Runoff Amid a Plethora of Political Parties

Author(s):  
Cynthia McClintock

This chapter explores the impact of runoff in the four nations where the number of parties averaged above 3.75 and coalitions did not emerge for presidential elections. The large number was not problematic in Colombia or Guatemala; levels of democracy improved in both countries as political exclusion of the left diminished. The large number was, however, problematic in Ecuador and, to a lesser degree, Peru. Presidents’ first-round tallies were often very low and at times presidents might not have been the Condorcet winner. Especially when presidents were unpopular, executive-legislative conflict could be severe. The weakness of political parties set the stage for the damages to democracy inflicted by the Serrano, Fujimori, and Bucaram governments. However, although levels of democracy declined in Ecuador amid the large number of parties, they declined more steeply after the election of Correa and a reduction in the number of parties.

Author(s):  
Cynthia McClintock

During Latin America’s third democratic wave, a majority of countries adopted a runoff rule for the election of the president. This book is the first rigorous assessment of the implications of runoff versus plurality for democracy in the region. Despite previous scholarly skepticism about runoff, it has been positive for Latin America, and could be for the United States also. Primarily through qualitative analysis for each Latin American country, I explore why runoff is superior to plurality. Runoff opens the political arena to new parties but at the same time ensures that the president does not suffer a legitimacy deficit and is not at an ideological extreme. By contrast, in a region in which undemocratic political parties are common, the continuation of these parties is abetted by plurality; political exclusion provoked disillusionment and facilitated the emergence of presidents at ideological extremes. In regression analysis, runoff was statistically significant to superior levels of democracy. Between 1990 and 2016, Freedom House and Varieties of Democracy scores plummeted in countries with plurality but improved in countries with runoff. Plurality advocates’ primary concern is the larger number of political parties under runoff. Although a larger number of parties was not significant to inferior levels of democracy, a plethora of parties is problematic, leading to a paucity of legislative majorities and inchoate parties. To ameliorate the problem, I recommend not reductions in the 50% threshold but the scheduling of the legislative election after the first round or thresholds for entry into the legislature.


Author(s):  
Bernard Grofman

This article looks at the impact of electoral laws on political parties. It focuses on empirical research, rather than on the implicitly normative foundations of different voting rules or on formal modeling results. The discussion presents comparisons of a limited number of polar electoral system types. The article lists forms of proportional election methods and plurality elections, which are considered to be two of the most important methods of voting. Finally, the article serves to report the results of one of the four main concerns of the field by observing the electoral system effects on the number of parties, etc.


2000 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAG ANCKAR ◽  
CARSTEN ANCKAR

The belief that modern democracy is party democracy is widespread. However, the belief may be questioned. A number of small independent island states that subscribe to a high extent to democratic values, standards, and institutions manage without political parties. In all, six such cases exist, namely, Belau (Palau), the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, and Tuvalu. The analysis of these cases is guided by three general assumptions: (a) the impact of diminutive size on the existence and number of parties, (b) the corresponding impact of geographical noncontiguity, and (c) the impact of culturally defined resistances against party life and party rule. Comparisons with conditions in other small island states suggest that the assumptions are valid given that extreme values are entered into the analysis. Extreme smallness, an extremely archipelagic geography, and an intense cultural resistance all contribute to an absence of political parties in democracies.


Author(s):  
Cynthia McClintock

During the third wave, like most democratizing countries worldwide, Latin American countries replaced plurality rules for presidential election with runoff rules. To date, most scholars fear the proliferation of political parties under runoff and favor plurality. I argue, however, that Latin American leaders were correct to adopt runoff. Runoff established a virtuous circle: amid lower barriers to entry, opposition parties and new parties held greater respect for the democratic process and this respect was in turn important to elites’ toleration of their entry. By contrast, plurality often facilitated political exclusion by long-standing dominant parties and exacerbated cynicism and polarization. Although the larger number of parties under runoff was problematic, and measures for the amelioration of the problem are important, the number of parties was considerable under plurality; runoff enabled democracies to cope, increasing the legitimacy of their elected presidents.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grigorii V Golosov ◽  
Kirill Kalinin

Using data from a nearly comprehensive set of the world’s electoral democracies, 1992–2014, this article empirically evaluates the impact of presidentialism upon legislative fragmentation. The analysis demonstrates that the impact is strong, consistent across a wide variety of political contexts, and conditioned by the type of presidential regime, the scope of presidential powers, electoral system effects, and essential party system properties. While much of the reasoning regarding the interplay between presidentialism and legislative fragmentation has been traditionally focused on short-term coattail effects of presidential elections, this study shows that these effects are real, but they are insufficient to make a significant impact upon the parameter of crucial importance for the functioning of presidential regimes: the number of parties in the legislature. The main impact of presidentialism is systemic, stemming from its tendency to restrict the number of parties to a limited set of viable competitors for the presidential prize.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-90
Author(s):  
Fuad Putra Perdana Ginting ◽  
Anwar Saragih

This study raises a discussion about the Illusion of Substantial Democracy in Indonesia: A Criticism of the Implementation of Theshold's Parliamentary. Since the 2009 general election. Indonesia has begun to introduce a parliamentary threshold system (Parliamentary Theshold) which sets a 2.5% threshold. Then in the next election, the 2014 election rose to 3.5% in the spirit of simplifying the number of parties in parliament. However, in fact this did not happen. Because, the number of political parties resulting from the 2009 elections which were 9 parties actually increased to 10 parties in the 2014 election. There were other problems in the electoral system using Theshold Parliamentary. As in the 2009 elections there were 29 political parties whose voices were lost due to this system, then in the 2014 elections there were 2 political parties who also lost votes due to the threshold system. Of course, as a democracy the people must know where the voice is. Is the system of implementing the Theshold Parliamentary system in the Indonesian elections in line with the essence of substantial democracy? The results of this study indicate the parliamentary threshold system has an impact on the loss of the voice of small parties, transactional presidential elections and the parliamentary threshold limiting democratic rights. Indonesia needs an electoral system that is honest, free, high-quality, transparent and represents the wishes of the majority of Indonesia's ractates


2003 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard Wantchekon

The author conducted a field experiment in Benin to investigate the impact of clientelism on voting behavior. In collaboration with four political parties involved in the 2001 presidential elections, clientelist and broad public policy platforms were designed and run in twenty randomly selected villages of an average of 756 registered voters. Using the survey data collected after the elections, the author estimated the effect of each type of message by comparing voting behavior in the villages exposed to clientelism or public policy messages (treatment groups) with voting behavior in the other villages (control groups). The author found that clientelist messages have positive and significant effect in all regions and for all types of candidates. The author also found that public policy messages have a positive and significant effect in the South but a negative and significant effect in the North. In addition, public policy messages seem to hurt incumbents as well as regional candidates. Finally, the evidence indicates that female voters tend to have stronger preference for public policy platforms than male voters.


2021 ◽  
pp. 146-180
Author(s):  
Peter John

This chapter assesses what politicians and members of political parties really care about: getting into office on the back of a successful election campaign. Rather than the general determinants of voting outlined in the previous chapter, this is about the choices voters and parties face within a particular system, so they can organize themselves to win. For that they need to play by the rules of the game, which includes developing strategies within electoral systems. The chapter then discusses the impact of electoral systems on that calculus, and how the number of parties is affected by the electoral system in place. It also looks at the factors that assist the winning of elections, and the extent to which the choices of parties and voters are affected by growing instability in the system. Overall, the chapter provides an overview of British political parties and party systems.


2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Negretto

The formulas for electing presidents and the rules determining the legislative powers of presidents are important variables for explaining the performance of presidential democracies. This article develops a strategic choice model to explain variations in these institutional features. Based on this model, it is proposed here that constitution makers are likely to opt for more-than-plurality rules of presidential elections when the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increases. It is also proposed that the makers of constitutions are likely to strengthen the legislative powers of the president when the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increases and when parties are decentralized. The argument is supported by a statistical analysis of the determinants of constitutional choice in Latin America.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey M. Berry

The relationships between interest groups, political parties, and elections have always been dynamic, but in recent years change has accelerated in ways that have favored some interests over others. This chapter considers these developments as the result of a variety of factors, the most critical of which are the growth of polarization, a new legal landscape for campaign finance, and new organizational forms. The chapter goes on to suggest, that as bipartisanship has ebbed, elections have become winner-take-all affairs and interest groups are pushed to choose sides. The chapter further suggests that the rise of super PACs is especially notable as wealthy individuals have become increasingly important, single sources of campaign money, supplanting in part traditional interest groups, especially conventional PACs. It concludes that even as sums spent by super PACs and other interest groups have skyrocketed, the impact of their direct spending on persuading voters remains uncertain.


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