scholarly journals Une critique d'explication par les causes finales: l'anticontractualisme de Hume. Une histoire naturelle du politique

Dialogue ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 637-662
Author(s):  
Céline Bonicco

ABSTRACTThis article proposes to show how David Hume's critique of contractualism is the political consequence of his analysis of causality. Hume rejects contractualism mainly for methodological reasons: explanations based on final causes are never satisfying. Therefore, contractualism applies to the political sphere the argument from design presented in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. The genesis of politics unfolded in A Treatise of Human Nature must be seen as a particular application of the only pertinent way of explaining phenomena, i.e., natural history, in which sympathy immanently configures and reconfigures society. The final cause must be replaced by the efficient cause. Hume's political theory—either positive or negative—and epistemology cannot be dissociated.

2021 ◽  
pp. 81-103
Author(s):  
James A. Harris

‘Religion' discusses Hume’s various treatments of religion, particularly in the essay ‘Of Miracles’, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, and ‘The Natural History of Religion’. Hume's earlier writings show some interesting implications for religion, including A Treatise of Human Nature and the essay ‘Of National Characters’. Looking at ‘Of Miracles’ shows that Hume’s theme was not the possibility of miracles as such, but rather the rational grounds of belief in reports of miracles. Considering the Dialogues emphasizes the distinction between scepticism and atheism. Meanwhile, ‘Natural History’ emphasizes Hume’s interest in the dangerous moral consequences of monotheism. What is the future for religion? Perhaps Hume was unlikely to have supposed that his writings would do anything to reduce religion’s hold on the vast majority of human beings.


1994 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cary J. Nederman

Several recent scholars have raised afresh the question of what Aristotle meant in Politics 1 by the statement that men are “by nature” political, that is, are political animals. This article addresses this quandary by reference to Aristotle's psychology and his notion of political education. It is argued that by concentrating on Aristotle's theory of human locomotion and its implications for moral choice, we may identify the relation he conceived between the polis and human nature. Specifically, the ability of humans to live according to their natures requires the systematic education afforded by the laws and institutions of the polis.


2010 ◽  
Vol 104 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW F. MARCH

This article presents an interpretation of Sayyid Qutb's political theory based on a prominent feature of his thought: the claim that Islamic law and human nature (fitra) are in perfect harmony, and that the demands of Islamic law are easy and painless for ordinary human moral capacities. I argue that Qutb is not only defending Islamic law as true and obligatory, but also as a coherent “realistic utopia”—a normative theory that also contains a psychological account of that theory's feasibility. Qutb's well-known fascination with the earliest generation of Muslims (the salaf) is an integral part of this account that serves two functions: (1) as a model of the feasibility and realism of an ideal Islamic political order, and (2) as a genealogy of the political origins of moral vice in society. Qutb's project is thus an account of exactly why and how Islam requires politics, and how modern humans can be both free and governed.


1995 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoff Stokes

Karl Popper's advocacy of freedom and toleration, his belief in the power of ideas, and the possibility of democratic social reform, place him in the more optimistic strand of liberal thought. Yet his awareness of the human needs for regularity and tradition bolster a largely conservative and pessimistic conception of human nature. Epistemologies have a central role in Popper's political programme and theory of history because they influence either the release or suppression of key human capacities. Elucidating Popper's conception of human nature shows the origins of Popper's understanding of dogmatism and violence and indicates the underlying rationale for critical rationalism. But it also explains why Popper prefers revolutions in thought among élites to those in politics among the masses. To the extent that Popper's conception of human nature is problematic, so the political theory and epistemology may also be misconceived.


2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Wisnovsky

Did classical kalām debates about how thing (šay') and existent (maw[gcaron]ūd) relate to each other pave the way for Avicenna's distinction between essence (māhiyya) and existence (wu[gcaron]ūd)? There are some indications that the concept of thingness (šay'iyya) may have played a bridging role between the mutakallimūn's discussions and those of Avicenna. Nevertheless, Avicenna's appeals to thingness occur most densely in passages devoted to analyzing the relationship between efficient and final causes, an entirely Aristotelian topic. A philological question arises: should these passages be emended to read causality (sababiyya) in place of thingness (šay'iyya)? I argue that the balance of evidence compels us to retain thingness. For Avicenna, thingness is the respect in which the final cause is prior to the efficient cause (as well as to the formal and material causes); existence, by contrast, is the respect in which the efficient cause is prior to the final cause. In fact, over the course of Avicenna's career a progression from the kalām problematic of šay' v. maw[gcaron]ūd to his own problematic of māhiyya v. wu[gcaron]ūd can be detected in his discussions of efficient and final causation.


1988 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Everson

Aristotle's Politics shows an apparent tension between a recognition of the desirability of individual liberty and his claim that ‘none of the citizens belongs to himself but all belong to the state’. We can start to resolve that tension by considering Aristotle's doctrine of man as a political animal. Artistotle offers a particular account of the nature of man according to which his specifically human capacities cannot be realized outside of the state. This is not an account adopted arbitrarily for Aristotle's political theory but follows directly from his analysis of substances in the Physics. On Aristotle's account of human nature, man is essentially rational and virtuous and the political theory allows the rational and virtuous man to be as free as possible without intefering with others. Some are less rational and are subject to authority in virtue of this. We can see that Aristotle's theory has advantages over rights-based theories since Aristotle has an account of what constitutes human flourishing, without which one cannot found rights claims.


1959 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 657-677 ◽  
Author(s):  
James P. Scanlan

Students of American political theory find themselves in general agreement concerning the character and significance of their most celebrated document, The Federalist. Few deny that this series of essays in support of the Constitution by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay represents a substantial contribution to the literature of political theory. The nature of the contribution is also well established. The Federalist, it is agreed, is a skillful exposition of the principles of constitutional republicanism — an exposition not haphazard or fanciful, but controlled by constant reference to the capacities and limitations of the political animal. The latter point is often emphasized; Benjamin F. Wright states: “The aspect of The Federalist which is of universal applicability is … its recognition of the importance of human nature in politics, togetherwith its remarkably penetrating analysis of the motives and the behavior of men in a free society.” x Finally, there is agreement on the general outlines of this theory of human nature. The authors of The Federalist, it is said, were decidedly “realistic,” brooking no illusions of the inherent goodness or rationality of man, but holding firm to “a conception of human corruptibility.” 2 The adjective most often employed is “pessimistic.”


2021 ◽  
pp. 66-93
Author(s):  
Robert Schuett

What makes Kelsen argue that we are no Kantian angels? Why is the Kelsenian state a centralised coercive order understood in terms of law as a system of norms? The chapter continues the exploration of Kelsen’s milieu and expands on it to examine how the impact of Freud’s psychology and philosophical anthropology on Kelsen’s thought relating to the dynamics of human nature, society, and the political as a problem of authority and obedience is shown to be real and profound. To zoom in on the core of Kelsen’s philosophy and political theory is to recapture a breathtakingly rich and realistic account of You and Me that makes clear, in the best of the Realist tradition, that where there is Us, the struggle for power and conflicts of interests are here to stay.


Author(s):  
Paul Sagar

This book examines how David Hume and Adam Smith forged a new way of thinking about the modern state. It considers what Hume referred to as the opinion of mankind, a political theory found in the second and third books of A Treatise of Human Nature. Smith read and absorbed Hume's arguments, adapting them to his own purposes in the construction of a political theory that would move beyond the Treatise. Both Hume and Smith rejected Thomas Hobbes's vision of human nature and his arguments about our capacity to form stable societies over time. The book discusses Hume's theory of sociability, the role of history and the family in debates over human sociability and the foundations of politics, and Smith's theory of regime forms. This introduction provides an overview of the theory of the state and the history of political thought.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanto Chandra

Purpose This paper argues that we need a more disciplined understanding of social enterprise (SE) that is able to incorporate its diversity across different contexts, yet remains sympathetic to its core ideal of value creation. This paper aims to revisit the meaning of value creation to reflect critically upon the diverse forms of SE. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses the Aristotelian causes, namely, the formal, efficient and final causes, to problematize the meaning of value creation. Findings This paper shows that SEs can create or destroy value depending on who evaluates the value. It also raises the issue that how value is created – the motives, means and action – is affected by the ethical orientation of the actors. Lastly, it encourages researchers to pay attention to how stakeholders are defined in SE, in light of the diverse nature of organizations that are labelled as SEs. Research limitations/implications This paper demonstrates that the current definition of SE is inadequate, and to-some extent, problematic. It then proposes some future research agendas, to unpack the issue of value creation, through social cost, politics, transparency and legal perspectives. Originality/value This research makes new contribution to the SE literature by injecting an Aristotelian perspective to problematize and reframe the meaning of value creation. It asks scholars to answer these questions: from whose perspective is value created or destroyed (formal cause), how is value created (efficient cause) and for whom is the value created (final cause)?


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