Redemption of Security Interests under Israel Law

1975 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Weisman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Body ◽  
Supreme Court Justice ◽  
Secured Transactions ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

The English “Equity of Redemption” was applied by the courts in Israel long before the enactment of the Security Interests Law, 1967. The courts did not hesitate to transplant this doctrine of English law into the body of Ottoman law which was then applicable in Israel in the field of secured transactions. Yet, the extent to which this symbiosis succeeded had still to be examined, and many questions relating to the right of redemption were still unanswered when the decision was taken to prepare the new Security Interests Law. In the new Law the right of redemption was expressly recognized. The influence of English law on this subject was so marked that on one occasion a Supreme Court Justice characterized the right of redemption provided by sec. 13(a) of the Law, as “actually only legislating the equity of redemption of English law”. It is the purpose of this article to examine the way in which Israel law formulated its “equity of redemption”, to analyze it, to point out its main features and expose its shortcomings.

scholarly journals The Certainty And Legal Protection To The Buyer's Auction Of The Mortgage Right Object On Online Auctions At The Service Of Wealth State Office And Auction (KPKNL)

Jurnal Akta ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 481
Author(s):  
Arif Budi Pamungkas ◽  
Djauhari Djauhari
Keyword(s):  
Research Method ◽  
Online Auctions ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
The Public ◽  
State Office ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

An auction is an activity of selling of goods in public by means of a verbal-bid to get the higher price or to get lower prices and the price quote can be done in a closed and written. This is done by the way of collecting the prospective buyers of the auction led by officials of the auction. In this case, the intended auction was the sale of goods that are held publicly. The auction, according to the regulations of security right, is when the debtor made a breach, the holder of the security rights have the right to sell the security rights’ objects over its own power through a public auction as well as taking payment of account receivable from the sale proceeds. An auction is an alternative to the sale of an undertaken asset by way of inviting prospective buyers at a particular time and place in which the last highest bidder in writing or orally is determined as the winner. The author used socio-legal research as his research method. To meet the forth standards set by the law, the auction should be widely announced to the public, either through printed file, electronic or visual. A legal certainty as a basis which concerned with propriety and justice is very closely related to the principle of auction sales in another. As the formulation of the problem of the form of identification of the problem, namely how the legal protection of the auction buyers encountered the obstacles as well as the solution.Keywords: Auction; Legal Protection; Mortgage Right

scholarly journals A Choice among Values: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives on the Defence of Necessity

1969 ◽  
pp. 848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Berger
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Historical Perspectives ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
A Value ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Way

The author explores various theoretical approaches to the defence of necessity, rejecting both excusatory conceptions of the defence and those based on the notion of moral involuntariness. Rather, the author argues that necessity is properly understood as a justificatory defence based on a lack of moral blameworthiness. After extensively surveying the history of the defence in Canadian law, the author critiques the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada has restricted the defence. He contrasts the current Canadian approach with the treatment of the defence in other jurisdictions and concludes that Canadian law would be served best by a robust defence of necessity, which would acknowledge that, in some circumstances, pursuit of a value of greater worth than the value of adherence to the law can be justified.

BECOMING HUMAN

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-7
Author(s):  
Christopher Jenks
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Body ◽  
Human Suffering ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Arbitrary Decision ◽  
Real Person ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

Opponents of abortion sometimes argue that a fetus "wants" to grow up into a real person. But every egg and sperm also "want" to become a person in this sense. And if that is the case, how can one defend either contraception or celibacy, both of which deny life to millions of eggs and sperms that "want" to become people, and both of which also involve repression of "natural" impulses? The question of whether abortion is morally wrong depends on when we become "human." Unfortunately, this does not happen all at once, as in medieval fantasies of the soul's entering the body. It happens bit by bit. We must therefore make some arbitrary decision about when to confer the "right to life." Because nature offers no clear guidance about where this line should be drawn, the most humane solution is to draw it so as to minimize human suffering. I doubt, however, that opponents of abortion will accept this approach, for once you accept it, you will almost inevitably be led to precisely the same "liberal" conclusion the Supreme Court reached five years ago in Roe v. Wade.

O caso Enka Insaat v. Insurance Company Chubb e a questão relativa à lei aplicável à cláusula arbitral: entre a lex contractus e a Lei da Sede

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
pp. 159-194
Author(s):  
Nadia de Araujo ◽  
Caio Gomes de Freitas
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Insurance Company ◽  
Party Autonomy ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Way

When negotiating a contract, parties usually establish that future and eventual disputes arising out and related to the performance of their obligations shall be resolved by arbitration. Such a choice, a clear expression of the principle of party autonomy, is embedded in a contractual clause, commonly referred to as arbitration agreement. The way by which the agreement is written and, to some extent, how it is construed can, and most commonly will, result in extensive and costly disputes. In the UK, the Supreme Court has recently decided a case related to the construction of an arbitration agreement, specifically to the law applicable to its validity, scope and effectiveness. According to the Court, in the absence of an express choice made by the parties, the system of law chosen to govern the substance of the contract will apply to the validity and scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Where no such choice is expressly or implied made by the parties, it will be the law of the seat of arbitration since it represents the system of law most closely connected to the agreement. This article reviews the case-law and provides some relevant excerpts of the case.

Seeking Reconciliation

2020 ◽  
pp. 88-124
Author(s):  
Arzoo Osanloo
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Cycle Of Violence ◽  
Considerable Influence ◽  
The Family ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Legitimate Violence ◽  
Sense Of Power ◽  
The Way

This chapter studies the operations of the Iranian criminal law and analyzes how the procedural administration of the law animates the shariʻa. Iranian criminal laws provide many avenues for victims to forgo retributive sanctioning. But preserving the right of retribution serves several purposes: maintaining the sovereign's monopoly on legitimate violence, giving victims a sense of power, and halting the cycle of violence. The way Iran achieves this comprises an interesting balancing act between maintaining the monopoly over legitimate violence and granting individual victims the right of retribution, which its leaders believe, through their interpretation of the shariʻa, cannot be appropriated by the sovereign. Since the law categorizes intentional murder as qisas and leaves judges with no discretion in sentencing, the judges may use their considerable influence to pressure the family to forgo retribution. The chapter then considers the role of judges and examines how the laws (substantive and procedural) shape their reasoning and discretion in both sentencing and encouraging forbearance.

3 The Supreme Court and the Irish Free State

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dickson Brice
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
Free State ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Irish Free State ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

This chapter considers the performance of the Irish Supreme Court during the life of the Irish Free State (1922–37). It charts the way in which the right to appeal from the Supreme Court to the Privy Council was abolished (comparing the position in other Dominions) and shows that, despite the rhetoric of Irish politicians at the time, the judges were keen to uphold the British approach to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The chapter then describes some of the emergency legislation enacted in the Free State to combat republican violence and examines how it was viewed by the Supreme Court, most notably in the very deferential (albeit split) decision in The State (Ryan) v Lennon. The chapter sums up the Court’s performance during the existence of the Irish Free State as disappointing and uninspiring.

scholarly journals Justices as “Sacred Symbols”: Antonin Scalia and the Cultural Life of the Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-23
Author(s):  
Brian Christopher Jones ◽  
Austin Sarat
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Public Life ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Cultural Relevance ◽  
Supreme Court Justice ◽  
Strict Adherence ◽  
Cultural Life ◽  
Single Judge ◽  
The Law

Abstract Perhaps no single judge in recent years has embodied the intricacies and difficulties of the cultural life of the law as much as American Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. While common law judges have traditionally acquired status—and cultural relevance—from the significance, eloquence and forcefulness of their judicial opinions, Justice Scalia took an altogether different route. Both on and off the bench, he pushed the limits of legal and political legitimacy. He did this through a strict adherence to what we call a “judicial mandate,” flamboyant but engaging writing, biting humor and widespread marketing of his originalist and textualist interpretative theories. This article chronicles these features of Scalia’s jurisprudence and public life more generally, ultimately characterising the late justice as a “sacred symbol” in American legal and political circles, and beyond.

scholarly journals Feu la D.C.D. L'arrêt Miller et la peine de mort

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.

scholarly journals Private Prosecutions in Mauritius: Clarifying Locus Standi and Making the Director of Public Prosecutions more Accountable

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Locus Standi ◽  
Statutory Requirement ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

Case law shows that private prosecutions have been part of Mauritian law at least since 1873. In Mauritius there are two types of private prosecutions: private prosecutions by individuals; and private prosecutions by statutory bodies. Neither the Mauritian constitution nor legislation provides for the right to institute a private prosecution. Because of the fact that Mauritian legislation is not detailed on the issue of locus standi to institute private prosecutions and does not address the issue of whether or not the Director of Public Prosecutions has to give reasons when he takes over and discontinues a private prosecution, the Supreme Court has had to address these issues. The Mauritian Supreme Court has held, inter alia, that a private prosecution may only be instituted by an aggrieved party (even in lower courts where this is not a statutory requirement) and that the Director of Public Prosecutions may take over and discontinue a private prosecution without giving reasons for his decision. However, the Supreme Court does not define “an aggrieved party.” In this article the author takes issue with the Court’s findings in these cases and, relying on legislation from other African countries, recommends how the law could be amended to strengthen the private prosecutor’s position.

scholarly journals Was the Supreme Court right to change the law on the right to a speedy trial?

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Reasonable Time ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Speedy Trial

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.

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