Toothless Tiger or Roaring Lion? A Surrejoinder to Underwager and Wakefield

1992 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clinton E. Arnold

Arnold focuses on three issues in his response to Underwager and Wakefield. (a) He recognizes the clarification of their understanding of the ontological status of Satan, but takes exception to their accusation that he understands the philosophy of science exclusively in logical positivist terms. On the contrary, he points out that it is Underwager and Wakefield who have a restricted understanding of the role of worldview in relationship to the issue of evil spirits. (b) Arnold once again suggests that Underwager and Wakefield's understanding of the present role of Satan is triumphalistic and far too restricted. He especially takes issue with their contention that Satan's only remaining capacity is to lie. Arnold also stresses the responsibility of believers to actualize their new identity in Christ as the primary means of resisting the influence of Satan. (c) Finally, Arnold contends that he is presenting the New Testament concept of freedom and thereby is certainly not leading people to a new form of legalism as Underwager and Wakefield charge.

Author(s):  
Steven French

An alternative and well-known option when it comes to the ontological status of theories is to understand them as fictions. Here again there is ‘trading’ between the philosophy of art and the philosophy of science as Walton’s account of fiction in terms of ‘make-believe’ is typically deployed in this regard. As before, the role of the imagination is crucial and in this case the issue of accommodating the heuristic processes involved can be more straightforwardly dealt with than in the case of theories conceived of as ‘abstract artefacts’. Nevertheless, it is not clear that this view of theories as fictions can embrace all the different kinds of models and theories deployed in science and it too incurs certain costs. Despite its attractive features, then, and given that an even less costly account is available, this view should also be rejected.


Author(s):  
Ronald Hoinski ◽  
Ronald Polansky

David Hoinski and Ronald Polansky’s “The Modern Aristotle: Michael Polanyi’s Search for Truth against Nihilism” shows how the general tendencies of contemporary philosophy of science disclose a return to the Aristotelian emphasis on both the formation of dispositions to know and the role of the mind in theoretical science. Focusing on a comparison of Michael Polanyi and Aristotle, Hoinski and Polansky investigate to what degree Aristotelian thought retains its purchase on reality in the face of the changes wrought by modern science. Polanyi’s approach relies on several Aristotelian assumptions, including the naturalness of the human desire to know, the institutional and personal basis for the accumulation of knowledge, and the endorsement of realism against objectivism. Hoinski and Polansky emphasize the promise of Polanyi’s neo-Aristotelian framework, which argues that science is won through reflection on reality.


Author(s):  
Eric Schliesser

This chapter articulates Adam Smith’s philosophy of science. The first section emphasizes the significance of Smith’s social conception of science—science takes place, not always comfortably, within a larger society and is itself a social enterprise in which our emotions play a crucial role. Even so, in Smith’s view science ultimately is a reason-giving enterprise, akin to how he understands the role of the impartial spectator. The second and third sections explain Smith’s attitude to theorizing and its relationship, if any, to Humean skepticism. Smith distinguishes between theory acceptance and the possibility of criticism; while he accepts fallibilism, he also embraces scientific revolutions and even instances of psychological incommensurability. His philosophy is not an embrace of Humean skepticism, but a modest realism. Finally, the chapter explores the implications of Smith’s analysis of scientific systems as machines.


The concept of a law of nature, while familiar, is deeply puzzling. Theorists such as Descartes think a divine being governs the universe according to the laws which follow from that being’s own nature. Newton detaches the concept from theology and is agnostic about the ontology underlying the laws of nature. Some later philosophers treat laws as summaries of events or tools for understanding and explanation, or identify the laws with principles and equations fundamental to scientific theories. In the first part of this volume, essays from leading historians of philosophy identify central questions: are laws independent of the things they govern, or do they emanate from the powers of bodies? Are the laws responsible for the patterns we see in nature, or should they be collapsed into those patterns? In the second part, contributors at the forefront of current debate evaluate the role of laws in contemporary Best System, perspectival, Kantian, and powers- or mechanisms-based approaches. These essays take up pressing questions about whether the laws of nature can be consistent with contingency, whether laws are based on the invariants of scientific theories, and how to deal with exceptions to laws. These twelve essays, published here for the first time, will be required reading for anyone interested in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the histories of these disciplines.


Author(s):  
Anya Farennikova

Experiences of absence are often laden with values and expectations. For example, one might notice that a job candidate is not wearing a tie, or see the absence of a wedding band on a person's ring finger. These experiences embody cultural knowledge and expectations, and therefore seem like good candidates for being a form of evaluative perception. This chapter argues that experiences of absence are evaluative apart from the social or cultural values they take on. They are evaluative in their core, solely by virtue of being experiences of absence. The chapter begins by explaining why certain experiences of absence should be treated as a case of genuine perception. It then clarifies the role of the evaluative states in experiences of absence. The chapter concludes by arguing that experiences of absence constitute a new form of evaluative perception, and presents the subjective–objective dichotomy in a new light.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
CHERYL HIU-KWAN CHUI ◽  
CHEE HON CHAN ◽  
YANTO CHANDRA

Abstract Policymakers have increasingly embraced social enterprises as a vehicle to create job opportunities for the disadvantaged. However, there is limited research on social enterprises in the context of disability in relation to labour market integration. Drawing on the perspectives of representatives of work integration social enterprises and people with disabilities employed in these enterprises (n=21), this study examines whether and how work integration social enterprises promote inclusion for people with disabilities, and also explores the role of WISEs in enabling people with disabilities to transition into open employment. Thematic analysis revealed three key emergent themes: Cocooned inclusion but not transition; Reinforced normative demarcation; and WISEs as a deflection from institutionalizing proactive disability policy measures. This article argues that, although WISEs were able to provide job opportunities for people with disabilities, their purported function in enabling disabled people to transition into open employment remains constrained by factors beyond their control including prevailing norms and the absence of proactive disability employment measures. This article cautions against the over-romanticisation of WISEs as the primary means to ensure the rights of people with disabilities to participate in the labour market. Implications on disability employment policies in relation to social enterprises are discussed.


Dialogue ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
William R. Shea

The mainstream of the philosophy of science in the second quarter of this century—the so-called “logical empiricist” or “logical positivist” movement—assumed that theoretical language in science is parasitic upon observation language and can be eliminated from scientific discourse by disinterpretation and formalization, or by explicit definition in or reduction to observational language. But several fashionable views now place the onus on believers in an observation language to show how such a language is meaningful in the absence of a theory.In the present paper, I propose to show why logical positivism failed to do justice to the basic empirical and logical problems of philosophy of science. I also wish to consider why the drastic reaction, typified by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, fails t o provide a suitable alternative, and to suggest that the radical approaches of recent writers such as Mary Hesse and Dudley Shapere hold out a genuine promise of dealing effectively with the central tasks that face the philosopher of science today.


Author(s):  
William Loader

After a brief overview of the social context and role of marriage and sexuality in Jewish and Greco-Roman cultures, the chapter traces the impact of the Genesis creation narratives, positively and negatively, on how marriage and sexuality were seen both in the present and in depictions of hope for the future. Discussion of pre-marital sex, incest, intermarriage, polygyny, divorce, adultery, and passions follows. It then turns to Jesus’ reported response to divorce, arguing that the prohibition sayings should be read as assuming that sexual intercourse both effects permanent union and severs previous unions, thus making divorce after adultery mandatory, the common understanding and legal requirement in both Jewish and Greco-Roman society of the time. It concludes by noting both the positive appreciation of sex and marriage, grounded in belief that they are God’s creation, and the many dire warnings against sexual wrongdoing, including adulterous attitudes and uncontrolled passions.


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