The Road to Peace in the Middle East

Worldview ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 6-12
Author(s):  
Arthur J. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Recent Issue ◽  
The Road ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
New Development ◽  
Peace Settlement

In light of the recent war between Israel and Egypt and Syria and the uneasy cease-fire which now prevails, it is entirely natural to inquire whether Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council, adopted on November 22, 1967, following the Six-Day War, remains operative.In a lecture delivered at Chatham House on April 6, 1971, and in an article published in a recent issue of the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, I stated my conviction that Resolution 242 may ultimately prove to be the basis for a peace settlement in the Middle East. I adhere to this view, despite the recent hostilities still smoldering.There is an important new development which reaffirms my conviction that the guidelines set forth in Resolution 242 are still relevant. That development is the resolution of the Security Council sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union–Resolution 338, adopted on October 22, 1973–calling for a cease-fire in the early hours of the morning of the following day.

13. ‘Stagflation’ and the Trials of Détente, 1973–6

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
The United States ◽  
South Vietnam ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Peace Settlement ◽  
The Impact

This chapter examines the onset of the so-called stagflation and the problems that beset détente during the period 1973–1976. In the aftermath of Israel’s victories in the Six Day War, a situation of ‘no peace, no war’ prevailed in the Middle East. Attempts in 1970 and 1971 by the United Nations and the United States to make progress on a peace settlement proved futile. The chapter first considers the Middle East war of October 1973, which sparked a confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union, before discussing the impact of stagflation, especially on the Bretton Woods system. It then explores political problems in Europe and how European détente reached a high point in the Helsinki conference of 1975. It concludes with an analysis of détente and crises in less developed countries such as Chile, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Angola.

13. ‘Stagflation’ and the Trials of Détente, 1973–6

2020 ◽  
pp. 321-343
Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
The United States ◽  
South Vietnam ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Peace Settlement ◽  
The Impact

This chapter examines the onset of the so-called stagflation and the problems that beset détente during the period 1973–6. In the aftermath of Israel’s victories in the Six Day War, a situation of ‘no peace, no war’ prevailed in the Middle East. Attempts in 1970 and 1971 by the United Nations and the United States to make progress on a peace settlement proved futile. The chapter first considers the Middle East War of October 1973, which sparked a confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union, before discussing the impact of stagflation, especially on the Bretton Woods system. It then explores political problems in Europe and how European détente reached a high point in the Helsinki conference of 1975. It concludes with an analysis of détente and crises in less developed countries such as Chile, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Angola.

Resolutions and vetoes in the UN Security Council: their relevance and significance

1990 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 341-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sally Morphet
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Majority Vote ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Soviet Union

IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to look at the United Nations Security Council and certain of the 646 resolutions and 232 public vetoes (vetoing 192 draft resolutions) cast between 1946 and the end of 1989, and to discover in what ways both it and they have been legally and politically relevant and significant. Security Council resolutions are, of course, passed by majority vote. This had to be 7 out of 11 votes until the end of 1965 when the Council was enlarged from 11 to 15. Security Council resolutions have had since then to be passed by at least 9 votes: these can only be vetoed by the five Permanent Members (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China) if the resolution would otherwise have been passed. By the end of 1989 the veto total for each Permanent Member (the Peoples Republic of China took over the China seat in 1971) was as follows: Soviet Union 114; United States 67; United Kingdom 30; France 18 and China 3.

Trygve Lie, 1946–1953

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellen Jenny Ravndal
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Political Role ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Political Negotiation

This chapter explores all aspects of Trygve Lie’s interaction with the Security Council, beginning with his appointment process and the negotiation of the relative domains of the Council and the Secretary-General. This was a time when the working methods of the UN system were rapidly evolving through political negotiation and responses to external crises. It examines Lie’s personality and character, how he viewed his own responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security as crises arose, the legal and political tools he developed and exercised, and his changing relationship with individual permanent members and the six elected members. In the emerging Cold War, Lie’s position in the Security Council would be determined in particular by his relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union. Taking initiative in response to external crises in Iran, Palestine, Berlin, and Korea, Lie succeeded in laying foundations for an expanded political role for the Secretary-General.

Security Council

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Government ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
States Government

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.

Israel-US Relations

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivia L. Sohns
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Homeland Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
American Jews ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Strategic Cooperation ◽  
Strategic Factors

Moral, political, and strategic factors have contributed to the emergence and durability of the U.S.-Israel alliance. It took decades for American support for Israel to evolve from “a moral stance” to treating Israel as a “strategic asset” to adopting a policy of “strategic cooperation.” The United States supported Israel’s creation in 1948 not only because of the lobbying efforts of American Jews but also due to humanitarian considerations stemming from the Holocaust. Beginning in the 1950s, Israel sought to portray itself as an ally of the United States on grounds that America and Israel were fellow liberal democracies and shared a common Judeo-Christian cultural heritage. By the mid-1960s, Israel was considered a strategic proxy of American power in the Middle East in the Cold War, while the Soviet Union armed the radical Arab nationalist states and endorsed a Palestinian “people’s wars of national liberation” against Israel. Over the subsequent decades, Israel repeatedly sought to demonstrate that it was allied with the United States in opposing instability in the region that might threaten U.S. interests. Israel also sought to portray itself as a liberal democracy despite its continued occupation of territories that it conquered in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the rise of regional instability and radicalism in the Middle East following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Arab Spring of 2011, Israel’s expertise in the realms of counterterrorism and homeland security provided a further basis for U.S.-Israel military-strategic cooperation. Although American and Israeli interests are not identical, and there have been disagreements between the two countries regarding the best means to secure comprehensive Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian peace, the foundations of the relationship are strong enough to overcome crises that would imperil a less robust alliance.

Allied Control Council for Germany

1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-178 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Power Control ◽  
Security Council ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
City Government ◽  
Control Plan ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The City ◽  
Basic Prerequisite

Quadripartite Activity: Failure to find a solution of the Berlin currency problem after the question had been considered by the United Nations Security Council was evident when the replies of the western powers and the Soviet Union to Dr. Juan Atilio Bramuglia's questions about the problem were made public on November 26, 1948. The Soviet reply stated that an agreement on the four-power control plan would mean the simultaneous lifting of the Berlin blockade and a return to four-power collaboration in the administration of Berlin, which in effect would mean resumption of direct conversations on the currency questions among the four military governors. The western powers made it clear that they considered the unity of Berlin city administration as the basic prerequisite for an agreement. Several days later, on November 30, a city government was installed in the Soviet sector of Berlin, with Friedrich Ebert as its mayor and on December 21, the western military governments announced formal reconstitution of the Allied Kommandatura on a three-power basis. In announcing the move, Brig. Gen. Jean Ganeval, French sector commandant, stated that fourparty administration of the city could be resumed any time that Soviet authorities decided to abide by agreements to which the four powers were committed.

scholarly journals ACTIVITIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUARTET AND ITS PARTICIPANTS TO ACHIEVE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN SETTLEMEN WITHIN THE ROAD MAP PROJECT (2003 – 2008)

2016 ◽  
pp. 168-181
Author(s):  
I. A. Leshchenya
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Complex Analysis ◽  
Active Phase ◽  
The United States ◽  
Division Of Labour ◽  
The Road ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Road Map ◽  
The Us ◽  
Peace Settlement

The most active phase in the work of the Quartet of international intermediaries was connected with the attempts to implement the Road Map plan for the Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. The significance of the Road Map lies in the fact that it is the plan on the Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement which was, for the first time ever, collectively drafted by the global actors and accepted by both conflicting parties To facilitate the implementation of the Road Map, a peculiar "division of labour" based on historical roles which each member of the Quartet had played in the Middle East settlement, emerged inside the Quartet. The work of the Quartet as a collective intermediary was complemented by individual actions of its members which influenced or were supposed to influence the Road Map implementation. The complex analysis of the examined problem conducted by the author in accordance with his own criteria revealed that all other activities of the international intermediaries were, in one way or another, connected to the Road Map. They were either implemented mainly within the framework of the aforementioned peace plan, or were connected with the efforts to create conditions to get the parties back to implementation of that plan, or were aimed at including alternative programmes into the framework of the Road Map. Quartet's activities to implement the settlement plan couldn't avoid the influence by the United States and a special character of the US-Israeli relations. The US leading role in the work of the Quartet led to a series of events which aggravated the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and became decisive for further development of the conflict which in the end led to the current stalemate. Nevertheless, the very fact of the Quartet creation, which evidenced that even the most influential global actor has no power to solve all aspects of the regional conflict on its own, became a sign of gradual transformation of a unipolar world towards a multipolar one.

The Cold War and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–74

2020 ◽  
pp. 147-170
Author(s):  
Jerome Slater
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nixon Administration ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Peace Settlement ◽  
Arab Israeli Conflict ◽  
The Cold War

During the Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict became entangled in the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. American policymakers, particularly Henry Kissinger, believed that the Soviets wanted to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to drive the West from the Middle East and dominate the region. To prevent that, the Nixon administration sought to end Soviet influence there and exclude it from all efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. However, the American view was based on misperceptions about Soviet interests and objectives in the region. In fact, fearing American dominance and a war with the United States, the Soviets proposed a joint superpower-guaranteed or even imposed comprehensive peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Because the United States spurned these proposals, the Cold War was exacerbated, there were several near-confrontations between the superpowers, and important opportunities to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict were permanently lost.

Security Council

1947 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-98
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Alphabetical Order ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
One Year ◽  
United Nations Charter

Under Article 23 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council was to be composed of representatives of five permanent Members — China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union — plus six non-permanent Members elected by the General Assembly. The election at the First Part of the First Session of the General Assembly of Egypt, Mexico, and the Netherlands for one year terms, and Australia, Brazil, and Poland for two year terms, enabled the Security Council to convene for its first meeting on January 18, 1946, at Church House, Dean's Yard, Westminster, in London. The first 23 meetings were held in London, and the balance of 87 for the period under review either at Hunter College in New York or at Lake Success on Long Island. The first President of the Council was Mr. N. J. 0. Makin (Australia) who held office for one month, and was followed for similar periods by the representatives of the other states members in alphabetical order of the names of their countries in English.

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