Documenting changes in the physical condition of the U.S. Declaration of independence, constitution, and bill of rights

1988 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 439-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan R. Calmes
Author(s):  
Danny M. Adkison ◽  
Lisa McNair Palmer

This chapter examines Article II of the Oklahoma constitution. Compared with other states in existence when Oklahoma’s constitution was written, Oklahoma’s contained a moderate list of rights. With few exceptions, these rights are similar, if not identical, to those found in the U.S. Constitution. The first two sections are theoretical statements concerning the role of government. These express ideas similar to those found in the Declaration of Independence. Indeed, Sections 1 and 2 explicitly recognize that the government is founded on popular consent and may be changed when the people consent to such changes. Among the “rights” not in the U.S. Constitution are: prohibition of imprisonment for debt; indictment by information; procedures for punishing for contempt; and regulations concerning the availability of corporate records to public inspection.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Risse

AbstractIn July 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo launched a Commission on Unalienable Rights, charged with a reexamination of the scope and nature of human rights–based claims. From his statements, it seems that Pompeo hopes the commission will substantiate—by appeal to the U.S. Declaration of Independence and to natural law theory—three key conservative ideas: (1) that there is too much human rights proliferation, and once we get things right, social and economic rights as well as gender emancipation and reproductive rights will no longer register as human rights; (2) that religious liberties should be strengthened under the human rights umbrella; and (3) that the unalienable rights that should guide American foreign policy neither need nor benefit from any international oversight. I aim to show that despite Pompeo's framing, the Declaration of Independence, per se, is of no help with any of this, whereas evoking natural law is only helpful in ways that reveal its own limitations as a foundation for both human rights and foreign policy in our interconnected age.


Author(s):  
John B. Nann ◽  
Morris L. Cohen

This introductory chapter provides an overview of legal history research. An attorney might conduct legal history research if the law at question in a legal dispute is very old: the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights are well over two hundred years old. Historical research also comes into play when the question at issue is what the law was at a certain time in the past. Ultimately, law plays an important part in the political and social history of the United States. As such, researchers interested in almost every aspect of American life will have occasion to use legal materials. The chapter then describes the U.S. legal system and legal authority, and offers six points to consider in approaching a historical legal research project.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Tamir

In the two decades since Israel’s constitutional revolution, the Basic Laws have come to enjoy normative supremacy and demonstrate efficacy by enabling judicial review of the legislative and the executive branches. Yet, they have not assumed an integrative role in the Israeli society. In terms of their substance, the Basic Laws are incomplete in scope. In terms of the procedure leading up to their enactment, they lack public legitimacy. This can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that the Supreme Court was the key political actor responsible for retroactively upgrading the Basic Laws from regular laws to constitutional norms. This paper argues that the only document in the history of Israel possessing the potential to fulfill an integrative role was the Declaration of Independence. Due to its intrinsic ‘transitional’ characteristics and the unique socio-political circumstances surrounding its drafting, this founding document could and should have been perceived as a transitional constitution. This transitional constitution established Israel’s basic values and opened the way for an incremental constitutional process that continued with the enactment of the Basic Laws, and that will culminate only with the drafting of a full constitution. However, owing in part to the narrow conception of transitional justice, the Declaration was never interpreted as such. This historical error could have been corrected in 1994 as the identical principle clause of Israel’s two Human Rights Basic Laws—which constitute Israel’s (partial) Bill of Rights—declared that the human rights regime in Israel should be “respected in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence”. Yet, this opportunity was once again not seized. This failure carries unfortunate consequences for the Israeli constitutional regime since unlike the Basic Laws, which enjoy formal normative supremacy yet nonetheless suffer from legitimacy deficiencies, the Declaration bears the potential to fulfill an integrative constitutional function.


2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 446-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Tushnet

The idea of rights has been central to U.S. political and constitutional discourse from the beginning. The Declaration of Independence appealed to “inalienable rights,” and the first amendments to the Constitution were universally described as a bill of rights. Yet, something distinctive appears to have happened to the idea of rights over the course of the twentieth century. By the end of the century, rights-claims were being asserted in locations, such as schools and prisons, where they had not been found at the century's beginning, and they were being asserted on behalf of claimants, such as fetuses and new arrivals to the United States, who were outside the domain of rights earlier. Even the content of rights-claims changed. Much of the Warren Court's work completed a constitutional agenda outlined, albeit unclearly, in the 1940s and early 1950s as part of the New Deal's constitutional vindication. The Warren Court added something new—an emphasis on personal autonomy—to the New Deal's concerns for fairness in the political process.


Author(s):  
Jeff Broadwater

Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, and James Madison, “Father of the Constitution,” were two of the most important Founders of the United States as well as the closest of political allies. Yet historians have often seen a tension between the idealistic rhetoric of the Declaration and the more pedestrian language of the Constitution. Moreover, to some, the adoption of the Constitution represented a repudiation of the democractic values of the Revolution. In this book, Jeff Broadwater explores the evolution of the constitutional thought of these two seminal American figures, from the beginning of the American Revolution through the adoption of the Bill of Rights. In explaining how the two political compatriots could have produced such seemingly dissimilar documents but then come to a common constitutional ground, Broadwater reveals how their collaboration ---and their disagreements---influenced the full range of constitutional questions during this early period of the American republic.


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