Political Parties and Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice in Latin America

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Negretto
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Choice Model ◽  
Constitutional Choice ◽  
Presidential Democracies ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Constitutional Changes

The formulas for electing presidents and the rules determining the legislative powers of presidents are important variables for explaining the performance of presidential democracies. This article develops a strategic choice model to explain variations in these institutional features. Based on this model, it is proposed here that constitution makers are likely to opt for more-than-plurality rules of presidential elections when the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increases. It is also proposed that the makers of constitutions are likely to strengthen the legislative powers of the president when the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increases and when parties are decentralized. The argument is supported by a statistical analysis of the determinants of constitutional choice in Latin America.

Electoral Rules and Democracy in Latin America

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cynthia McClintock
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
Primary Concern ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
New Parties ◽  
Political Exclusion ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Freedom House

During Latin America’s third democratic wave, a majority of countries adopted a runoff rule for the election of the president. This book is the first rigorous assessment of the implications of runoff versus plurality for democracy in the region. Despite previous scholarly skepticism about runoff, it has been positive for Latin America, and could be for the United States also. Primarily through qualitative analysis for each Latin American country, I explore why runoff is superior to plurality. Runoff opens the political arena to new parties but at the same time ensures that the president does not suffer a legitimacy deficit and is not at an ideological extreme. By contrast, in a region in which undemocratic political parties are common, the continuation of these parties is abetted by plurality; political exclusion provoked disillusionment and facilitated the emergence of presidents at ideological extremes. In regression analysis, runoff was statistically significant to superior levels of democracy. Between 1990 and 2016, Freedom House and Varieties of Democracy scores plummeted in countries with plurality but improved in countries with runoff. Plurality advocates’ primary concern is the larger number of political parties under runoff. Although a larger number of parties was not significant to inferior levels of democracy, a plethora of parties is problematic, leading to a paucity of legislative majorities and inchoate parties. To ameliorate the problem, I recommend not reductions in the 50% threshold but the scheduling of the legislative election after the first round or thresholds for entry into the legislature.

scholarly journals Ilusi Demokrasi Substansial di Indonesia: Sebuah Kritik Terhadap Impementasi Parliamentary Treshlod

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-90
Author(s):  
Fuad Putra Perdana Ginting ◽  
Anwar Saragih
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
General Election ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Parliamentary System ◽  
The People ◽  
Democratic Rights ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
The Voice

This study raises a discussion about the Illusion of Substantial Democracy in Indonesia: A Criticism of the Implementation of Theshold's Parliamentary. Since the 2009 general election. Indonesia has begun to introduce a parliamentary threshold system (Parliamentary Theshold) which sets a 2.5% threshold. Then in the next election, the 2014 election rose to 3.5% in the spirit of simplifying the number of parties in parliament. However, in fact this did not happen. Because, the number of political parties resulting from the 2009 elections which were 9 parties actually increased to 10 parties in the 2014 election. There were other problems in the electoral system using Theshold Parliamentary. As in the 2009 elections there were 29 political parties whose voices were lost due to this system, then in the 2014 elections there were 2 political parties who also lost votes due to the threshold system. Of course, as a democracy the people must know where the voice is. Is the system of implementing the Theshold Parliamentary system in the Indonesian elections in line with the essence of substantial democracy? The results of this study indicate the parliamentary threshold system has an impact on the loss of the voice of small parties, transactional presidential elections and the parliamentary threshold limiting democratic rights. Indonesia needs an electoral system that is honest, free, high-quality, transparent and represents the wishes of the majority of Indonesia's ractates

Runoff Amid a Plethora of Political Parties

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cynthia McClintock
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Condorcet Winner ◽  
Political Exclusion ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
The Impact

This chapter explores the impact of runoff in the four nations where the number of parties averaged above 3.75 and coalitions did not emerge for presidential elections. The large number was not problematic in Colombia or Guatemala; levels of democracy improved in both countries as political exclusion of the left diminished. The large number was, however, problematic in Ecuador and, to a lesser degree, Peru. Presidents’ first-round tallies were often very low and at times presidents might not have been the Condorcet winner. Especially when presidents were unpopular, executive-legislative conflict could be severe. The weakness of political parties set the stage for the damages to democracy inflicted by the Serrano, Fujimori, and Bucaram governments. However, although levels of democracy declined in Ecuador amid the large number of parties, they declined more steeply after the election of Correa and a reduction in the number of parties.

How Political Parties in Hybrid Regimes Help the Incumbent Maintain a Democratic Façade

2020 ◽  
pp. 088832542094110
Author(s):  
Dušan Pavlović
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Hybrid Regimes ◽  
Electoral Fraud ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Parliamentary Debate ◽  
Incumbent Party ◽  
Number Of Parties

Why would a large incumbent party, that can by itself muster more than 45 per cent of electoral support, add seven insignificant political parties to its electoral list, thus providing them with a free ticket into the Assembly, state-sponsored financing for the next four years, and an independent deputy club in the Assembly? More importantly, why would the incumbent party, as a consequence of this deliberate decision, end up without parliamentary majority? In this article, I discuss less frequently mentioned aspects of institutional design that can help us understand why the incumbent party makes such decisions and why a party system in a hybrid regime has a large number of parties. I offer qualitative evidence from the postcommunist Serbia (1990–2018). The first two aspects refer to electoral design (but not the electoral formula or district magnitude): a larger number of parties under the incumbent party’s control provides stronger political influence in the Republican Electoral Commission and at polling stations on election day. In hybrid regimes, the incumbent party is interested in this influence because it can use it to arrange electoral fraud. The third aspect relates to parliamentary design: more parties in the Serbian Assembly under the incumbent party’s control secure more minutes on the floor for the incumbent party during parliamentary debate.

Arnoldo Alemán Takes on the NGOs: Antifeminism and the New Populism in Nicaragua

2003 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Kampwirth
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Nongovernmental Organizations ◽  
The Political ◽  
Foreign Born

This article analyzes the campaign of Nicaraguan president Arnoldo Alemán (1997–2002) against organized competitors, what has been called his war against the nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs. Alemán's attacks on the NGO sector are shown to be consistent with the logic of the new populism in Latin America. At the same time, his choice of targets—prominent NGO figures who were often foreign-born and always female—must be explained with reference to the specifics of Nicaraguan civil society and its evolving relationship with the political parties. This study argues that by choosing to respond to the challenges of international neoliberalism and local feminism through the anti-NGO campaign, Alemán helped to weaken democracy in Nicaragua.

Crowded Space, Fertile Ground: Party Entry and the Effective Number of Parties

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Kselman ◽  
Eleanor Neff Powell ◽  
Joshua A. Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Effective Number ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Fertile Ground ◽  
Effective Number Of Parties ◽  
Number Of Parties

This paper develops a novel argument as to the conditions under which new political parties will form in democratic states. Our approach hinges on the manner in which politicians evaluate the policy implications of new party entry alongside considerations of incumbency for its own sake. We demonstrate that if candidates care sufficiently about policy outcomes, then the likelihood of party entry shouldincreasewith the effective number of status quo parties in the party system. This relationship weakens, and eventually disappears, as politicians’ emphasis on “office-seeking” motivations increases relative to their interest in public policy. We test these predictions with both aggregate electoral data in contemporary Europe and a data set on legislative volatility in Turkey, uncovering support for the argument that party system fragmentation should positively affect the likelihood of entry when policy-seeking motivations are relevant, but not otherwise.

Uno studio sulle presidenziali americane: l'economia conta?

2012 ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Marco Morini
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Economic Indicators ◽  
Economic Data ◽  
The Real ◽  
Approval Rating ◽  
History Of ◽  
Electoral Behaviour

The economy matters. This is one of the dogmas taught us by those who have studied the history of the American presidential elections. But is this collective perception of the influence of economic data on individual electoral behaviour confirmed by statistical analysis of the history of presidential elections? This study shows that the most commonly used economic indicators are poor predictors of election outcomes, and also that variation in the approval rating of the incumbent president is a variable independent from the real economic data.

scholarly journals Perubahan Perilaku Pemilih (Voting Behaviour) Partai Politik Islam Dalam Sejarah Kofigurasi Politik Indonesia

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-254
Author(s):  
Ahmad Gelora Mahardika ◽  
Sun Fatayati
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
New Order ◽  
Voting Behaviour ◽  
Presidential Decree ◽  
History Of ◽  
Political Configuration ◽  
Islamic Political Parties ◽  
Constitutional Changes ◽  
Islamic Party

This paper aims to examine the phenomenon of the decline of voters in Islamic ideology in Indonesia. Indonesian history notes that Islamic Political Parties have triumphed in political circles with their ability to impose fierce debates against nationalist groups and religions other than Islam when discussing constitutional changes. The endless debate then forced President Soekarno to issue a presidential decree. The sweet history of Islamic Political Parties began to decline when the regime of the New Order government fused authoritatively and caused no more unity of opinion in the Islamic party. At present, Islamic ideology political parties also have a tendency to turn to the Cacth All Party, which is considered more profitable and provides wider opportunities to gain power. This paper aims to prove the changing behavior of voters of Islamic political parties in the history of Indonesia's political configuration.

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