scholarly journals The conflict between market competition and worker solidarity: moving from consumer to a citizen welfare standard in competition law

Legal Studies ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Firat Cengiz

Abstract This paper critically investigates the law and economics of competition law enforcement in conflicts between workers and employers in the EU and the US. The conflict between worker solidarity and market competition attracts significant public attention due to the legal conundrum facing precariously employed gig workers. This paper reveals that in light of the strict consumer welfare standard underlying competition rules, competition law has become an overall disciplining mechanism impeding collective worker action beyond the limited case of the gig economy. Using a holistic theoretical framework comprising of neoclassical and Marxist exploitation theories, the paper shows that sound economic analysis justifies resolving the competition–solidarity conflict in favour of solidarity. After showing that the consumer welfare standard overlooks the idiosyncratic qualities of labour as a ‘fictitious’ commodity, the paper offers an original and inclusive ‘citizen welfare’ standard that takes into consideration how anti-competitive behaviour affects workers as well as consumers. As a result, the paper also contributes to the post-2008 debate on whether and how competition law could contribute to equality by shedding light on competition law's treatment of workers and their welfare.

2019 ◽  
pp. 99-130
Author(s):  
Anu Bradford

Chapter 4 discusses competition law, which offers one of the most prominent examples of the EU’s global regulatory hegemony. This chapter first introduces the key aspects of EU competition law. It then explains why the EU has chosen to build an extensive regulatory capacity in this area, illustrating how competition law forms a critical dimension of the EU’s broader, single market program. Following that, it offers examples of the de facto and de jure Brussels Effects pertaining to competition regulation. These examples illustrate that the de jure Brussels Effect has been extensive. At the same time, the occurrence of the de facto Brussels Effect often turns to the question of non-divisibility, at times enabling while at times limiting the global effect of EU competition rules.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 11-31
Author(s):  
Sofia Oliveira Pais

Competition law sets limits on the exercise of intellectual property rights by dominant companies, namely in cases involving standard essential patents (SEPs). This article will examine the framework for SEP owners’ right to seek an injunction, discussing competitive problems that such situations may cause as well as the solutions adopted by the European Institutions, comparing them with the US and Japanese approach, and finally reflecting upon the opportunity for a new test for a new type of abuse. Although the three legal orders – US, EU and Japan – apply different laws establishing a general presumption against injunctions in SEPs encumbered with FRAND commitments, their goal is the same: to protect the interest of the SEP holder to obtain a remuneration without an abusive recourse to injunctions. I will argue that, in the EU, the Huawei case created a new test for a new type of abuse, improving the comprehensibility and certainty for the companies involved in standardization across Europe and allowing the harmonization of national judicial solutions regarding the seeking of injunctions in the SEPs context. In spite of some uncertainties, the new test clarifies the role that competition rules should play in cases of abuses by SEPs owners


Author(s):  
Lavinia Brancusi

This chapter discusses possible negative effects on market competition resulting from registration and exercise of NTTMs. A first insight into EU judicial precedents dealing with trademarks reveals the risk of different practices violating competition rules. A following inquiry from a “law and economics” approach emphasizes certain competition concerns characteristic of NTTMs. The focal point concerns the issue of product substitutability, with a consideration as to whether competition law perspective may be of some use for trademark law, especially for functionality cases featuring NTTMs. After articulating the need of applying a functionality test based on product delineation and an assessment of substitutable alternatives, separate remarks discuss market definition in competition law underlining cases of narrowly defined markets because of branding strategies. The study advocates the use of methods and proofs modeled on those applied in competition law for examining the registrability and resolution of conflicts related to NTTMs.


Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi

‘The legal framework’ outlines the key competition provisions currently in the US and EU. Like in most other jurisdictions, EU and US laws include competition provisions that are used to address antitrust violations such as anti-competitive agreements or abuse of monopoly power. They also include laws dealing with proposed mergers and acquisitions. The US Antitrust Law prohibits contracts and agreements between two or more individuals or entities in restraint of trade or commerce. Meanwhile, EU competition law prohibits agreements between ‘undertakings’ that have, as their object or effect, the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition, and affect trade between the EU member states.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1019-1055
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter deals with four issues. First it will briefly examine three sectors of the economy that are wholly or partly excluded from EU competition law, namely nuclear energy, military equipment and agriculture; the special regime that once existed for coal and steel products under the former European Coal and Steel Community (‘the ECSC’) Treaty is also mentioned in passing. Secondly, it will explain the application of the EU competition rules apply to the transport sector. Thirdly, the chapter will consider the specific circumstances of four so-called ‘regulated industries’, electronic communications, post, energy and water, where a combination of legislation, regulation and competition law seek to promote competition. Last, but by no means least, the current debate concerning digital platforms is discussed where it is likely that ex ante regulatory rules will be introduced, both in the EU and the UK, to address concerns about anti-competitive conduct and a tendency towards the monopolisation of markets.


Author(s):  
Muchlinski Peter T

This chapter studies competition law (antitrust law in US terminology), which protects competition to maximize consumer welfare. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) may use their market power to distort competitive conditions. Unlike purely domestic firms, MNEs can do this in a transnational context. Therefore, regulating MNE competition involves not only substantive rules but also jurisdictional questions which have led to extraterritoriality conflicts. The chapter then examines the competition issues arising from the market power of MNEs operating global networks of production and distribution in often concentrated markets. It also assesses whether competition law should control MNE entry and establishment to preserve the national economy from harmful foreign competition, involving issues of industrial policy and national security. Moreover, MNE operations challenge the hitherto predominantly national approach to competition regulation. To date, there has been little progress towards global competition rules, but it remains a worthwhile question, especially in the context of sustainable development, which has been introduced into competition policy debates in recent years.


Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne

This chapter sketches the history and functions of the EU and its institutions in order to set the EU competition rules in context. It then describes the competition provisions themselves and outlines the way in which the rules are applied and enforced, including the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 under Regulation 1/2003, the control of mergers with a European dimension under Regulation 139/2004, public enforcement by the national competition authorities of the Member States, and the role of private enforcement. It discusses the position and powers of the European Commission, particularly the role of the Competition Directorate General (DG Comp); the powers of the EU Courts; the significance of fundamental rights and the general principles of EU law in competition cases; the application of competition rules to particular sectors of the economy; and the application of the EU rules to the EEA.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 368-398
Author(s):  
Fabrizio Esposito ◽  
Giovanni Tuzet

Abstract This article moves from the premise that a bilateral relationship between law and economics requires the contribution of the theory of legal argumentation. The article shows that, to be legally relevant, economic consequences have to be incorporated into interpretive arguments. In this regard, the jurisprudential preface strategy proposed by Craswell goes in the right direction, but begs the question of why the legally relevant consequences have to be assessed in terms of total welfare maximization instead of, in the EU context at least, consumer welfare maximization. After having identified five points of divergence between total and consumer welfare approaches, the article draws from legal inferentialism to propose an analytical tool – the explanatory scorekeeping model – for assessing the explanatory power of these two approaches. The model is then applied to the reasoning in United Brands Company v. Commission.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 55-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J. Cseres

In order to facilitate national competition authorities (NCAs) in their application of EU competition rules, the EU legislator adopted Directive 2019/1/EU. The Directive’s aim is to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers of competition law and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. The so-called ECN+ Directive introduces minimum harmonisation rules allowing competition authorities to have common investigative, decision-making (notably fining decisions) and enforcement powers. The Directive, furthermore, sets minimum safeguards for the NCAs’ independence, accountability and resources as well as harmonizes leniency programmes including the coordination of national leniency programmes with each other and with that of the European Commission. This paper critically analyzes the legal and policy developments that paved the way for the adoption of this Directive. Moreover, it examines the changes the implementation of the Directive is likely to generate in current Hungarian law and policy of competition protection. The focus of the paper’s assessment is on the institutional aspects of the Directive and the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in particular the mechanisms for ensuring independence and accountability of the NCAs. Through the assessment of the Hungarian implementation, the paper aims to shed light on a broader context of the Directive and the enforcement of EU competition law in EU Member States. The paper shows that the implementation of the Directive may fail to translate into (more) effective enforcement without an effective institutional capacity on the side of the NCAs, and in the broader legal and constitutional context of competition law and its multilevel enforcement


Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.


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