Political Trust and Support for Immigration in the American Mass Public

Author(s):  
David Macdonald

Abstract Immigration is one of the most salient and important issues in contemporary American politics. While a great deal is known about how cultural attitudes and economics influence public opinion toward immigration, little is known about how attitudes toward government influence support for immigration. Using cross-sectional data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), panel data from the ANES and General Social Survey, as well a Mechanical Turk (MTurk) survey experiment, I show that political trust exerts a positive and substantively meaningful influence on Americans' support for immigration. Politically trustful individuals, both Democrats and Republicans, are more supportive of pro-immigration policies. These findings underscore the political relevance of trust in government and show that public attitudes toward immigration are not driven solely by feelings about immigrant groups, partisanship, core political values, nor personality traits, but are also affected by trust in government, the actor most responsible for managing immigration policy.

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 790-804 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Macdonald

The United States has become increasingly unequal. Income inequality has risen dramatically since the 1970s, yet public opinion toward redistribution has remained largely unchanged. This is puzzling, given Americans’ professed concern regarding, and knowledge of, rising inequality. I argue that trust in government can help to reconcile this. I combine data on state-level income inequality with survey data from the Cumulative American National Election Studies (CANES) from 1984 to 2016. I find that trust in government conditions the relationship between inequality and redistribution, with higher inequality prompting demand for government redistribution, but only among politically trustful individuals. This holds among conservatives and non-conservatives and among the affluent and non-affluent. These findings underscore the relevance of political trust in shaping attitudes toward inequality and economic redistribution and contribute to our understanding of why American public opinion has not turned in favor of redistribution during an era of rising income inequality.


2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 350-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yida Zhai

Chinese traditional culture is viewed to sustain political trust in the authoritarian regime. Given that Chinese cultural traditions are complex and multi-dimensional, it is ineffective to deal with this notion by a single index. This study divides Chinese traditional values into a non-political dimension (traditional family and social values) and a political dimension (traditional political values). Then, I empirically test how different dimensions of Chinese cultural traditions shape the ordinary people’s orientations toward their political institutions and government officials. The results show that the impact of traditional values on political trust varies by its different dimensions. Traditional political values and social values are positively correlated with both institutional trust and trust in government officials. Traditional family values are positively correlated with trust in government officials but do not have an effect on institutional trust. Liberal democratic values negatively correlate with trust in government officials, but this effect on institutional trust is not significant.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernesto F. L. Amaral ◽  
Paige Mitchell ◽  
Guadalupe Marquez-Velarde

This study investigates demographic, socioeconomic, political, and contextual factors associated with attitudes toward U.S. immigration. We analyze cross-sectional data from the 2004–2016 General Social Survey and American Community Survey five-year estimates. Results from generalized ordered logit models suggest that support to immigration has been increasing over time. There is no difference by sex on attitudes toward immigration. Non-whites, those between 18 and 24 years of age, people with higher educational attainment, and non-Protestants are more likely to be pro-immigration. People working on sales, office, natural resources, construction, maintenance, production, transportation, material moving, and military occupations are less likely to support immigration. People living in the South Atlantic region are the least likely to support an increase in immigration. People who lived in areas at the age of 16 that tend to have higher proportions of foreign-born individuals are more likely to support immigration. People who self-classify as strong Democrats, Independents near Democrats, and in other parties are more likely to be in favor of an increase on the number of immigrants. People with more liberal political views are more likely to be in favor of immigration. People with lower levels of racial resentment have higher chances to be in favor of an increase in immigration. Opinion about immigration has stronger associations with racial resentment than with opinion about U.S. economic achievement. People who live in counties with higher proportions of college graduates and higher proportions of immigrants are more likely to be pro-immigration.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
David S. Pedulla ◽  
Michael J. Donnelly

Abstract The social and economic forces that shape attitudes toward the welfare state are of central concern to social scientists. Scholarship in this area has paid limited attention to how working part-time, the employment status of nearly 20% of the U.S. workforce, affects redistribution preferences. In this article, we theoretically develop and empirically test an argument about the ways that part-time work, and its relationship to gender, shape redistribution preferences. We articulate two gender-differentiated pathways—one material and one about threats to social status—through which part-time work and gender may jointly shape individuals’ preferences for redistribution. We test our argument using cross-sectional and panel data from the General Social Survey in the United States. We find that the positive relationship between part-time employment, compared to full-time employment, and redistribution preferences is stronger for men than for women. Indeed, we do not detect a relationship between part-time work and redistribution preferences among women. Our results provide support for a gendered relationship between part-time employment and redistribution preferences and demonstrate that both material and status-based mechanisms shape this association.


2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292199355
Author(s):  
Rieko Kage ◽  
Frances M. Rosenbluth ◽  
Seiki Tanaka

What factors shape attitudes toward immigration? Previous studies have typically debated whether citizens oppose immigration more for economic or cultural reasons. We broaden this debate by exploring how different segments of the citizenry feel about immigration. Our original surveys conducted in Japan reveal two separate axes along which many citizens view immigration: (1) its cultural and economic effects, and (2) its positive and negative effects. Even in Japan, whose relatively closed policy toward immigration is conventionally believed to reflect widespread public intolerance of outsiders, over 60 percent of our respondents favor widening the doors to immigrants for economic or cultural reasons or both.


2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-97
Author(s):  
Lim Jae Young ◽  
Woo Harin

The arts in the United States, for a long time received strong support from both sides of the political aisle. However, in recent years, the arts have been transformed into a partisan issue that pits conservatives against liberals. The article points to the importance of political trust as a means of helping conservatives overcome their ideological inclinations and support the arts. Scholars argue that political trust influences more strongly individuals who perceive a given policy to be one that imposes ideological risks for them compared with those without such risks. Focusing on the moderating role of political trust, the article examines whether political trust can help alleviate the conservatives’ hostility to the arts. Relying on the 2016 General Social Survey, the article finds that conservatives have no direct relationship with arts spending, but they will be more likely to support arts spending when this is contingent upon political trust.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 237802311772765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Rosenfeld

Most public opinion attitudes in the United States are reasonably stable over time. Using data from the General Social Survey and the American National Election Studies, I quantify typical change rates across all attitudes. I quantify the extent to which change in same-sex marriage approval (and liberalization in attitudes toward gay rights in general) are among a small set of rapid changing outliers in surveyed public opinions. No measured public opinion attitude in the United States has changed more and more quickly than same-sex marriage. I use survey data from Newsweek to illustrate the rapid increase in the 1980s and 1990s in Americans who had friends or family who they knew to be gay or lesbian and demonstrate how contact with out-of-the-closet gays and lesbians was influential. I discuss several potential historical and social movement theory explanations for the rapid liberalization of attitudes toward gay rights in the United States, including the surprising influence of Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1238-1264
Author(s):  
Nora Theorin ◽  
Jesper Strömbäck

Over the last decade, issues related to immigration have become increasingly salient across Western democracies. This increasing salience has made it more important to understand people’s attitudes toward immigration, including the effects of media use on those attitudes. Differentiating between attitudes toward different types of immigration, attitudes toward immigration from different parts of the world, and perceptions of immigration’s impact, this article investigates the effects of media use on attitudes toward and perceptions of immigration in Sweden. Based on a three-year, three-wave panel study, it investigates the effects of media use on the individual level. Among other things, results show that there are limited effects of using traditional news media but more substantial effects on people’s immigration attitudes of using anti-immigration, right-wing alternative media and pro-immigration, left-wing alternative media. These findings imply that it is highly relevant to account for media use, especially alternative media use, when studying public attitudes toward immigration. Further, we find that variations in people’s immigration attitudes, to a high degree, depend on the type of immigration and on where migrants are coming from. This finding underlines the importance of measuring both of these aspects when the aim is understanding general attitudes toward immigration and/or key predictors behind immigration attitudes.


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