scholarly journals Positioning under Alternative Electoral Systems: Evidence from Japanese Candidate Election Manifestos

2017 ◽  
Vol 112 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
AMY CATALINAC

We study a core question of interest in political science: Do candidates position themselves differently under different electoral systems and is their positioning in line with the expectations of spatial theories? We use validated estimates of candidate ideological positions derived from quantitative scaling of 7,497 Japanese-language election manifestos written by the near universe of candidates who competed in the eight House of Representatives elections held on either side of Japan’s 1994 electoral reform. Leveraging variation before and after Japan’s electoral reform, as well as within each electoral system, we find that candidates converge in single-member districts and diverge in multimember districts, and converge on copartisans when not faced with intraparty competition and diverge when they do. Our study helps to clarify debates about the effects of electoral systems on ideological polarization and party cohesion in Japan and more generally.

2021 ◽  
pp. 211-233
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Shugart ◽  
Matthew E. Bergman ◽  
Cory L. Struthers ◽  
Ellis S. Krauss ◽  
Robert J. Pekkanen

This chapter focuses on the impact of electoral reform in New Zealand, which changed from first-past-the post (FPTP) to mixed-member proportional (MMP). The chapter analyzes the National and Labour parties under both electoral systems. As expected, the expertise model becomes more important to parties’ allocation of legislators to House of Representatives committees after the electoral reform to MMP, due to the move to a system in which votes cast anywhere count toward seat maximization. Parties also change how they assign members under the electoral–constituency model, as the system moves from one in which winning districts is the exclusive way in which a party maximizes seats to one in which legislators representing districts may be leveraged to help the party win more votes from the party list. Both parties show strong issue ownership tendencies before and after electoral reform.


Author(s):  
Kuniaki Nemoto

The system used for Japan’s House of Representatives (Shugiin, or HoR) was changed in the mid-1990s from hyperpersonalistic single nontransferable voting (SNTV) to mixed-member majoritarian (MMM). The reform was expected to bring about a move toward two-party competition, party-centered campaigning, and party centralization. Evidence generally supports the theoretically expected consequences of the electoral reform. However, the electoral system change did not completely transform Japanese party politics as expected. Some of the institutions and practices considered peculiar to the old electoral system, such as personal support networks and factions, were not wiped away by the reform. Other rules in the new system initially considered minor, such as dual candidacy, can have a substantive impact on incumbency advantage and Duvergerian convergence. These suggest that Japan’s electoral reform opens the way for new comparative research on the effects of electoral systems.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 744-760 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER KAM ◽  
ANTHONY M. BERTELLI ◽  
ALEXANDER HELD

Electoral accountability requires that voters have the ability to constrain the incumbent government’s policy-making power. We express the necessary conditions for this claim as an accountability identity in which the electoral system and the party system interact to shape the accountability of parliamentary governments. Data from 400 parliamentary elections between 1948 and 2012 show that electoral accountability is contingent on the party system’s bipolarity, for example, with parties arrayed in two distinct blocs. Proportional electoral systems achieve accountability as well as majoritarian ones when bipolarity is strong but not when it is weak. This is because bipolarity decreases the number of connected coalitions that incumbent parties can join to preserve their policy-making power. Our results underscore the limitations that party systems place on electoral reform and the benefits that bipolarity offers for clarifying voters’ choices and intensifying electoral competition.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
OLLI HELLMANN

AbstractThis article argues that major cases of electoral reform across democracies in Asia in recent years can be explained as institutional measures aimed at curbing corruption and ‘money politics’. More specifically, Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand rid themselves of their extreme candidate-centered electoral systems as a means to encourage politicians to invest in ‘clean’ collective party labels, while Indonesia discarded its extremely party-centered electoral system to increase the accountability of individual politicians. The article thus disagrees with scholars who argue that recent electoral reform should be understood as part of a wider project by Asian governments to engineer a majoritarian form of democracy. Instead, the comparative analysis shows that democracies across Asia, in line with global trends in institutional design, have been ‘normalizing’ their electoral systems, moving them closer towards the ideal of electoral ‘efficiency’.


Author(s):  
Steven R. Reed

This chapter describes and analyzes the electoral systems used to elect members of the Japanese Diet since 1947. The more powerful lower house has used two different electoral systems, and the upper house has used three. The chapter focuses on each system’s effects on the quality of democracy, particularly malapportionment and alternation in power. Electoral systems powerfully influence the quality of democracy. Many of those effects can be predicted by political science theory, but others cannot. The chapter shows that the effects of the first electoral system have long-lasting effects. The institutions and practices developed as the party system develops are not easily changed by later political reforms.


1999 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain McLean

THERE ARE TWO MAIN CONCEPTIONS OF ‘REPRESENTATION’ IN democratic theory, and they are not wholly compatible. All democratic electoral systems implicitly appeal to one or the other conception of representation. Therefore, the nature of an ideal electoral system is an essentially contested question. Furthermore, the mathematics of social choice sets severe limits on what an electoral system — any electoral system — can achieve. Though the implications of social choice are not so nihilistic as some would have us believe, they are relevant and serious.


Author(s):  
Kristof Jacobs

The Netherlands has one of the most proportional electoral systems in the world. This chapter details the origins, functioning, and effects of the Dutch electoral system. After providing the historical background of the electoral system, the chapter discusses the allocation of seats both to parties and to candidates and gives practical examples. Afterward, the chapter outlines the effects of the electoral system on the party system, the parties themselves, the composition of the parliament, and the government formation. Lastly, the chapter covers historical and more recent electoral reform debates. It turns out that in the Netherlands, electoral reform is a Sisyphean task: because of the low electoral threshold, electoral reform is always on the table, but given the broad coalitions and rigid constitution, reform attempts typically fail, and the reform discussions have to start all over again.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurdistan Saeed ◽  
Chawan Salah

This study deals with the electoral systems applied in Iraq after 2003 for the Iraqi Parliament elections. The issue's importance lies in the fact that elections are the legitimate means adopted by modern political systems based on the separation of powers. Therefore, after changing the political system in Iraq in 2003 from a one-party system to a democratic parliamentary system, the permanent constitution of 2005 granted the right to political participation for citizens. Including the right to participate in elections through nomination or candidacy for the Iraqi Council of Representatives, this study examines the electoral systems applied after 2003 and the reasons for the instability of the Iraqi parliament elections on a specific law. The study dealt with the types of electoral systems by focusing on the concept and emergence of elections and the most critical electoral systems adopted by political systems. Furthermore, the electoral systems applied after 2003 in the Iraqi parliament elections by focusing on the electoral laws or their amendments that preceded each electoral cycle since 2003 until now. The study concluded that the electoral system in Iraq was not legally stable; several amendments have been made to the laws regulating the elections for the House of Representatives. So the two elections did not repeat under one law because of political parties' criticism leveled at it. Moreover, the attempt by the large parliamentary blocs, through their control of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, to legislate laws that limit the victory of the blocs and small parties.


Author(s):  
Ian McAllister ◽  
Toni Makkai

Australia is often characterized as “a democratic laboratory,” where a wide variety of electoral systems have been designed and implemented. Australia gave the world “the Australian ballot” (or secret ballot), and it is one of the few countries to operate an enforced system of compulsory voting. This chapter examines the evolution of the electoral systems in the lower House of Representatives and in the upper house, the Senate. Particular attention is given to the design of the Senate electoral system, and to the changes that were implemented at the 2016 election to eliminate the proliferation of “micro parties.” The development of compulsory voting is also outlined, and its consequences for the party system evaluated. Finally, the chapter discusses the major challenges to reform of the electoral system.


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