scholarly journals Disciplinary Proceedings as an Instrument for Breaking the Rule of Law in Poland

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Gajda-Roszczynialska ◽  
Krystian Markiewicz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Council ◽  
Political Will ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Lower House ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Disciplinary System

Abstract This article advances the thesis that disciplinary proceedings may constitute a tool for breaking the rule of law in Poland. In 2017, as part of a package of legal changes to the judiciary, a disciplinary system was created in Poland to ensure that judges were subservient to the political will of the authorities. From the beginning, new disciplinary officers appointed by the Minister of Justice (the Prosecutor General) have targeted judges who disagree with unconstitutional changes to the judiciary. Disciplinary proceedings are by no means repressions that affect judges who demand that other authorities respect the rule of law in Poland. The article discusses, on a step by step basis, the practical mechanisms taken by the political authorities to break the rule of law in Poland. Particular attention is paid to the measures which have been taken concerning the judiciary. The article discusses the judgment of the CJEU on 19 November 2019 in combined cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18 and the implementing resolution of the combined Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of the Supreme Court on 23 January 2020 as well as the collapse of the rule of law in Poland from a practical perspective. The analysis of the recent events shows that after the so-called Muzzle Law (A bill amending the Act on the Organization of Ordinary Courts, the Act on the Supreme Court and the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary was submitted on 12 December 2019, and then voted on by the parliamentary majority in the lower house of the Polish Parliament (Sejm) on 20 December 2019.) came into force, the application of the resolution of the combined Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of the Supreme Court on 23 January 2020 implementing the CJEU judgment in the joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18 of 19 November 2019 can be and, in fact, is penalized by further disciplinary proceedings, which constitutes a real threat to the already weakened rule of law. Institutions and, above all, judges who are safeguarding the rule of law are being destroyed.

The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies

1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Public Life ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Independent Judiciary ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Harsh Criticism

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.

DEKADENSI PEMILIHAN HAKIM AGUNG OLEH DPR RI

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Institutional Status ◽  
The Government

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.

The oath of a judge – oath of office and judicial symbol

2021 ◽  
pp. 85-92
Author(s):  
O. Kravchuk ◽  
I. Ostashchuk
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Symbolic Action ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Conscious Choice ◽  
Justice Process ◽  
The Moment ◽  
First Time

The oath of a judge as an oath of office and as an element of judicial symbolism is considered in the article. The oath of a judge belongs to the categories of oaths of office, taken by an official upon taking office. At the same time, it belongs to the judicial oaths used in the justice process and is an element of judicial symbols. The oath of a judge as an oath of office symbolizes the endowment of a judge as an official by the state (judicial) power, the moment of his acquisition of powers (it is the inauguration ceremony), and the duty of a judge as an official to perform his duties properly. The oath of a judge as a judicial symbol represents a public and solemn obligation of the judge to exercise a fair trial in all its manifestations, including: independence and impartiality of the court, adversarial proceedings, equality of arms, and the rule of law. The judge takes the oath in a solemn atmosphere in the presence of senior officials (in Ukraine – in the presence of the President of Ukraine). It is an important ritual – a symbol of giving a person judicial power. The oath itself is a symbolic action of conscious choice of responsible and impartial observance of the law in the professional functions of realization of the rule of law for the good of all people. The coronavirus pandemic has shown that gathering a large number of people in one room can be problematic, so the oath ceremony was held even outdoors. It is stated that holding a ceremony in one of the judicial bodies, for example, in the premises of the Supreme Court or (subject to quarantine restrictions) in the territory of the Supreme Court may symbolize the independence of the judiciary and each judge from other branches of power. The peculiarity of the oath of a judge in Ukraine is its one-time nature. It should be taken only by a person first appointed to the position of a judge. In case of an appointment or transfer to another court, the judge shall not take the oath again. In this aspect, the oath of a judge is similar to the oath of a civil servant, which is taken only by persons recruited for the first time.

Canadian Exclusion Jurisprudence post-Febles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Molly Joeck
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Asylum Seekers ◽  
Refugee Status ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Refugee Protection ◽  
Refugee Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
International Refugee Law

Abstract This article examines the state of Canadian refugee law since the decision of the Supreme Court in Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2014] 3 SCR 431. Drawing upon an analysis of a set of decisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board, the administrative tribunal tasked with refugee status determination in Canada, the article seeks to determine whether administrative decision makers are heeding the guidance of Febles when excluding asylum seekers from refugee protection on the basis of serious criminality pursuant to article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. In doing so, it examines the controversy around article 1F(b) since its inception across various jurisdictions and amongst academic commentators, situating Febles within that controversy in order to demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s reluctance to clearly set out the purpose underlying article 1F(b) is in step with a longstanding tendency to understand the provision as serving a gatekeeping function, that prevents criminalized non-citizens from obtaining membership in our society. It argues that by omitting to set out a clear and principled standard by which asylum seekers can be excluded from refugee protection pursuant to article 1F(b), the Supreme Court failed to live up to a thick understanding of the rule of law. It concludes by calling for a reassertion of the rule of law into exclusion decision making, both nationally and internationally, in order to ensure that the legitimacy of the international refugee law regime is maintained.

scholarly journals KEPASTIAN HUKUM MENGENAI PERBEDAAN ANTARA PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH AGUNG DAN PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI TERKAIT PENCALONAN PERSEORANGAN PESERTA PEMILU ANGGOTA DPD

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasji . ◽  
Cinthia .
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Law And Justice

Indonesia is a country based on the law (rechstaat) whose basis is stated in Article 1 Paragraph (3) of the UUD NRI 1945. The essential principles of the rule of law based on Article 24 Paragraph (1) of the UUD NRI 1945 are the guarantee of the organizer of the power of an independent judicial institution without interference from other parties to hold a court to uphold law and justice. Ideally, the results of the two institutions' decisions do not cause problems in society. However, the results of the decisions of the two institutions are still found differently regarding the issue of nominating individual participants in the members of the Regional Representatives Council. Any other way, the results of the Constitutional Court ruling prohibited members of the Regional Representatives Council who were still in the position of administrators of political parties. Meanwhile, the decision of the Supreme Court allows candidates for members of the Regional Representatives Council who are still in the position of managing political parties. In this study, the researcher will examine the differences between the Supreme Court's decision and the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council by using normative legal methods and conducting interviews as supporting data. The results of the study revealed that based on the legal basis and authority of the institution, the verdict that had legal certainty regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council election was the decision of the Constitutional Court.

Francis Karioko Muruatetu v. Republic

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 707-713
Author(s):  
Jacquelene Mwangi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Death Sentence ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Trial Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Mandated

The decision of the Supreme Court of Kenya (Court) in Francis Karioko Muruatetu and Another v. Republic (Muruatetu), finding the mandatory nature of the death penalty unconstitutional, represents not only a victory for human rights in Africa but also the transformative capacity of contemporary constitutions in Africa and the growing assertiveness of African judiciaries. In the judgment, the Court held that the mandatory death penalty is “out of sync with the progressive Bill of Rights” in Kenya's 2010 Constitution (para. 64) and an affront to the rule of law. The Court also relied on global death penalty jurisprudence to find the mandatory death sentence “harsh, unjust and unfair” (para. 48). Consequently, the Court mandated that all trial courts conduct a pre-sentencing hearing to determine whether the death penalty is deserved. The Court's judgment could spell the end of the mandatory death penalty in Kenya after almost 120 years on the statute books.

scholarly journals Tapping the Potential of Senate-Driven Reform: Proposals to Limit the Powers of the Senate

2015 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Heard
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
The Political ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Political Will ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Democratic System

In the immediate aftermath of the 2014 Senate Reform Reference, there was considerable talk about the limitations that the Supreme Court had put on Senate reform. Some political leaders expressed frustration and declared that we are left with the status quo. But, that view both misunderstands what the Court said and underestimates what can be achieved through non-constitutional means. There is much that can be done simply with the political will to change the Senate situation without resorting to constitutional amendment; senators already have the power to effect some serious reform from within. This paper focuses on an unorthodox suggestion: that substantive reforms might be achieved through changes to the Rules of the Senate governing its legislative process. With some changes to both the legislative and appointment processes, substantial improvements to the Senate are both possible and achievable. The result would be a Senate better able to perform its intended function as a chamber of sober second thought. It would also answer the most serious concerns about an appointed Senate’s role in a modern democratic system.

scholarly journals The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law

1961 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 531
Author(s):  
Paul G. Kauper
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court
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