Soviet Technological Man Speaks: The Enemy is Everywhere

Worldview ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 6-8
Author(s):  
Victor C. Ferkiss

Since the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in the late summer of 1968 hopes for détente between East and West have ebbed. The ruthless suppression of internal political autonomy in that often overrun nation seems to have given the lie to all those who have asserted that under the common pressures of modern industrialized society the social systems of the United States and the Soviet Union were becoming more and more alike. The use of the naked force of the Red Army to destroy the Czech road to socialism has left in ruin not only immediate aspirations for a reduction of international tensions in Central Europe but the broader faith in a future peace based on a convergence of the democratic and the Communist ways of life.

Author(s):  
Jeronim Perović

This chapter presents the first detailed account of the tragic impact of the collectivization and “de-kulakization” campaign in the North Caucasus based on Soviet archival sources. In 1929-30, under the slogan of “socialist transformation of the country,” the Soviet state reached out to the countryside, trying forcibly to change traditional economic ways of life and break up the existing social structures within the villages. In the eyes of the peasants, however, the state’s collectivization and “de-kulakization” campaign represented nothing less than a brutal assault, plunging the whole country into chaos and provoking large-scale rebellions. Resistance was especially fierce in the Muslim-dominated parts of the North Caucasus, where Soviet structures were weak and the social cohesion of mountain communities strong. Ultimately, the Red Army and the armed forces of the secret police crushed these rebellions ruthlessly. However, especially in Chechnia, Ingushetia, Karachai, and the mountainous parts of Dagestan, they were at least sufficiently violent for the Soviet leadership to decide to suspend their collectivization attempt altogether. In fact, it was not until mid-1930s, much later than in most other areas of the Soviet Union, that collectivization was formally completed.


Author(s):  
Steven A. Barnes

This chapter takes the Gulag into the postwar era when authorities used the institution in an attempt to reassert social control. At the same time, arrivals from the newly annexed western territories and former Red Army soldiers dramatically altered the social world of the Gulag prisoner. New prisoner populations of war veterans, nationalist guerrillas, and peoples with significant life experience outside the Soviet Union provided a potentially combustible mix. The isolation and concentration of many of these prisoners in a small number of special camps raised even further the potential explosiveness of the population. The Gulag was a political institution, though, and it was only the death of the system's founder that would set off the explosions.


2020 ◽  
pp. 405-422
Author(s):  
David G. Tompkins

In the aftermath of World War II, the Red Army as a symbol of power was supported in many other arenas so as to counteract the rival influence of the United States on Central Europe. The Soviet Union brought new urgency to these efforts from 1948, with music—and culture more broadly—providing a case for Russia’s attractiveness and superiority with respect to the West. This chapter discusses the nature and scope of Soviet influence in the Central European music world through the examples of East Germany and Poland, and through the prism of the music and persona of Sergei Prokofiev. After his return to the USSR in 1936, Prokofiev, along with Shostakovich, became associated with the very definition of what made music Soviet and thus worthy of emulation. And even more than Shostakovich, Prokofiev and his music functioned as powerful but malleable symbols that could be appropriated by all Soviet actors for their own ends.


Author(s):  
Richard M. Titmuss

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the study of the beliefs, attitudes, and values concerning blood and its possession, inheritance, and use and loss in diverse societies. The study originated and grew over many years of introspection from a series of value questions formulated within the context of attempts to distinguish the ‘social’ from the ‘economic’ in public policies and in those institutions and services with declared ‘welfare’ goals. As such, this book centres on human blood: the scientific, social, economic, and ethical issues involved in its procurement, processing, distribution, use, and benefit in Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and other countries. Ultimately, it considers the role of altruism in modern society. It attempts to fuse the politics of welfare and the morality of individual wills.


2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID REYNOLDS

This review examines some of the recent British, American, and Russian scholarship on a series of important international transitions that occurred in the years around 1945. One is the shift of global leadership from Great Britain to the United States, in which, it is argued, the decisive moment was the fall of France in 1940. Another transition is the emergence of a wartime alliance between Britain and America, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, followed by its disintegration into the Cold War. Here the opening of Soviet sources during the 1990s has provided new evidence, though not clear answers. To understand both of these transitions, however, it is necessary to move beyond diplomacy and strategy to look at the social, cultural, and economic dimensions of the Second World War. In particular, recent studies of American and Soviet soldiers during and after the conflict re-open the debate about Cold War ideology from the bottom up.


1987 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Welch Larson

Much has been written about how the United States and the Soviet Union have managed crises since World War II, avoiding dangerous escalation and war; little on how the two superpowers have avoided confrontations. In part scholarly neglect of the question of crisis avoidance reflects the acute suspicion and hostility of the cold war. When U.S.-Soviet rivalry was perceived as a struggle between incompatible ideologies and ways of life, it was unthinkable that the superpowers might have any common interests, much less that they could collaborate, even tacitly, to control the conflict in their relationship.


1989 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred H. Lawson

Diplomatic historians of all persuasions agree that the Iranian Crisis of 1945–1946 played a considerable part in initiating the Cold War. For revisionist writers, the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union that took place during these months resulted from American efforts to carve out a sphere of influence in the oil-producing areas of the Middle East. By the autumn of 1945, according to this view, U.S. firms had gained controlling interests in the consortia holding exclusive rights to work the extensive petroleum deposits located in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain; more importantly, Iranian officials were making repeated overtures to American concerns in an effort to counterbalance established British interests with more dynamic ones based in the United States. When the Red Army prevented the government in Tehran from suppressing separatist movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in December 1945, the Truman Administration manipulated the Security Council of the United Nations into mandating a Soviet withdrawal from northern Iran.


2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantin Akinsha

AbstractThis article is dedicated to the collection from the Bremen Kunsthalle, comprising 1715 drawings, 50 paintings, and about 3000 prints found by Soviet troops in castle of Karnzow near Berlin in May 1945. The collection was not seized by Soviet trophy brigades but was looted by soldiers and officers of the 38th Field Engineers' Brigade of the Red Army.After their return to the USSR and demobilization, some of the officers donated their loot to different museums around the Soviet Union. One of the most important parts of the collection, with 362 drawings and two paintings—among them works of Dürer, Rembrandt, Goya, and Van Gogh, was appropriated by Captain Viktor Baldin. In 1948 Baldin deposited his loot in the A. V. Shchusev State Research Museum of Architecture in Moscow. Later Baldin became the director of the museum and advocated return of the art to its rightful owners.Since the days of Gorbachev's perestroika, these art works have frequently attracted public attention and provoked fierce debates. The Federal Law on Cultural Valuables adopted in 1998 did not cover art works looted by private individuals. Rather, such conflicts have to be solved within the framework of Russian criminal law.In contrast, other works of art from the same Bremen Kunsthalle collection were restituted from the United States, Ukraine, and Estonia. Another 101 drawings and prints of the collection, seized by another member of Baldin's brigade, were returned from Russia to Bremen in 2000, but that was in “exchange” for an original mosaic from the legendary Amber Chamber. However, despite more than 20 years of efforts by German officials and endless negotiations, the Baldin Collection remains in the Russian Federation. The return of those stolen drawings any time soon now looks highly improbable. The case of the Baldin Collection became the most striking example of the Russian nonrestitution of cultural property looted during World War II.


Author(s):  
Yevgeny Zvedre

This article is primarily focused on the diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing the weaponisation of outer space, or development of weapon systems designed to destroy targets, either orbital or terrestrial, or from the ground in outer space. Along with that, a number of anti-satellite weapon projects that both the United States (US) and the Soviet Union/Russia have been developing since the 1950s are briefly described as examples of their military competition in space. Highlighted is the work that has been done within the United Nations (UN) context to develop a corpus of universal principles and norms governing international exploration of outer space as the common heritage of humankind, free from the use of force. The author also highlights the positive role that arms control treaties have been playing in preventing deployment of weapons in space. Particular emphasis is given to the potential consequences for global security should attack weapons appear in outer space, and to the importance of a further targeted effort by the international community to work out additional regulations strengthening space security. In this regard, draft treaties on the prevention of weapons in space introduced by Russia and China, and the European Union’s International Code of conduct for Space are emphasised.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-44
Author(s):  
A. Yu. Borisov

It is unfortunate to note again today that World War II did not end, it continues in the form of the war of memory. Politicians and scholars who stand as ideological successors of collaborators are trying to rewrite the history of those tragic days, to downplay the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over fascism. They try to revive certain political myths, which have been debunked long ago, that the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany bear equal responsibility for the outbreak of World War II, that the Red Army did not liberate Eastern Europe but ‘occupied’ it. In order to combat these attempts it is necessary to examine once again a turbulent history of the inter-war period and, particularly, the reasons why all attempts to form a united antifascist front had failed in the 1930s, but eventually led to the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition.The paper focuses on a complex set of political considerations, including cooperation and confrontation, mutual suspicions and a fervent desire to find an ally in the face of growing international tensions, which all together determined the dynamics of relations within a strategic triangle of the Soviet Union — the United States — Great Britain in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The paper shows how all attempts to establish a collective security system during the prewar period had shattered faced with the policy of appeasement, which allowed the Nazi Germany to occupy much of Europe. Only the Soviet Union’s entry into the war changed the course of the conflict and made a decisive contribution to the victory over fascist aggressors. The author emphasizes that at such crucial moment of history I.V. Stalin, F.D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill raised to that challenge, demonstrating realism, common sense and willingness to cooperate. Although within the anti-Hitler coalition there was a number of pending issues, which triggered tensions between the Allies, their leaders managed to move beyond old grievances, ideological differences and short-term political interests, to realize that they have a common strategic goal in the struggle against Nazism. According to the author, this is the foundation for success of the anti-Hitler coalition and, at the same time, the key lesson for contemporary politicians. The very emergence of the anti-Hitler coalition represented a watershed in the history of the 20th century, which has determined a way forward for the whole humanity and laid the foundations for the world order for the next fifty years.


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