Early British Administration in the Southern Sudan

1961 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Collins ◽  
Richard Herzog

During the first decade of the Anglo-Egyptian occupation of the Sudan, the newly formed Condominium Government had slowly established its rule in the Southern Sudan. A way to the south was first cleared through the sudd-choked channels of the Bahr al-Jabal and the Bahr al-Ghazāl Rivers, and administrators and troops soon followed to secure the control of the Upper Nile Valley for Britain and Egypt against the pretensions of other European powers. In 1898 Britain successfully rejected the claims of France to the Upper Nile, but it was not until 1906 that the British Government was able to eliminate the third competitor for control of the Southern Sudan—the Congo Free State. From 1902 to 1906 desultory negotiations were carried on between the British Foreign Office and the representatives of Leopold II, King of the Belgians and Sovereign of the Congo Free State, enlivened only by provocative incidents precipitated by Leopold's agents in the Southern Sudan. Both parties had valid legal and moral claims to the Upper Nile which were supported by the arms of the Force Publique on the one hand and Egyptian and Sudanese troops on the other.

1966 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. J. S. Cookey

In 1899 the French Colonial Ministry parcelled out the greater part of the French Congo among various concession companies in imitation of a similar policy adopted earlier by the Congo Free State. British companies which had pioneered the trade found themselves being treated as squatters and interlopers subject to legal prosecutions. They claimed that the French government had infringed the provisions of the Berlin Act and called for the diplomatic support of the Foreign Office. Their call was backed by the British Chambers of Commerce.For long British humanitarians had been decrying the treatment of Africans in the Congo basin whose lands were being expropriated, and they had repeatedly appealed to the British government to ensure that the provisions of the Berlin Act were enforced. Consequently, the British merchants and the humanitarians found common ground for agitation.In the face of such a powerful combination the Foreign Office had to act and protracted Anglo-French negotiations ensued. They were brought to an end in 1906 when the French government, while maintaining the principle of concessions, agreed to compensate the British firms for their losses.


Author(s):  
YI MENG CHENG

Abstract A fresh look at the 1888 Sikkim Expedition using both Chinese and English language sources yields very different conclusions from that of previous research on the subject. During the course of policymaking, the British Foreign Office and the British Government of India did not collaborate to devise a plan to invade Tibet; conversely, their aims differed and clashed frequently. During the years leading to war, the largest newspapers in British India gave plenty of coverage to the benefits of trade with Tibet, thus influencing British foreign policy and contributing indirectly to the outbreak of war. The Tibetan army was soundly defeated in the war, while the British troops suffered only light casualties. Although the Tibetan elites remained committed to the war, the lower classes of Tibetan society quickly grew weary of it. During the war, the British made much use of local spies and enjoyed an advantage in intelligence gathering, which contributed greatly to their victory. Finally, although the war was initially fought over trade issues, the demarcation of the Tibetan-Sikkim border replaced trade issues as the main point of contention during the subsequent peace negotiations. During the negotiations, Sheng Tai, the newly appointed Amban of Tibet, tried his best to defend China's interests.


Author(s):  
George Shepperson

(These notes were offered as a contribution to discussion at the nineteenth and twentieth century sessions of the Third Conference on African History and Archaeology at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, 3 - 7 July, 1961. Two additions - references 3 and 12 - have been made to the original notes.)The historical position of the United States in Subsaharan Africa has until recently been one of detachment. There have been official moves, as when in 1833 an agreement was concluded with the Sultan of Zanzibar which, among other things, permitted American consuls to reside in his ports and judge disputes involving U. S. citizens; or the recognition of the Congo Free State in 1884. On the whole, however, the United States has left Africa to the European powers who took over the responsibility of governing her peoples.


1978 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-223
Author(s):  
Sheldon Spear

Edmund Dene Morel was born in Paris in 1873, the son of a French civil servant father and an English mother. Modestly educated in England, he emerged at age thirty from the obscurity of a clerkship in a Liverpool commercial firm to launch a journalistic crusade against the murderous exploitation of blacks on the rubber plantations of the Congo Free State. Largely as a result of this effort he became critical of what he considered the deviousness of the British Foreign Office, and by 1911 he was questioning the extent of the commitment to France in the Entente Cordiale. He was pro-German only in the sense that he opposed the prevalent anti-German hysteria and believed that an Anglo-German confrontation would be catastrophic for both countries. Morel was one of a number of free-trade, anti-imperialist, foreign- and imperial-affairs specialists associated with the pre-war Liberal Party; J. A. Hobson, H. N. Brailsford and E. G. Browne were others. But it was the war which made him the butt of nationalist fury and the victim of government prosecution for his advocacy of a negotiated peace and for his infuriating insistence that Germany's share of the blame for the war's origin was much less than that of Tsarist Russia or even of Britain's Liberal government.


1981 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 364-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward C. Keefer

In assessing the events which brought Great Britain and France from the edge of war at Fashoda in 1898 to the alliance of 1914, scholars have paid little attention to the settlement of Anglo-French differences in the independent African empire of Ethiopia. The resolution of Ethiopian problems in 1906 was nonetheless important in forging close Anglo-French relations, especially when viewed within the context of the better-known Entente Cordiale of 1904. By excluding Anglo-French conflicting Ethiopian interests from the already difficult entente negotiations, British and French statesmen removed a potential stumbling block to that important and seminal agreement. In a more positive vein, the subsequent signing of a separate Tripartite Treaty on Ethiopia—the Italians were the third signatory—actively reinforced the Entente Cordiale itself. To the French the Ethiopian agreement was a confirmation of British good faith in implementing the spirit of the entente beyond areas specified in the more important accord of 1904. To the British it was an object lesson that certain imperial interests in Ethiopia should not jeopardize generally improving relations with France. To both countries the Tripartite Treaty of 1906 tidied unfinished business of the entente and eliminated to each nation's general satisfaction a nagging local conflict.French Foreign Minister Theophile Delcassé had wanted to include Ethiopia in the entente agreement. During the course of the negotiations he suggested to his English counterpart Lord Lansdowne a “comprehensive settlement” of colonial-imperial differences. While individuals in the British Foreign Office considered adding Ethiopia to the larger rapprochement over Egypt and Morocco, the British cabinet decided to postpone Ethiopian matters until after conclusion of the Entente Cordiale. In good part this decision reflected respect for the complexity of strategic, financial, and personal rivalries of the two great imperial powers in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.


1975 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marian Kent

‘The National Bank of Turkey was founded in 1909 with British Government encouragement and support to further British economic enterprise in the Ottoman Empire’ so we are told in all die standard and respectable works on the subject. This is correct in form but incorrect in substance, for one cannot accept the implications it carries with it, in some cases explicitly stated. These are that, in the first place, the Foreign Office was instrumental in actually starting the Bank, in the second place, that the Bank succeeded very far in its objects, and in the third place, that it ever received much Foreign Office support in what it sought to do.


1987 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raul García Heras

By 1930 there were £435.1 million of British capital invested in Argentina, 62.3% of which was located in railway companies whose securities duly yielded reasonable annual profits. However, the onset of the Great Depression and the successful 1930 revolution brought this state of affairs to a standstill. Moreover, both events inaugurated years of growing difficulties for the British-owned railways and the British government, for whom these public utilities gradually turned into economic hostages and a potential source of conflict in Anglo-Argentine relations. On the one hand, the railways were slowly squeezed between rising operating costs and regulated tariffs while their net receipts dwindled becausé of the crisis. Furthermore, the companies began to experience the following: growing hostility from a local public opinion who resented their foreign ownership; the adverse effects of the Argentine nationalistic economic policies; and had to find suitable new courses of action to deal with government officials who were not wholly sympathetic to their interests. On the other hand, although Whitehall could not fail to consider that to some extent the railways were the backbone of Britain's economic stronghold in the Argentine, they also had other substantial trading, financial and shipping interests at stake in this highly profitable market. Therefore, the British government began to weigh carefully the role of these public utilities in British policy towards Argentina; the real prospects of a clash with Argentina if the railways' finances deteriorated too much and the Foreign Office intervened on their behalf; and whether their aspirations should be considered on the same standing as other British concerns in the Argentine.


2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (136) ◽  
pp. 455-468
Author(s):  
Hartwig Berger

The article discusses the future of mobility in the light of energy resources. Fossil fuel will not be available for a long time - not to mention its growing environmental and political conflicts. In analysing the potential of biofuel it is argued that the high demands of modern mobility can hardly be fulfilled in the future. Furthermore, the change into using biofuel will probably lead to increasing conflicts between the fuel market and the food market, as well as to conflicts with regional agricultural networks in the third world. Petrol imperialism might be replaced by bio imperialism. Therefore, mobility on a solar base pursues a double strategy of raising efficiency on the one hand and strongly reducing mobility itself on the other.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document