The North Caucasus During Collectivisation

Author(s):  
Jeronim Perović

This chapter presents the first detailed account of the tragic impact of the collectivization and “de-kulakization” campaign in the North Caucasus based on Soviet archival sources. In 1929-30, under the slogan of “socialist transformation of the country,” the Soviet state reached out to the countryside, trying forcibly to change traditional economic ways of life and break up the existing social structures within the villages. In the eyes of the peasants, however, the state’s collectivization and “de-kulakization” campaign represented nothing less than a brutal assault, plunging the whole country into chaos and provoking large-scale rebellions. Resistance was especially fierce in the Muslim-dominated parts of the North Caucasus, where Soviet structures were weak and the social cohesion of mountain communities strong. Ultimately, the Red Army and the armed forces of the secret police crushed these rebellions ruthlessly. However, especially in Chechnia, Ingushetia, Karachai, and the mountainous parts of Dagestan, they were at least sufficiently violent for the Soviet leadership to decide to suspend their collectivization attempt altogether. In fact, it was not until mid-1930s, much later than in most other areas of the Soviet Union, that collectivization was formally completed.

Worldview ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 6-8
Author(s):  
Victor C. Ferkiss

Since the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in the late summer of 1968 hopes for détente between East and West have ebbed. The ruthless suppression of internal political autonomy in that often overrun nation seems to have given the lie to all those who have asserted that under the common pressures of modern industrialized society the social systems of the United States and the Soviet Union were becoming more and more alike. The use of the naked force of the Red Army to destroy the Czech road to socialism has left in ruin not only immediate aspirations for a reduction of international tensions in Central Europe but the broader faith in a future peace based on a convergence of the democratic and the Communist ways of life.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (9) ◽  
pp. 48-58
Author(s):  
Valentin Golub ◽  

The article is devoted to one of the activities of the outstanding domestic ecologist Leonty Grigorievich Ramen-skii. In the 1930s, Ramenskii began to develop theoretical and practical issues of lands typology. In essence, the concept of the land’s typology by Ramenskii does not differ from the classification of biotopes, which began to be developed in European countries about 30 years ago under such projects as CORINE, Palaearctic Habitats, EUNIS. Only their results use differs. The lands typology is intended for the economic exploitation of biotopes, and their classification in the CORINE, Palaearctic Habitats, EUNIS projects for their protection. Ramenskii creat-ed a new direction of ecology, namely, the typology of lands, or in other words, the science of the typology of biotopes. Academician V. R. Williams was a strong opponent of the development of this direction of science in the USSR. Detailed characterization of biotopes was accompanied by their mapping. This characteristic was called land certification. Large areas of vacant land appeared in the first half of the 1940s in the North Caucasus and Kalmykia. There was an urgent need for certification of these lands. Ramenskii prepared instructions for carrying out certification. Similar instructions were reprinted several times in the future. In accordance with these instructions, it is necessary to carry out mapping of lands during their certification on a scale of 1 : 10000–1 : 25000 for agricultural areas and 1 : 25000–1 : 50000 for desert, semi-desert and mountainous areas. The author believed that this was nothing more than a mapping of biotopes, designed for their agricultural exploita-tion. Since the late 1950s, the certification of natural forage lands began to be carried out everywhere throughout the Soviet Union. The instructions indicated that re-survey of hayfields and pastures should be carried out, as a rule, every 15 years, and in areas of intensive use after 10 years. In Russia, large-scale mapping of natural hay-field and pasture biotopes ceased in the early 1990s with the transition to market forms of farming. In Western Europe, large-scale biotope mapping began 30-40 years later than in the Soviet Union.


Author(s):  
Ivan V. ZYKIN

During the years of Soviet power, principal changes took place in the country’s wood industry, including in spatial layout development. Having the large-scale crisis in the industry in the late 1980s — 2000s and the positive changes in its functioning in recent years and the development of an industry strategy, it becomes relevant to analyze the experience of planning the spatial layout of the wood industry during the period of Stalin’s modernization, particularly during the first five-year plan. The aim of the article is to analyze the reason behind spatial layout of the Soviet wood industry during the implementation of the first five-year plan. The study is based on the modernization concept. In our research we conducted mapping of the wood industry by region as well as of planned construction of the industry facilities. It was revealed that the discussion and development of an industrialization project by the Soviet Union party-state and planning agencies in the second half of the 1920s led to increased attention to the wood industry. The sector, which enterprises were concentrated mainly in the north-west, west and central regions of the country, was set the task of increasing the volume of harvesting, export of wood and production to meet the domestic needs and the export needs of wood resources and materials. Due to weak level of development of the wood industry, the scale of these tasks required restructuring of the branch, its inclusion to the centralized economic system, the direction of large capital investments to the development of new forest areas and the construction of enterprises. It was concluded that according to the first five-year plan, the priority principles for the spatial development of the wood industry were the approach of production to forests and seaports, intrasectoral and intersectoral combining. The framework of the industry was meant to strengthen and expand by including forests to the economic turnover and building new enterprises in the European North and the Urals, where the main capital investments were sent, as well as in the Vyatka region, Transcaucasia, Siberia and the Far East.


2021 ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
O. Lysenko ◽  
O. Fil ◽  
L. Khoynatska

Discussions around various aspects of World War II in the world’s scientific space and memory field have continued throughout the postwar decades. Initially, they were determined by polar and antagonistic ideological paradigms, and after the end of the Cold War – the discovery and introduction into scientific circulation of previously classified sources, testing of avant-garde methods of scientific knowledge, the development of interpretive tools. In the late 1930s, the Soviet Union found itself virtually isolated, alone with the Axis bloc and their allies. It was difficult for the Soviet leadership to overcome the existing threats on its own, especially after the German attack. Only the realization by the Western Allies that Berlin’s aggressive course had become a global challenge made it possible to find a constructive way to join forces in the fight against a common enemy. One of the channels of cooperation between the states of the Anti-Hitler Coalition was the organization of supplies to the USSR of military equipment, ammunition, food, and materials necessary for the facilities of the Soviet military-industrial complex within the framework of the land lease program. Until recently, the problem of land lease was more in ideological discourse than in purely scientific. The currently available source base allows for an unbiased analysis of this phenomenon and elucidation of the place and role of foreign revenues to the USSR in strengthening its defense capabilities during the war against Germany and its allies. However, to this day, the researchers look out of focus, because of the perception of this phenomenon by veterans who fought on foreign military equipment, ate food from overseas. The authors of the article sees their task as combining these two dimensions of the lend-lease and finding out its impact not only on the scale of the large-scale armed confrontation, but also on the moral and psychological condition of the Red Army, for whom the war was an extremely difficult test.


Author(s):  
Steven A. Barnes

This chapter takes the Gulag into the postwar era when authorities used the institution in an attempt to reassert social control. At the same time, arrivals from the newly annexed western territories and former Red Army soldiers dramatically altered the social world of the Gulag prisoner. New prisoner populations of war veterans, nationalist guerrillas, and peoples with significant life experience outside the Soviet Union provided a potentially combustible mix. The isolation and concentration of many of these prisoners in a small number of special camps raised even further the potential explosiveness of the population. The Gulag was a political institution, though, and it was only the death of the system's founder that would set off the explosions.


Author(s):  
Fei Wu

Vladimir Putin's annual address as president in 2006 neatly summaries the reason why Russia had to press forward with long-overdue reforms of its armed forces. Two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was still left with an oversized military organization built for large-scale mobilization and the demands of the Cold War, but highly ineffective for the type of conventional military conflicts that Russia was most likely to become involved in. The rationale behind Russia's reforms of the armed forces were thus clear long before the war in Georgia, which has often been pointed to as the reason why the reforms were launched in October 2008. President Vladimir Putin's current period runs out in 2024, when he is due to step down, according to the constitution. Given the fact that the current political system has been carefully crafted for almost 20 years, it is evident that there is uncertainty about its future. First, it no longer produces wealth for the population. For five years in a row, the real disposable income has been decreasing.


Author(s):  
James H. Meyer

The history of Muslim populations in Russia and other former republics of the Soviet Union is long and varied. In a Pew–Templeton poll conducted in Russia in 2010, 10 percent of respondents stated that their religion was Islam, while Muslims also make up a majority of the population in six post-Soviet republics: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Muslims have long lived in regions across Russia, with far-flung communities ranging from distant outposts of Siberia to western cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg. At the beginning of the 20th century, there were more Muslims in the Russian Empire than there were in Iran or the Ottoman Empire, the two largest independent Muslim-majority states in the world at the time. Historically, the Muslim communities of Russia have been concentrated in four main regions: the Volga–Ural region in central Russia, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. While Muslim communities across former Soviet space share both differences and similarities with one another with regard to language and religious practices, their respective relations with the various Russian states that have existed over the years have varied. Moreover, Russian and Soviet policymaking toward all of these communities has shifted considerably from one era, and one ruler, to another. Throughout the imperial and Soviet eras, and extending into the post-Soviet era up to the present day, therefore, the existence of variations with regard to both era and region remains one of the most enduring legacies of Muslim–state interactions. Muslims in Russia vary by traditions, language, ethnicity, religious beliefs, and practices, and with respect to their historical interactions with the Russian state. The four historically Muslim-inhabited regions were incorporated into the Russian state at different points during its imperial history, often under quite sharply contrasting sets of conditions. Today most, but not all, Muslims in Russia and the rest of the former USSR are Sunni, although the manner and degree to which religion is practiced varies greatly among both communities and individuals. With respect to language, Muslim communities in Russia have traditionally been dominated demographically by Turkic speakers, although it should be noted that most Turkic languages are not mutually comprehensible in spoken form. In the North Caucasus and Tajikistan, the most widely spoken indigenous languages are not Turkic, although in these areas there are Turkic-speaking minorities. Another important feature of Muslim–state interactions in Russia is their connection to Muslims and Muslim-majority states beyond Russia’s borders. Throughout the imperial era, Russia’s foreign policymaking vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire and Iran was often intimately connected to domestic policymaking toward Muslim communities inside Russia. While this was a less pronounced feature of Moscow’s foreign policymaking during the Soviet era, in the post-Soviet era, policymaking toward Muslims domestically has once again become more closely linked to Russia’s foreign policy goals.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-32
Author(s):  
Anne E. Hasselmann

In the wake of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet museum curators began to establish a museal depiction of the war. This article analyzes these early beginnings of Soviet war commemoration and the curtailing of its surprising heterogeneity in late Stalinism. Historical research has largely ignored the impact of Soviet museum workers (muzeishchiki) on the evolution of Russian war memory. Archival material from the Red Army Museum, now renamed the Central Museum of the Armed Forces, in Moscow and the Belarus Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War in Minsk documents the unfolding of locally specific war exhibitions which stand in stark contrast to the later homogenized official Soviet war narrative. Yet war memory was not created unilaterally by the curators. Visitors also participated in its making, as the museum guestbooks demonstrate. As “sites of commemoration and learning,” early Soviet war exhibitions reveal the agency of the muzeishchiki and the involvement of the visitors in the “small events” of memory creation.


Author(s):  
Jeronim Perović

The focus of this chapter is on the complex developments in the North Caucasus during the time of Revolution and Civil War (1917-1921). If the period of the February and October revolutions was characterized by attempts of the North Caucasian political and religious elite to form a single state entity, the outbreak of civil war brought societal and ethnic cleavages to the fore, undermining common state-building efforts. Caucasians fought on all sides of the front, but most of the North Caucasian Muslims allied themselves with the forces of the Bolsheviks, with whom they shared a common cause: to prevent the re-establishment of the old regime. While the “White” troops under former tsarist General Anton Denikin fought for a Russia “one and united,” the Bolsheviks promised the non-Russian peoples land and freedom. Shortly after the triumph of the Bolsheviks, cracks began to appear in these alliances. By mid-1920, the mountainous parts of Chechnia and Dagestan had been set aflame in a large-scale anti-Bolshevik uprising led Imam Gotsinskii. Only in late 1921 did the Bolsheviks, with assistance from regular units of the Red Army, manage to crush this rebellion and establish military superiority.


1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 220-223

The fifteen countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were represented by their defense ministers at a conference held in Paris from October 10 to 12, under the chairmanship of Lord Ismay (Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and Secretary General of NATO). The meeting, which was attended by the Standing Group and the Supreme Commanders, was a preliminary to the full ministerial session, to be held in December; it was the first occasion on which the NATO defense ministers met in Council without the foreign or finance ministers. A communique issued at the close of the meeting stated that the meeting had primarily been for the exchange of information, and that the ministers had heard statements on the strategic situation and on western defensive arrangements from General Sir John Whiteley (United Kingdom), Chairman of the Standing Group, and from his colleagues on the Standing Group, General Joseph Lawton Collins (United States), General Jean Valluy (France), General Alfred M. Gruenther (SACEUR), Admiral Jerauld Wright (SACLANT) and several other officers. Following these statements, a useful exchange of views between the defense ministers took place, the communique concluded. It was reported that many of the speakers had concurred in the view that the military potential of the Soviet Union was steadily increasing, especially in the areas of atomic weapons and submarines, that the recently announced decision to reduce the armed forces in the Soviet Union and some of the people's democracies did not modify the potential of communist forces, and that it was therefore indispensable to intensify the NATO military effort, which so far had not met expectations for it.


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