MISSILE DEFENSES AND STRATEGIC STABILITY IN ASIA: EVIDENCE FROM SIMULATIONS

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Jaganath Sankaran

Abstract The contention over the quantity and quality of regional missile defenses forward-deployed by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region animates much of the US–China disagreement about strategic stability. The Chinese argue that the deployed assets exceed reasonable defensive requirements and suggest that if these missile-defense deployments continue, they will be forced to increase the size of their nuclear arsenal. In disagreement, the United States claims that regional missile defenses are defensive by design, limited in scope, and necessary to defeat a North Korean missile campaign. In this article, a series of simulation experiments were developed to empirically test these opposing arguments over missile defenses and strategic stability. The simulations indicate that current deployments are necessary for defense and proportional to the threat. The analysis also argues that current deployments do not possess the ability to alter the US–China strategic nuclear balance significantly. The article concludes with a discussion of other subjective aspects of national security that may explain Chinese concerns and explore possible ways to reassure China.

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Mohamed Kamal ◽  
Khalid Hashim Mohammed

The Middle East region is no longer enjoys the relative importance for the United States. This was due to the massive discoveries of Shale oil in the United States. Many analysts believe that such discovery led to the decline of the US interest in the Middle East and shifting the orientation towards Asia because of the growing importance of the Southeast Asia in the global economy. The United States, in return, has re-defined the role and the size of involvement in the Middle East by adopting a new strategy based on reducing economic and military consequences resulting from the direct investment in the region, which is rejected by US public opinion.


Author(s):  
Ivan Desiatnikov ◽  

The article focuses on the analysis of US-Vietnam relations during the period from 1945 to 1975. The aim of the article is to trace the changes that took place in the US-Vietnam relationship over that period, to identify the factors that influenced them, as well as the approaches used by the heads of the countries to tackle their foreign policy objectives in the region. The author traces the evolution of US policy in Vietnam pursued by Presidents H. Truman, D. Eisenhower, J. Kennedy, L. Johnson and R. Nixon. The United States had diametrically opposed position on relations with the Vietnamese governments, namely, confrontation and military conflict with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and cooperation, military and economic aid to the Republic of Vietnam. The author concludes that the US attitude towards Vietnam was determined by the international situation at that time, including the beginning of the Cold War. The policies of Presidents D. Eisenhower and J. Kennedy were to restrain the expansion of the Communist bloc's sphere of influence. The direct involvement of the US military in the Vietnam conflict, initiated by L. Johnson, pursued the goal of enhancing the prestige of the United States in the global confrontation with the USSR. The split between the Soviet Union and China was used by the US to get out of the Vietnam War and mend relations with China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region. Instead, the Republic of Vietnam, which had been the "junior partner" of the United States, was left to its fate.


Author(s):  
D. V. Suslov

Both Russia and the United States consider the Asia-Pacific as the center of the world economy and politics and assume the active presence in the region crucial for their security and economic development. They did not have such sharp contradictions there as in Europe or in the post-Soviet space. Moreover, some of their interests in the Asia-Pacific Region coincide – such as preventing Chinese hegemony. In this regard, the Russian-American dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific could be an important pillar of the positive agenda of their relations and a factor in their sustainability. Due to foreign policy inertia, the inflexibility of the agenda of Russian-American relations and the inability of the parties to go beyond the usual pattern, such a dialogue has not even begun. Both sides demonstrated strategic myopia. This weakened the resilience of US-Russian relations in the face of new challenges and accelerated their deterioration and disruption to a new confrontation. The Asia-Pacific has become another theater of the US-Russian systemic confrontation. However, it is in the interest of bothRussia and the United States to separate relations in this region from their general confrontation. This will create favorable conditions for Russia to build a balanced partnership system in the Asia-Pacific, which is necessary to consolidate its role as an independent global great power. In addition, the Russian-American dialogue on the Asia-Pacific, or at least the weakening of their confrontation in this region, will reduce its polarization and prevent tensions between the US and its Asian allies and partners.


Author(s):  
Evgeny Zvedre

The USA considers missile potentials of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea as the main sources of threats to their national security. In the early 2000s following the withdrawal from the Soviet-American ABM Treaty the US began to deploy a global ballistic missile defense system to protect their “homeland, US forces abroad and its allies” from potential and real threats. The set of basic elements of a multi-layer ballistic missile defense is generally the same, its architecture is always adapted to the local conditions of the regions of deployment and specific tasks. Their common designation is the ability to work as subsystems within an integrated, global in scope antiballistic missile defense system controlled by the United States. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is actively engaging its regional allies Australia, South Korea and Japan in a joint effort to build-up ABM capabilities while simultaneously increasing its military-strategic presence in the region. Moscow strongly opposes the program considering it as potential threat to the effectiveness of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and undermining strategic stability and considers emergence the ballistic missile subsystems in Europe and the Asian-Pacific Region as a direct threat to its security. US ABM policy provokes the accelerated development by China and the DPRK of ballistic missile delivery systems, encourages Russia to create new weapon systems that are guaranteed to be able to overcome any existing and future missile defense.


Author(s):  
J. Y. Parshkova

The article analyses military and technical cooperation of the United States and APAC. After the successful implementation of the first phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), adopted in September 2009, the United States began to develop a similar plan for the Asia-Pacific region - Asia-Pacific Adaptive Approach. The ultimate goal of such large-scale missile defense deployment is to convince the adversaries that the use of ballistic missiles is useless in military terms and that any attack on the United States and its allies is doomed to failure. The United States are developing military cooperation with its allies and partner countries in the Asia-Pacific region, excluding interests of China and Russia. That may only exacerbate a struggle for power between the three world largest countries and lead to negative consequences - involvement in the arms race.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
H.D.P. Envall

Japan has been a strong supporter of America’s ‘pivot’, or ‘rebalance’, to the Asia-Pacific. Why has it responded in such a way? Japan’s established position in the region naturally makes it a keen supporter of the status quo and thus of the US-led order. Yet this does not fully explain Japan’s support. This article contends that to understand Japan’s position, it is necessary to more closely consider how Japan views the rebalance’s probable strategic benefits and costs. In fact, increasingly difficult Sino-Japanese relations have led Japan to reassess such costs and benefits, with Japan becoming more anxious to ensure that the United States continues to provide strategic reassurance to the region, even if this means that Japan is required to restructure its own security role in return. In turn, Japan’s security restructuring has important implications not only for its national security but also for wider regional stability.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph A. Cossa ◽  
Brad Glosserman ◽  
Michael A. McDevitt ◽  
Nirav Patel ◽  
James Przystup ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda J. Bilmes

AbstractThe United States has traditionally defined national security in the context of military threats and addressed them through military spending. This article considers whether the United States will rethink this mindset following the disruption of the Covid19 pandemic, during which a non-military actor has inflicted widespread harm. The author argues that the US will not redefine national security explicitly due to the importance of the military in the US economy and the bipartisan trend toward growing the military budget since 2001. However, the pandemic has opened the floodgates with respect to federal spending. This shift will enable the next administration to allocate greater resources to non-military threats such as climate change and emerging diseases, even as it continues to increase defense spending to address traditionally defined military threats such as hypersonics and cyberterrorism.


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