scholarly journals Précis of Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Heyes
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Psychology ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Evolutionary Developmental Biology ◽  
Genetic Mutation ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Human Populations ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Extended Evolutionary Synthesis ◽  
Cultural Evolutionary

Abstract Cognitive gadgets are distinctively human cognitive mechanisms – such as imitation, mind reading, and language – that have been shaped by cultural rather than genetic evolution. New gadgets emerge, not by genetic mutation, but by innovations in cognitive development; they are specialised cognitive mechanisms built by general cognitive mechanisms using information from the sociocultural environment. Innovations are passed on to subsequent generations, not by DNA replication, but through social learning: People with new cognitive mechanisms pass them on to others through social interaction. Some of the new mechanisms, like literacy, have spread through human populations, while others have died out, because the holders had more students, not just more babies. The cognitive gadgets hypothesis is developed through four case studies, drawing on evidence from comparative and developmental psychology, experimental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. The framework employed – cultural evolutionary psychology, a descendant of evolutionary psychology and cultural evolutionary theory – addresses parallel issues across the cognitive and behavioural sciences. In common with evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) and the extended evolutionary synthesis, cultural evolutionary psychology underlines the importance of developmental processes and environmental factors in the emergence of human cognition. In common with computational approaches (deep learning, predictive coding, hierarchical reinforcement learning, causal modelling), it emphasises the power of general-purpose mechanisms of learning. Cultural evolutionary psychology, however, also challenges use of the behavioural gambit in economics and behavioural ecology, and rejects the view that human minds are composed of “innate modules” or “cognitive instincts.”

Integrating Knowledge of Cognitive System and E-Learning Applications

2011 ◽  
pp. 72-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Spanoudis ◽  
Eleni A. Kyza
Keyword(s):  
Learning Environments ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
General Purpose ◽  
Cognitive System ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Computer Based Learning ◽  
E Learning ◽  
Computer Based

This chapter outlines key findings of cognitive and developmental psychology which could be used as a theoretical framework to guide the design and research of e-learning applications. The chapter consists of two main sections. The first section presents the basic cognitive mechanisms and their development, while the second part discusses how our knowledge of the cognitive system can guide the design of computer-based learning environments. It is proposed that the human mind is organized in three levels: two of them are general-purpose mechanisms and processes and one consists of domainspecific structures of knowledge representation and problem solving processes. These three levels are associated with an effective learning framework. The suggested framework describes the basic points that any designer of e-learning environments must consider. The second section of the chapter discusses e-learning, connecting it to knowledge about the human cognitive system. In this section, we first present the conceptual bounds of the e-learning construct and discuss how cognitive theories of learning should guide the design of technologically-enhanced learning environments. It is proposed that a synergy between the study of human cognition and the design of e-learning applications is required for effectively understanding both fields.

Tinkering with cognitive gadgets: Cultural evolutionary psychology meets active inference

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Badcock ◽  
Axel Constant ◽  
Maxwell James Désormeau Ramstead
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Psychology ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Active Inference ◽  
Innovative Research ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Cultural Evolutionary ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract Cognitive Gadgets offers a new, convincing perspective on the origins of our distinctive cognitive faculties, coupled with a clear, innovative research program. Although we broadly endorse Heyes’ ideas, we raise some concerns about her characterisation of evolutionary psychology and the relationship between biology and culture, before discussing the potential fruits of examining cognitive gadgets through the lens of active inference.

scholarly journals Neo-mechanistic explanatory integration for cognitive science: the problem of reduction remains

Sofia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diego Azevedo Leite
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Models ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Significant Challenge ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Multi Level

One of the central aims of the neo-mechanistic framework for the neural and cognitive sciences is to construct a pluralistic integration of scientific explanations, allowing for a weak explanatory autonomy of higher-level sciences, such as cognitive science. This integration involves understanding human cognition as information processing occurring in multi-level human neuro-cognitive mechanisms, explained by multi-level neuro-cognitive models. Strong explanatory neuro-cognitive reduction, however, poses a significant challenge to this pluralist ambition and the weak autonomy of cognitive science derived therefrom. Based on research in current molecular and cellular neuroscience, the framework holds that the best strategy for integrating human neuro-cognitive theories is through direct reductive explanations based on molecular and cellular neural processes. It is my aim to investigate whether the neo-mechanistic framework can meet the challenge. I argue that leading neo-mechanists offer some significant replies; however, they are not able yet to completely remove strong explanatory reductionism from their own framework.

scholarly journals Variation is the universal: making cultural evolution work in developmental psychology

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1743) ◽  
pp. 20170059 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Ann Kline ◽  
Rubeena Shamsudheen ◽  
Tanya Broesch
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Interdisciplinary Studies ◽  
Cultural Research ◽  
Cross Cultural Research ◽  
Cultural Evolutionary ◽  
Geographical Scope ◽  
Cultural Gaps

Culture is a human universal, yet it is a source of variation in human psychology, behaviour and development. Developmental researchers are now expanding the geographical scope of research to include populations beyond relatively wealthy Western communities. However, culture and context still play a secondary role in the theoretical grounding of developmental psychology research, far too often. In this paper, we highlight four false assumptions that are common in psychology, and that detract from the quality of both standard and cross-cultural research in development. These assumptions are: (i) the universality assumption , that empirical uniformity is evidence for universality, while any variation is evidence for culturally derived variation; (ii) the Western centrality assumption , that Western populations represent a normal and/or healthy standard against which development in all societies can be compared; (iii) the deficit assumption , that population-level differences in developmental timing or outcomes are necessarily due to something lacking among non-Western populations; and (iv) the equivalency assumption , that using identical research methods will necessarily produce equivalent and externally valid data, across disparate cultural contexts. For each assumption, we draw on cultural evolutionary theory to critique and replace the assumption with a theoretically grounded approach to culture in development. We support these suggestions with positive examples drawn from research in development. Finally, we conclude with a call for researchers to take reasonable steps towards more fully incorporating culture and context into studies of development, by expanding their participant pools in strategic ways. This will lead to a more inclusive and therefore more accurate description of human development. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Bridging cultural gaps: interdisciplinary studies in human cultural evolution’.

Is Our Brain an Open or Closed System? Prediction Model of Brain and World–Brain Relation

2018 ◽  
pp. 55-76
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Model ◽  
Closed System ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Resting State ◽  
Clinical Symptoms ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
The World ◽  
World Brain ◽  
The Brain

Some recent philosophical discussions consider whether the brain is best understood as an open or closed system. This issue has major epistemic consequences akin to the scepticism engendered by the famous Cartesian demon. Specifically, one and the same empirical theory of brain function, predictive coding, entailing a prediction model of brain, have been associated with contradictory views of the brain as either open (Clark, 2012, 2013) or closed (Hohwy, 2013, 2014). Based on recent empirical evidence, the present paper argues that contrary to appearances, these views of the brain are compatible with one another. I suggest that there are two main forms of neural activity in the brain, one of which can be characterized as open, and the other as closed. Stimulus-induced activity, because it relies on predictive coding is indeed closed to the world, which entails that in certain respects, the brain is an inferentially secluded and self-evidencing system. In contrast, the brain’s resting state or spontaneous activity is best taken as open because it is a world-evidencing system that allows for the brain’s neural activity to align with the statistically-based spatiotemporal structure of objects and events in the world. This model requires an important caveat, however. Due to its statistically-based nature, the resting state’s alignment to the world comes in degrees. In extreme cases, the degree of alignment can be extremely low, resulting in a resting state that is barely if at all aligned to the world. This is for instance the case in schizophrenia. Clinical symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations in schizophrenics are indicative of the fundamental delicateness of the alignment between the brain’s resting-state and the world’s phenomena. Nevertheless, I argue that so long as we are dealing with a well-functioning brain, the more dire epistemic implications of predictive coding can be forestalled. That the brain is in part a self-evidencing system does not yield any generalizable reason to worry that human cognition is out of step with the real world. Instead, the brain is aligned to the world accounting for “world-brain relation” that mitigates sceptistic worries.

Is Compassion Innate? A Psychological Perspective

2020 ◽  
pp. 29-44
Author(s):  
Agnes M.F. Wong
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Evolutionary Psychology ◽  
Psychological Health ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Psychological Perspective ◽  
Reward Systems ◽  
Support Provision ◽  
Two Systems ◽  
Support Seeking

In this chapter, the author looks at compassion from two psychological perspectives: evolutionary and developmental. Evolutionary psychology proposes that there are three emotion systems: threat/self-protect, drive/reward, and affiliative/soothing. By developing our capacity to mindfully access, accept, and direct affiliative motives and emotions—for others and ourselves—we can cultivate compassion skills to shift our mind toward the affiliative/soothing system and down-regulate the threat/self-protect and drive/reward systems. Developmental psychology further contributes to our understanding of compassion by proposing two behavioural systems: the attachment behavioural system that governs support-seeking and the caregiving behavioural system that governs support provision. It suggests that the interplay between these two systems may account for individual differences in the disposition to compassion. Last, the author shows that compassion not only benefits the recipients, but also improves the psychological health of the caregivers.

Rethinking Cultural Evolutionary Psychology

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 477-492
Author(s):  
Ryan Nichols ◽  
Henrike Moll ◽  
Jacob L. Mackey
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Social Interaction ◽  
Evolutionary Psychology ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Cultural Learning ◽  
Cultural Evolutionary ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Point Of Departure ◽  
Alternative Theories

AbstractThis essay discusses Cecilia Heyes’ groundbreaking new book Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking. Heyes’ point of departure is the claim that current theories of cultural evolution fail adequately to make a place for the mind. Heyes articulates a cognitive psychology of cultural evolution by explaining how eponymous “cognitive gadgets,” such as imitation, mindreading and language, mental technologies, are “tuned” and “assembled” through social interaction and cultural learning. After recapitulating her explanations for the cultural and psychological origins of these gadgets, we turn to criticisms. Among those, we find Heyes’ use of evolutionary theory confusing on several points of importance; alternative theories of cultural evolution, especially those of the Tomasello group and of Boyd, Richerson and Henrich, are misrepresented; the book neglects joint attention and other forms of intersubjectivity in its explanation of the origins of cognitive gadgets; and, whereas Heyes accuses other theories of being “mindblind,” we find her theory ironically other-blind and autistic in character.

“I Know, you Know”: Epistemic Egocentrism in Children and Adults

2003 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward B. Royzman ◽  
Kimberly Wright Cassidy ◽  
Jonathan Baron
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
General Feature ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Human Judgment ◽  
Privileged Information ◽  
Research Traditions

This article reviews the evidence and theory pertaining to a form of perspective-taking failure—a difficulty in setting aside the privileged information that one knows to be unavailable to another party. The authors argue that this bias (epistemic egocentrism, or EE) is a general feature of human cognition and has been tapped by 2 independent and largely uncommunicating research traditions: the theory-of-mind tradition in developmental psychology and, with more sensitive probes, the “heuristics and biases” tradition in the psychology of human judgment. This article sets the stage for facilitating communication between these traditions as well as for the recognition of EE's breadth and potential interdisciplinary significance: The authors propose a life-span account and a tentative taxonomy of EE; and they highlight the interdisciplinary significance of EE by discussing its implications for normative ethics.

Race and the Law in the Genomic Age

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Bradley Kar ◽  
John Lindo
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Psychology ◽  
Civil Liability ◽  
Central Mechanism ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Equal Protection ◽  
Human Populations ◽  
Critical Race ◽  
Human Psychology ◽  
Racial Perceptions ◽  
The Law

Despite the ‘Age of Genomics’, many scholars who study race and the law resist biological insights into human psychology and behaviour. Contemporary developments make this resistance increasingly untenable. This chapter synthesizes recent findings in genomics and evolutionary psychology, which suggest cause for concern over how racial concepts function in the law. Firstly, racial perceptions engage a ‘folk-biological’ module of psychology, which generates inferences poorly adapted to genomic facts about human populations. Racial perceptions are, therefore, prone to function in ways more prejudicial than probative of many issues relevant to criminal and civil liability. Secondly, many folk biological inferences function automatically, unconsciously, and without animus or discriminatory intent. Hence, current equal protection doctrine, which requires a finding of discriminatory intent and is a central mechanism for guaranteeing people equal treatment under the law, is poorly suited to that task. These facts support but complicate several claims made by Critical Race Theorists.

Evolutionary Cognitive Archaeology

Anthropology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick L. Coolidge ◽  
Thomas Wynn
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Psychology ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Homo Sapiens ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Evolutionary Development ◽  
Last Common Ancestor ◽  
Archaeological Remains ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Modern Humans ◽  
Cognitive Archaeology

Cognitive archaeology may be divided into two branches. Evolutionary cognitive archaeology (ECA) is the discipline of prehistoric archaeology that studies the evolution of human cognition. Practitioners are united by a methodological commitment to the idea that archaeological traces of past activity provide access to the minds of the agents responsible. The second branch, ideational cognitive archaeology, encompasses archaeologists who strive to discover the meaning of symbolic system, primarily through the analysis of iconography. This approach differs from ECA in its epistemology, historical roots, and citation universes, and focuses on comparatively recent time periods (after 10,000 years ago). Evolutionary cognitive archaeologists are concerned with the nature of cognition itself, and its evolutionary development from the time of the last common ancestor with chimpanzees to the final ascendancy of modern humans at the end of the Pleistocene. Although ECA methods are primarily archaeological, its theoretical grounding is in the cognitive sciences, including cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and cognitive neuroscience. It is by its nature interdisciplinary. ECA differs from the allied discipline of evolutionary psychology in several important respects. Methodologically, ECA is a macroevolutionary science that studies physical evidence of past human cognition, including archaeological and fossil remains. Evolutionary psychology relies heavily on reverse engineering from controlled experiments on living humans. Theoretically, ECA is more eclectic, drawing on a variety of cognitive and evolutionary models; evolutionary psychology is committed to a neo-Darwinian, selectionist understanding of evolutionary change. The two approaches tend to study different components of human mental life, but are not inherently contradictory. ECA practitioners reconstruct prehistoric activities using well-established archaeological methods and techniques, including morphological analysis of artifacts to identify action sequences and decision patterns, functional analyses (e.g., microwear) to identify use patterns, and spatial patterns within sites to recognize activity loci (e.g., hearths). An increasingly important method is the actualistic recreation of prehistoric technologies to identify features not preserved in the archaeological remains. Neuroarchaeologists enhance such actualistic research by imaging the brains of the participants (most typically using fMRI), an approach that also contributes directly to cognitive science’s understanding of the neural basis of technical cognition. ECA practitioners take two non-mutually exclusive approaches to documenting human cognitive evolution. The first approach enriches the understanding of specific hominin taxa (i.e., Homo sapiens and their direct ancestors since 6 million years ago) by providing accounts of their cognitive life worlds, or by contrasting two taxa with one another. This approach is famously exemplified by attempts to contrast the abilities of Neandertals with those of modern humans. The second approach traces the evolution of specific cognitive abilities from the first appearance of stone tools 3.3 million years ago to the emergence of city-states 5,000 years ago. The range of accessible cognitive abilities is limited by the nature of archaeological remains, but evolutionary cognitive archaeologists have been able to trace developments in spatial cognition, memory, cognitive control, technical expertise, theory of mind, aesthetic cognition, symbolism, language, and numeracy.

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