The great disorder and the birth of the East Asian sovereign state system

2011 ◽  
pp. 226-258
Author(s):  
Andrew Phillips
Author(s):  
Anuschka Tischer

The Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648 in Münster (Germany), ended the Thirty Years War, which started with an anti-Habsburg revolt in Bohemia in 1618 but became an entanglement of different conflicts concerning the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, religion, and the state system of Europe. This contest was a civil “German war,” but foreign powers played a crucial role. The Peace of Westphalia ended with the signing of two treaties between the empire and the new great powers, Sweden and France, and settled the conflicts inside the empire with their guarantees. A new electorate was established for the exiled son of the revolt’s leader, the elector Palatine. Bavaria kept the electorate that it had been given for its support of the emperor Ferdinand II during the revolt. This compromise in 1648 meant a change of the empire’s fundamental Golden Bull of 1356 and was a symbol that all conflicts occurring since 1618 were resolved and that those who made peace did not avoid radical cuts and invented fresh ideas in order to make peace. Catholics and Protestants (now including Calvinists as well as Lutherans) accepted each other. Several regulations guaranteed their balance: 1624 was declared the “normal year” of any territory’s denomination, minorities were tolerated or had a right to emigrate, and no one could be forced to convert any longer. The Peace of Westphalia is regarded as a milestone in the development toward tolerance and secularization. This settlement also strengthened the imperial Estates: they could enter into foreign alliances and decide important matters, such as peace and war, along with the emperor. The suspected ambition of the Habsburgs for a “universal monarchy” was thereby controlled, in particular because the Franco-Spanish negotiations in Münster did not bring peace between France and Spain and left open conflict areas, such as Lorraine. Moreover, France and Sweden got territorial “satisfaction,” especially in Alsace and Pomerania. The Peace of Westphalia also confirmed the legal independence of the Swiss Confederation, whereas by a separate peace with Spain, in Münster, the United Provinces of the Netherlands officially became a sovereign state after eighty years of war. The Peace of Westphalia was crucial in German and international history. Its precise role in the European state system and international law is, however, subject to controversy, such as the debate over the “Westphalian System” in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Controversies about the Peace of Westphalia are not new. The history of its reception and interpretation is as long as the history of its emergence. Unquestionably, though, the negotiations were a milestone in diplomacy and peacemaking. Sources on the peace are most valuable for always changing methods and perspectives of history. Research on the Peace of Westphalia increased enormously with its 350th anniversary in 1998 and its several conferences and exhibitions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
pp. 619-653
Author(s):  
M. L. Sehgal

In 1954, India did a ‘Himalayan Blunder’ of having fallen into China’s trap of accepting Tibet to be a part of China. In ‘1962 Indo- China War’, China’s biggest argument of its having claim over Ladakh was that since Ladakh was a part of Tibet and thus belongs to China. But the historical perspective, altogether, contradicts it. Having annexed Tibet and forcefully occupying Aksai Chin, there was no looking back for China; be it in 1965, 1967, 1987, 2013, 2017; and now in 2020. Every time, the Chinese rulers would invent one lie or the other. Xi Jinping, the present Chinese President, imbibes the qualities of both- Mao Tse Tung, Chinese ideologue, a protagonist of the ‘Expansionist Ideology’ and the philosopher- Sun Yat-sen who wrote “The Art of War” and believed that“The greatest victory is that which requires no battle”. Xi Jinping is an expert in both. He did ‘land grabbing’ not just of India and Tibet rather China has 17 territorial disputes with its neighbours, on land and sea. He has also applied ‘Debt- Diplomacy’; mostly on the nascent, economically weak, fragile democracies to subjugate them without firing a bullet. What to talk of entrapping India’s immediate friendly neighbours under his ‘Debt-net’ by using it as a political ideology called “String of Pearls” (weaning away friendly Indian neighbours with the money power), China has loaned over $ 1.5 trillion(5% of its GDP) to more than 150 countries that make it a bigger lender than even W.B. and IMF that compares it well with the USA. China's stance along LAC fits well with a larger pattern of the ‘Expansionist Ideology of Mao. Modi, unlike Nehru, chose to follow Multi-Alignment and befriended countries both the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the South China Sea lying in the periphery of China by garlanding China with a ‘Necklace of Diamonds’ which gave India the strategic access and fast-developing routes to Central Asians, East Asian and South-East Asian countries. Moreover, the USA, India, Australia and Japan formed ‘The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue QUAD’ in case of any emergency. India’s ‘Look East Policy; has paid it the dividends with the USA openly playing the role of a deterrent to China in South China; Australia gave a military base in Cocos Islands, France supplied Rafales and good-humoured Russia, unlike the Russia of 1962, is supplying India with the much needed Military pieces of Equipment while refusing the S-400 to China. The suspected role of China in the pandemic COVID-19 has made it ‘a persona non- grata’ in the eyes of many countries. The anti-democracy Security Law in Hong Kong and the USA’s open support to the ‘Independent Tibet’ and recognizing ‘Taiwan as a Sovereign State’ has threatened ‘One China Principle’ which has resulted in the taming China by India.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Phillips

Since 1919, world leaders have sought to uphold and advance international order by sponsoring a succession of global security hierarchies, understood as authoritative arrangements that are global in scope and dedicated to mitigating international security challenges. These hierarchies have progressively broadened in the inclusivity of their security referents. Explicitly racist and civilizational answers to the question ‘security for whom’ have given way to more cosmopolitan visions of security hierarchy. The scope of the challenges these hierarchies have aimed to mitigate (‘security from what’) has also broadened, alongside the intrusiveness of the measures (‘security through which means’) licenced to manage them. The progression towards more inclusive, ambitious and intrusive global security hierarchies has nevertheless evolved in tension with the parallel globalization of both nationalism and the sovereign state system. These countervailing influences – in conjunction with the recent worldwide resurgence of illiberal forces – now threaten the prospective longevity of today’s United Nation (UN)-centric cosmopolitan global security hierarchy.


Author(s):  
Salvatore Babones

China’s economic rise has been accompanied by the maturation and increasing professionalization of academic disciplines in China, including the discipline of international relations. The emergence of an indigenous international relations discipline in China has led to an intense debate about the development of a distinctive “Chinese School” that draws on China’s intellectual traditions and historical record to inspire the development of new international relations theories. While the debate continues, the outlines of a Chinese School are becoming clear. The Chinese School of international relations theory draws on Confucian concepts of relationality and hierarchy to theorize the character of the relations between countries rather than focus on the attributes of countries themselves. It also highlights the historical existence of interstate systems organized in a hub-and-spoke pattern around a single, central state. The premodern East Asian world-system in which China was embedded and classical Chinese scholars developed their ideas was a central state system. Premodern China was always by far the dominant state in East Asia, with the result that international relations in the East Asian world-system exhibited a hub-and-spoke pattern centered on China, as in the tributary system of the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Moreover the Confucian worldview that ultimately came to be China’s state ideology served in effect as the governing moral code of the system as a whole. The combination of a central state structure with a universal moral code created what in Chinese is called a tianxia (“all under heaven”), a world-embracing system of governance centered on a particular state, in this case China. In a tianxia system international relations tend to be hierarchical because of the clear power differentials between the central state and other states. They can be either expressive (showing social solidarity) or purely instrumental, depending on the stance taken by the central state. Chinese School international relations theorists tend to assume that the “best” (most stable, most peaceful, most prosperous, etc.) world-system configuration would be a tianxia system dominated by expressive rationality and centered on China, but this is no more self-evident than the widely held Western preference for a liberal, rules-based order. What Chinese School international relations theory really offers the discipline is a new set of concepts that can be applied to the theorization and empirical analysis of today’s millennial world-system. This postmodern interstate system appears to be a central state system with a universal moral code, an American tianxia based on individualism. The historical Confucian Chinese tianxia may be the best precedent for modeling this system.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur A. Stein

Current economic and political developments spotlight the relationship between domestic and global governance and the impact of globalization on both. A key question is whether a sovereign state system, democratic governments, and an integrated global marketplace can coexist. The paper assesses analytic materialist arguments for their incompatibility and the key assumptions on which they rest. The paper describes the extant pressures operating to limit each of the three: how sovereignty and democracy work to constrain globalization, how globalization and sovereignty generate a democratic deficit, and how globalization and democracy lead to limitations upon, and even the transcendence of, sovereignty. How to make the three compatible, and failing that, which facet to restrain, characterizes political contestation in a globalizing age. Global and domestic governance reflect the need to reconcile the combined implications of globalization, sovereignty, and democracy, and to do so by restraining, limiting, or transforming one or more of these features.


1980 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 339-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Falk

This paper explores and identifies “creative space” in the struggle against militarization. Taking into account the political structures and restraints of different polities, the author examines normative initiatives that challenge the root assumptions of militarization and that can be linked to actual social forces working for principled demilitarization. The author points to the primacy of the Third System in this effort. He argues that, at the present time, the First System (the state system and its support infrastructure) is supportive of the underlying logic of militarization, that the Second System (the UN and regional international institutes) being a dependency of the First System is unable to implement demilitarization initiatives, and that only the Third System (represented by people acting individually and collectively through voluntary institutions) is able to sustain normative initiatives of consequence to demilitarization. Normative initiatives relevant to demilitarization undertaken in the Third System can aid in mobilizing effective opposition to militarization in all three systems by altering the normative climate, thereby producing new “creative space” for political innovation. Finally, the author provides examples of the most promising Third System normative initiatives at the global, regional; sovereign state and individual levels.


Grotiana ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 252-276
Author(s):  
B.S. Chimni

Abstract The times of Grotius were a period of transition from a feudal to a capitalist order in Europe, ushering in new thinking on subjects such as human nature, commerce, state, war, and colonialism. In articulating his views, Grotius was not seeking to shape the law of nations for all times but to recast it in order to respond to the problems encountered by Holland (or the United Provinces), and more generally European nations, in the ongoing transition. In the backdrop of a brief discussion of the ‘Grotian tradition’, this article distinguishes different uses of the term ‘Grotian Moment’ and contends that ideally the term should be reserved for capturing developments that profoundly impact both the ‘logic of territory’ and the ‘logic of capital’ with the law of nations playing a significant role. While decolonization saw the expansion of the sovereign state system and certainly was a setback to the global accumulation of capital, the law of nations did not pro-actively support that process. Furthermore, efforts by postcolonial nations to bring about the transformation of the colonial legal order did not succeed making less meaningful the characterization of the decolonization process as a ‘Grotian Moment’.


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