Allied Control Council for Germany

1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-178 ◽  

Quadripartite Activity: Failure to find a solution of the Berlin currency problem after the question had been considered by the United Nations Security Council was evident when the replies of the western powers and the Soviet Union to Dr. Juan Atilio Bramuglia's questions about the problem were made public on November 26, 1948. The Soviet reply stated that an agreement on the four-power control plan would mean the simultaneous lifting of the Berlin blockade and a return to four-power collaboration in the administration of Berlin, which in effect would mean resumption of direct conversations on the currency questions among the four military governors. The western powers made it clear that they considered the unity of Berlin city administration as the basic prerequisite for an agreement. Several days later, on November 30, a city government was installed in the Soviet sector of Berlin, with Friedrich Ebert as its mayor and on December 21, the western military governments announced formal reconstitution of the Allied Kommandatura on a three-power basis. In announcing the move, Brig. Gen. Jean Ganeval, French sector commandant, stated that fourparty administration of the city could be resumed any time that Soviet authorities decided to abide by agreements to which the four powers were committed.

1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 473-474

Activities of the Secretary-General: On March 21, 1950, the Secretary-General (Lie), in an address delivered at the triennial dinner of B'nai B'rith in Washington, D.C., called for a twenty-year program of peace within the framework of the United Nations. After referring to the difficulties arising from the non-participation of the Soviet Union in United Nations organs because of the presence of the representative of the Nationalist government of China, Mr. Lie suggested that negotiation between the major powers was possible if the Security Council would hold the “periodic meetings” referred to in Article 28(2) of the Charter, in which the various Members would be represented by either the heads of states or the foreign ministers.


1969 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amos Shapira

More than a year has passed since the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967, concerning the “grave situation in the Middle East”. On the basis of this resolution, the Secretary-General of the United Nations designated Ambassador Gunnar Jarring as a Special Representative “to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement…” It is not proposed here to analyze all the political and diplomatic aspects of the Resolution or its practical prospects to bring about peace in the Middle East. Nor is it proposed to advance any particular interpretation of its substantive contents or to assess its merits and shortcomings. The sole purpose of this article is to examine the legal nature and implications of the Resolution within the framework of the United Nations Charter.Intellectual curiosity and academic research are not the only motivations for this legal inquiry. Sceptics of the political relevance of such “theoretical” inquiry need only obtain the November 24, 1968 issue of Pravda, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.


1945 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 970-981 ◽  
Author(s):  
William T. R. Fox

The Security Council of the United Nations will, from the first day of its existence, include in its membership all of the great powers. The Council, backed by the united will of the five powers with permanent seats in that body, will act, if it acts at all, with an authority which no organ of the League of Nations ever possessed. In the League Council, there was no time during which all of the great powers participated. Only two of them, France and the United Kingdom, were League members throughout its period of activity. Some may believe that too high a price, or a higher price than was necessary, was paid to insure the participation of the Five Powers, and especially the United States and the Soviet Union, in the United Nations Organization. The price was paid largely in provisions of its Charter relative to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security which circumscribe carefully the situations in which the Security Council can take action.


1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-431

Amendments to Articles 23, 27, and 61 of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on December 17, 1963, came into force on August 31, 1965. The amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen. The amended Article 27 provides that decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters be made by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven) and on all other matters by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven), including the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The amendment to Article 61 enlarges the membership of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) from eighteen to 27.


1967 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 737-752 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constantin A. Stavropoulos

A question which was much discussed in legal literature in the early years of the United Nations, and which has been cited as a classic example of the effect of subsequent practice upon a provision in a multilateral treaty, has recently been raised again. This concerns the interpretation of Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, which deals with voting in the Security Council on non-procedural matters. Both Portugal and South Africa last year reserved the position of their governments regarding the validity of Security Council Eesolution 221 of April 9, 1966, in the vote on which both France and the Soviet Union abstained. This is the resolution by which the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, called for certain measures to enforce an embargo on oil and petroleum products from reaching Southern Ehodesia through the port of Beira in Mozambique, and authorized the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of force, if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia.


2020 ◽  
pp. 131-136
Author(s):  
B. Борисов ◽  
О. Левін

The processes that took place in the public life of our country at those stages of its historical development, when the issue of preserving the Ukrainian statehood, were of great interest in the context of the implementation of the “decentralization” reform and the growing role of local self-government in modern Ukraine. In this context, the issues of participation of the Ukrainian intellectuals in the work of local self-government bodies (“Ukrainian subsidiary administrations”) during the difficult period of the German-fascist occupation of the territory of Ukraine in 1941-1944 are of current relevance. In the first weeks of the war with the Soviet Union, the fascist leadership decisively eliminated all attempts by Ukrainian nationalists to recreate the Ukrainian state in any form. The occupied territories were artificially divided into several administrative territorial units. On August 20, 1941, the Reich Commissariat of Ukraine was formed, which included ten occupied regions of Ukraine, including Dnipropetrovsk.On the initiative of P.T. Sokolovsky, The “Committee of Managing Propagandists” was established in the city and solemnly celebrated the second anniversary of “liberation” of Dnepropetrovsk “from the Bolsheviks” on August 25, 1943. The views of P.T. Sokolovsky were shared by many of his subordinates. Propaganda of the ideas of the new totalitarian ideology certainly met the requirements of the occupying power. Analyzing the article, we can conclude that the activities of the local intellectuals in the “Ukrainian Supplementary Authority” of Dnepropetrovsk were fully subordinated to the economic needs of the occupiers. However, the city government resolved the issues of social security of the population, preservation of the infrastructure and economic objects of the city by serving the occupying power. That is why the study of the positive aspects of the participation of the intellectuals in the work of the city government of Dnepropetrovsk in the complex historical period of 1941–1943 is a prospect for further investigation of this problem.


Worldview ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 6-12
Author(s):  
Arthur J. Goldberg

In light of the recent war between Israel and Egypt and Syria and the uneasy cease-fire which now prevails, it is entirely natural to inquire whether Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council, adopted on November 22, 1967, following the Six-Day War, remains operative.In a lecture delivered at Chatham House on April 6, 1971, and in an article published in a recent issue of the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, I stated my conviction that Resolution 242 may ultimately prove to be the basis for a peace settlement in the Middle East. I adhere to this view, despite the recent hostilities still smoldering.There is an important new development which reaffirms my conviction that the guidelines set forth in Resolution 242 are still relevant. That development is the resolution of the Security Council sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union–Resolution 338, adopted on October 22, 1973–calling for a cease-fire in the early hours of the morning of the following day.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 81
Author(s):  
Oleksandr L. Kovalkov

In December, 1979 sub-units of the Soviet Army invaded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, eliminated Hafizullah Amin from power, established the government of Babrak Karmal and occupied the country. These events caused the condemnation of the international community, that were reflected by the statement on the Afghan question in the agenda of the Security Council and the UN General Assembly in January, 1980. The minute-books of SC of the UNO, as well as the UN General Assembly resolutions are the main sources of research of this problem. The discussion of the Afghan question in the UN Security Council lasted from 5 to 7 January, 1980, involving 42 countries. The USSR Representative to the United Nations O. Troyanovskyi and Foreign Minister of DRA Sh. M. Dost tried to persuade all those present that Soviet troops had been brought to Afghanistan at the invitation of a legitimate Afghan government to repulse allegedly externally-aggressive aggression. Herewith they referred to Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 4 of the Treaty of Friendship, Neighborhood and Cooperation between the USSR and the DPA. Most of the delegations (primarily the US delegation, Pakistan, the Chinese People’s Republic, Great Britain) rejected the arguments of the Soviet and Afghan sides and condemned Soviet aggression and called for the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Afghanistan immediately. The Soviet Union and the DRA were supported only by a few delegations of Soviet satellites (Poland, the GDR, Hungary, the Mongolian People’s Republic, Laos and Vietnam). But during the vote on the anti-Soviet resolution on January 7, 1980, the USSR expected vetoed it. After that, the consideration of the «Afghan question» was postponed to the General Assembly, where 108 countries condemned the Soviet aggression on January, 14 (18 countries abstained, the same number supported the USSR). The discussion of the «Afghan question» at the United Nations Organization in January, 1980 assured that the Soviet Union had suffered a loud defeat in the international arena, its authority was severely undermined. This was also confirmed by the end of the policy of "discharging" and the subsequent eruption of the Cold War in international relations. In addition, the consideration of the Afghan question at the UNO has shown the lack of a mechanism for influencing an aggressor country that has a veto power in the UN Security Council. The USSR was expected to veto the Security Council resolution, and the decisions of the General Assembly were recommendatory. This is particularly relevant in terms of the current UN crisis in deterring the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation, the DPRK, Syria and others like that.


1990 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 341-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sally Morphet

IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to look at the United Nations Security Council and certain of the 646 resolutions and 232 public vetoes (vetoing 192 draft resolutions) cast between 1946 and the end of 1989, and to discover in what ways both it and they have been legally and politically relevant and significant. Security Council resolutions are, of course, passed by majority vote. This had to be 7 out of 11 votes until the end of 1965 when the Council was enlarged from 11 to 15. Security Council resolutions have had since then to be passed by at least 9 votes: these can only be vetoed by the five Permanent Members (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China) if the resolution would otherwise have been passed. By the end of 1989 the veto total for each Permanent Member (the Peoples Republic of China took over the China seat in 1971) was as follows: Soviet Union 114; United States 67; United Kingdom 30; France 18 and China 3.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 496-500

Application of the Republic of Korea: The report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of the Republic of Korea for admission to the United Nations was considered at the 423rd meeting of the Council on April 8, 1949. Attacked by the Soviet and Ukrainian representatives as a puppet regime illegally established by the intervention of an illegally constituted Interim Committee of the Assembly, the Republic of Korea was strongly defended by the representatives of the United States, China and Argentina as an independent state willing and able to assume the obligations of membership. The vote on the Chinese resolution to recommend the admission of Korea recorded nine members in the affirmative, with the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR in the negative. The resolution therefore failed to pass because of the negative vote of the Soviet Union.


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