law’, ‘necessary in a democratic society’, ‘public safety’, ‘public order, health or morals’ and ‘the rights and freedoms of others’. This article seeks to extract clear principles from the contradictory and confusing jurisprudence, particularly at its intersection with the Court’s illusory doctrine of margin of appreciation.


Author(s):  
Lara Redondo Saceda

El artículo 8 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos –que protege los derechos al respeto la vida privada y familiar, el domicilio y la correspondencia– se ha configurado en estos setenta años de Convenio como uno de los escenarios habituales del desarrollo del margen de apreciación nacional y la doctrina de las obligaciones positivas del Estado. Esto parece justificarse en el contenido y estructura de este artículo y en las restricciones y limitaciones al ejercicio de estos derechos establecidas por su párrafo segundo. En este marco, el objetivo de este artículo es analizar cuál ha sido el papel del artículo 8 CEDH en el desarrollo de estos estándares interpretativos y cómo ha influido en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights –which protects the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence– has been configured as a traditional place for the development of the margin of appreciation and the doctrine of State’s positive obligations. The scope and structure of this article and its limitation clause in the second paragraph seem to justify these developments. In this context, the objective of this article is to analyse the role of Article 8 ECHR in the development of these interpretative standards and its influence in the European Court of Human Rights case-law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 9-32
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Jasudowicz

The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in tax matters has developed in three dimensions. Firstly, it involved Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention with reference to “the payment of taxes”, viewed, notwithstanding the State’s wide margin of appreciation, in the light of the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions. Secondly, from the perspective of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Convention, tax disputes can be covered by the guarantees of a fair trial where the proceedings and sanctions, for example, concerning tax surcharges, are qualified in their autonomous Convention meaning as a “criminal charge” against the taxpayer. Moreover, despite its traditional case-law, in the last years the Court has seemed to allow the possibility of qualifying tax disputes as concerning “civilrights and obligations” Thirdly, on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, the Court has found violations of the prohibition “to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings” in the context of dual, i.e. tax (administrative) and penal, proceedings. The author critically assesses the Court judgment in the case of A. and B. v. Norway, in which the Court did not find a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. In the Norwegian case, the distinct administrative and penal proceedings were in fact merged, since the state introduced a system of integrated legal answers to taxpayers’ behavior. According to Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, expressing a dissenting opinion, the Court in this judgment wrongly changed its stance from pro persona to pro auctoritate, possibly forgetting that it is a court of humanrights, and not a pleader of raison d’Etat. Although the Court declared that it considers the Convention “as a whole”, and seeks to ensure the consistency of the Convention system and harmony of its provisions, it might have lost sight of ties existing between them. Taxpayers are also individual humansand have a title to human rights, thus tax disputes are those of a human rights nature. Understandably, the ECHR must persist as a Court of Human Rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (S1) ◽  
pp. S31-S54
Author(s):  
Margarita Markoviti

AbstractThis paper examines the impact of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions on the field of religion and education in Greece around the issues of the content and objectives of religious education, the exemption thereof, and religious symbols in school. The findings indicate that despite the relevance of ECtHR case law with the specific field in Greece, the Court's role in influencing such national debates is minimal. Drawing on empirical research and discourse analysis, the paper argues that this is due to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, apparently linked to strategic references to and varying interpretations of the Court's judgments; the unwillingness of actors to litigate in a potentially sensitive, lengthy, and costly procedure; and to a shared belief in the perceived primacy of constitutional provisions on religion and education that precludes the formation of structured mobilizations.


Author(s):  
Nussberger Angelika

This chapter examines the basic doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). ‘Doctrine’ is a word the Court would rather avoid. The Court has preferred to develop ‘formula’ as a basis for discussing all relevant issues, formula which are repeated again and again, developed further in manifold scenarios, used as argumentation patterns, allowing to arrive at differentiated solutions, formula often linked to specific cases for which they were originally invented. With about 20,000 judgments, the case-law is rich and all-embracing and gives a lot of illustrative examples of how to understand these formula. What is called ‘basic doctrine’ is therefore something very specific. It cannot be compared to stare decisis in the British tradition or theoretical models in German constitutional law. Originating from a conglomerate of different legal cultures, the ECtHR has developed not only its own style, but also its own jurisprudential approach. If there is a ‘doctrine’, it denies being one. Yet, the non-doctrinal doctrine is very influential and has created notions such as ‘margin of appreciation’ and ‘European consensus’ which convey a certain message of the Court's mission and are widely discussed and disputed.


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