Intersubjectivity evolved to fit the brain, but grammar co-evolved with the brain

2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 523-524
Author(s):  
Patricia M. Greenfield ◽  
Kristen Gillespie-Lynch

AbstractWe propose that some aspects of language – notably intersubjectivity – evolved to fit the brain, whereas other aspects – notably grammar – co-evolved with the brain. Cladistic analysis indicates that common basic structures of both action and grammar arose in phylogeny six million years ago and in ontogeny before age two, with a shared prefrontal neural substrate. In contrast, mirror neurons, found in both humans and monkeys, suggest that the neural basis for intersubjectivity evolved before language. Natural selection acts upon genes controlling the neural substrates of these phenotypic language functions.

1997 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey J. Hutsler ◽  
Michael S. Gazzaniga

Understanding the neural basis of language is one of the oldest and most difficult pursuits in neuroscience. Despite decades of accumulated data on aphasic subjects with cortical damage, we still know relatively little of how language functions are represented within the neural circuitry of the brain. A major issue of debate is whether language is a species-specific adaptation built into the neocortex, or a by-product of neocortical expansion. Cognitive studies emphasizing the universal nature of language abilities, the consistencies of language structure, and the consistent time course of language development have all indicated that language abilities are innate and must be built into the brain by evolutionary forces. Comparative studies of primates are equivocal since we have little evidence indicating that primate communication is homologous to human language systems. Much of this confusion is related to a lack of information regarding the neural basis of human communication. Recent anatomical data from human brains indicates that left hemisphere regions can have unique types of organization that may be responsible for functional specialization.


Author(s):  
Elliot A. Ludvig ◽  
Marc G. Bellemare ◽  
Keir G. Pearson

In the last 15 years, there has been a flourishing of research into the neural basis of reinforcement learning, drawing together insights and findings from psychology, computer science, and neuroscience. This remarkable confluence of three fields has yielded a growing framework that begins to explain how animals and humans learn to make decisions in real time. Mastering the literature in this sub-field can be quite daunting as this task can require mastery of at least three different disciplines, each with its own jargon, perspectives, and shared background knowledge. In this chapter, the authors attempt to make this fascinating line of research more accessible to researchers in any of the constitutive sub-disciplines. To this end, the authors develop a primer for reinforcement learning in the brain that lays out in plain language many of the key ideas and concepts that underpin research in this area. This primer is embedded in a literature review that aims not to be comprehensive, but rather representative of the types of questions and answers that have arisen in the quest to understand reinforcement learning and its neural substrates. Drawing on the basic findings in this research enterprise, the authors conclude with some speculations about how these developments in computational neuroscience may influence future developments in Artificial Intelligence.


2009 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 313-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chantal Martin-Soelch

The neural substrates of MDD (major depressive disorder) are complex and not yet fully understood. In the present review, I provide a short overview of the findings supporting the hypothesis of a dysfunctional dopamine system in the pathophysiology of depression. Because the mesocorticolimbic dopamine system is involved in reward processing, it has been hypothesized that a reduced function of this system could underlie the anhedonia and amotivation associated with depression. This hypothesis is supported by several observations providing indirect evidence for reduced central dopaminergic transmission in depression. However, some of the differences observed between controls and depressed patients in dopamine function seem to be specific to a subsample of patients, and influenced by the methods chosen. Studies that investigated the neural bases of some MDD behavioural symptoms showed that anhedonia, loss of motivation and the diminished ability to concentrate or make decisions could be associated with a blunted reaction to positive reinforcers and rewards on one side, and with a bias towards negative feedback on the other side. Only a few studies have investigated the neural basis of anhedonia and the responses to rewards in MDD subjects, mostly evidencing a blunted response to reward signals that was associated with reduced brain activation in regions associated with the brain reward system. In conclusion, there is evidence for a dysfunction of the dopamine system in depression and for blunted response to reward signals. However, the exact nature of this dysfunction is not yet clear and needs to be investigated in further studies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 371 (1697) ◽  
pp. 20150256 ◽  
Author(s):  
HyunGoo R. Kim ◽  
Dora E. Angelaki ◽  
Gregory C. DeAngelis

In addition to depth cues afforded by binocular vision, the brain processes relative motion signals to perceive depth. When an observer translates relative to their visual environment, the relative motion of objects at different distances (motion parallax) provides a powerful cue to three-dimensional scene structure. Although perception of depth based on motion parallax has been studied extensively in humans, relatively little is known regarding the neural basis of this visual capability. We review recent advances in elucidating the neural mechanisms for representing depth-sign (near versus far) from motion parallax. We examine a potential neural substrate in the middle temporal visual area for depth perception based on motion parallax, and we explore the nature of the signals that provide critical inputs for disambiguating depth-sign. This article is part of the themed issue ‘Vision in our three-dimensional world’.


Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Cavedon-Taylor

AbstractHow tight is the conceptual connection between imagination and perception? A number of philosophers, from the early moderns to present-day predictive processing theorists, tie the knot as tightly as they can, claiming that states of the imagination, i.e. mental imagery, are a proper subset of perceptual experience. This paper labels such a view ‘perceptualism’ about the imagination and supplies new arguments against it. The arguments are based on high-level perceptual content and, distinctly, cognitive penetration. The paper also defuses a recent, influential argument for perceptualism based on the ‘discovery’ that visual perception and mental imagery share a significant neural substrate: circuitry in V1, the brain’s primary visual cortex. Current neuropsychology is shown to be equivocal at best on this matter. While experiments conducted on healthy, neurotypical subjects indicate substantial neural overlap, there is extensive clinical evidence of dissociations between imagery and perception in the brain, most notably in the case of aphantasia.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Caba ◽  
Michael N. Lehman ◽  
Mario Daniel Caba-Flores

In the newborn rabbit, the light entrainable circadian system is immature and once a day nursing provides the primary timing cue for entrainment. In advance of the mother’s arrival, pups display food anticipatory activity (FAA), and metabolic and physiological parameters are synchronized to this daily event. Central structures in the brain are also entrained as indicated by expression of Fos and Per1 proteins, GFAP, a glial marker, and cytochrome oxidase activity. Under fasting conditions, several of these rhythmic parameters persist in the periphery and brain, including rhythms in the olfactory bulb (OB). Here we provide an overview of these physiological and neurobiological changes and focus on three issues, just beginning to be examined in the rabbit. First, we review evidence supporting roles for the organum vasculosum of lamina terminalis (OVLT) and median preoptic nucleus (MnPO) in homeostasis of fluid ingestion and the neural basis of arousal, the latter which also includes the role of the orexigenic system. Second, since FAA in association with the daily visit of the mother is an example of conditioned learning, we review evidence for changes in the corticolimbic system and identified nuclei in the amygdala and extended amygdala as part of the neural substrate responsible for FAA. Third, we review recent evidence supporting the role of oxytocinergic cells of the paraventricular hypothalamic nucleus (PVN) as a link to the autonomic system that underlies physiological events, which occur in preparation for the upcoming next daily meal. We conclude that the rabbit model has contributed to an overall understanding of food entrainment.


2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Christy L. Ludlow

The premise of this article is that increased understanding of the brain bases for normal speech and voice behavior will provide a sound foundation for developing therapeutic approaches to establish or re-establish these functions. The neural substrates involved in speech/voice behaviors, the types of muscle patterning for speech and voice, the brain networks involved and their regulation, and how they can be externally modulated for improving function will be addressed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (9) ◽  
pp. 800-811 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferath Kherif ◽  
Sandrine Muller

In the past decades, neuroscientists and clinicians have collected a considerable amount of data and drastically increased our knowledge about the mapping of language in the brain. The emerging picture from the accumulated knowledge is that there are complex and combinatorial relationships between language functions and anatomical brain regions. Understanding the underlying principles of this complex mapping is of paramount importance for the identification of the brain signature of language and Neuro-Clinical signatures that explain language impairments and predict language recovery after stroke. We review recent attempts to addresses this question of language-brain mapping. We introduce the different concepts of mapping (from diffeomorphic one-to-one mapping to many-to-many mapping). We build those different forms of mapping to derive a theoretical framework where the current principles of brain architectures including redundancy, degeneracy, pluri-potentiality and bow-tie network are described.


2016 ◽  
Vol 74 (8) ◽  
pp. 632-637 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Furtado da Silva ◽  
Mauricio Rocha Calomeni ◽  
Rodolfo Alkmim Moreira Nunes ◽  
Carlos Elias Pimentel ◽  
Gabriela Paes Martins ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT This study focused upon the functional capacity of mirror neurons in autistic children. 30 individuals, 10 carriers of the autistic syndrome (GCA), 10 with intellectual impairments (GDI), and 10 non-autistics (GCN) had registered eletroencephalogram from the brain area theoretically related to mirror neurons. Data collection procedure occurred prior to brain stimulation and after the stimulation session. During the second session, participants had to alternately process figures evoking neutral, happy, and/or sorrowful feelings. Results proved that, for all groups, the stimulation process in fact produced additional activation in the neural area under study. The level of activation was related to the format of emotional stimuli and the likelihood of boosting such stimuli. Since the increase of activation occurred in a model similar to the one observed for the control group, we may suggest that the difficulty people with autism have at expressing emotions is not due to nonexistence of mirror neurons.


Author(s):  
Anastasia O. Shabalina ◽  

The article considers the main arguments against the neurobiological theory of consciousness from the point of view of the enactivist approach within the philosophy of mind. The neurobiological theory of consciousness, which reduces consciousness to neural activity, is currently the dominant approach to the mind-body problem. The neurobiological theory emerged as a result of advances in research on the phenomena of consciousness and through the development of technologies for visualizing the internal processes of mind. However, at the very heart of this theory, there is a number of logical contradictions. The non-reductive enactivist approach to consciousness, introduced in this article, contributes to the existing argumentation against the reduction of consciousness to neural processes with remonstrations that take into account the modern neuroscientific data. The article analyzes the argumentation of the sensorimotor enactivism developed by A. Noe and offers the account of the teleosemantic approach to the concept of information provided by R. Cao. The key problems of the neurobiological theory of consciousness are highlighted, and the objections emerging within the framework of the enactivist approach are analyzed. Since the main concepts on which the neural theory is based are the concepts of neural substrate, cognition as representation, and information as a unit of cognition, the author of the article presents three key enactivist ideas that oppose them. First, the enactivist concept of cognition as action allows us to consider the first-person experience as a mode of action, and not as a state of the brain substrate. Second, the article deals with the “explanatory externalism” argument proposed by Noe, who refutes the image of cognition as a representation in the brain. Finally, in order to critically revise the concept of information as a unit of cognition, the author analyzes Cao’s idea, which represents a teleosemantic approach, but is in line with the general enactivist argumentation. Cao shows that the application of the concept “information” to neural processes is problematic: no naturalized information is found in the brain as a physical substrate. A critical revision of beliefs associated with the neural theory of consciousness leads us to recognize that there are not enough grounds for reducing consciousness to processes that take place in the brain. That is why Noe calls expectations that the visualization of processes taking place in the brain with the help of the modern equipment will be able to depict the experience of consciousness the “new phrenology”, thus indicating the naive character of neural reduction. The article concludes that natural science methods are insufficient for the study of consciousness.


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