scholarly journals Neo-mechanistic explanatory integration for cognitive science: the problem of reduction remains

Sofia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diego Azevedo Leite
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Models ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Significant Challenge ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Multi Level

One of the central aims of the neo-mechanistic framework for the neural and cognitive sciences is to construct a pluralistic integration of scientific explanations, allowing for a weak explanatory autonomy of higher-level sciences, such as cognitive science. This integration involves understanding human cognition as information processing occurring in multi-level human neuro-cognitive mechanisms, explained by multi-level neuro-cognitive models. Strong explanatory neuro-cognitive reduction, however, poses a significant challenge to this pluralist ambition and the weak autonomy of cognitive science derived therefrom. Based on research in current molecular and cellular neuroscience, the framework holds that the best strategy for integrating human neuro-cognitive theories is through direct reductive explanations based on molecular and cellular neural processes. It is my aim to investigate whether the neo-mechanistic framework can meet the challenge. I argue that leading neo-mechanists offer some significant replies; however, they are not able yet to completely remove strong explanatory reductionism from their own framework.

scholarly journals Systematic and Random Sources of Variability in Perceptual Decision-Making: Comment on Ratcliff, Voskuilen, and McKoon (2018)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan J. Evans ◽  
Gabriel Tillman ◽  
Eric-Jan Wagenmakers
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
External Noise ◽  
Cognitive Models ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Perceptual Decision Making ◽  
Choice Decision ◽  
Random Variability ◽  
General Existence ◽  
Item Effects

A key assumption of models of human cognition is that there is variability in information processing. Evidence accumulation models (EAMs) commonly assume two broad variabilities in information processing: within-trial variability, which is thought to reflect moment-to-moment fluctuations in perceptual processes, and between-trial variability, which is thought to reflect variability in slower-changing processes like attention, or systematic variability between the stimuli on different trials. Recently, Ratcliff, Voskuilen, and McKoon (2018) claimed to “provide direct evidence that external noise is, in fact, required to explain the data from five simple two-choice decision tasks” (p. 33), suggesting that at least some portion of the between-trial variability in information processing is due to “noise”. However, we argue that Ratcliff et al. (2018) failed to distinguish between two different potential sources of between-trial variability: random (i.e., “external noise”) and systematic (e.g., item effects). Contrary to the claims of Ratcliff et al. (2018), we show that “external noise” is not required to explain their findings, as the same trends of data can be produced when only item effects are present. Furthermore, we contend that the concept of “noise” within cognitive models merely serves as a convenience parameter for sources of variability that we know exist, but are unable to account for. Therefore, we question the usefulness of experiments aimed at testing the general existence of “random” variability, and instead suggest that future research should attempt to replace the random variability terms within cognitive models with actual explanations of the process.

Dondersian dreams in brain-mappers' minds, or, still no cross-fertilization between mind mappers and cognitive modelers?

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur M. Jacobs ◽  
Frank Rösler
Keyword(s):  
Blood Flow ◽  
Information Processing ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Models ◽  
Subtraction Method ◽  
Brain Waves ◽  
Science Community ◽  
Processing Activity ◽  
Cross Fertilization

Pulvermüller identifies two major flaws of the subtraction method of neuroimaging studies and proposes remedies. We argue that these remedies are themselves flawed and that the cognitive science community badly needs to take initial steps toward a cross-fertilization between mind mappers and cognitive modelers. Such steps could include the development of computational task models that transparently and falsifiably link the input (stimuli) and output (changes in blood flow or brain waves) of neuroimaging studies to changes in information processing activity that is the stuff of cognitive models.

Language as a mental travel guide

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles P. Davis ◽  
Gerry T. M. Altmann ◽  
Eiling Yee
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Travel Guide

Abstract Gilead et al.'s approach to human cognition places abstraction and prediction at the heart of “mental travel” under a “representational diversity” perspective that embraces foundational concepts in cognitive science. But, it gives insufficient credit to the possibility that the process of abstraction produces a gradient, and underestimates the importance of a highly influential domain in predictive cognition: language, and related, the emergence of experientially based structure through time.

scholarly journals ‘Pure’ Constructional Apraxia—A Cognitive Analysis of a Single Case

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luigi Trojano ◽  
Dario Grossi
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Impairment ◽  
Information Processing ◽  
Single Case ◽  
Cognitive Models ◽  
Motor Output ◽  
Cognitive Analysis ◽  
Cerebral Lesions ◽  
Recent Information ◽  
Geometric Figures ◽  
Constructional Apraxia

We report on a patient affected by selective drawing disabilities. The patient could correctly reproduce and draw simple geometric figures on request, but when he tried to reproduce more complex drawings or to draw common objects he performed very poorly. To identify the cognitive impairment in this patient, we adopted two test batteries based on recent information-processing models of drawing. Results showed that the patient’s drawing disabilities were independent of visuo-perceptual and executive impairments. These findings support recent cognitive models of drawing abilities: some intermediate stages of drawing exist at which information is processed to prepare and guide motor output, and which may be selectively disrupted after discrete cerebral lesions.

scholarly journals Legal Concepts as Mental Representations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Jakubiec
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Cognitive Tools ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Cognitive Aspect ◽  
Fundamental Level ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
Mental Constructs

AbstractAlthough much ink has been spilled on different aspects of legal concepts, the approach based on the developments of cognitive science is a still neglected area of study. The “mental” and cognitive aspect of these concepts, i.e., their features as mental constructs and cognitive tools, especially in the light of the developments of the cognitive sciences, is discussed quite rarely. The argument made by this paper is that legal concepts are best understood as mental representations. The piece explains what mental representations are and why this view matters. The explanation of legal concepts, understood as mental representations is one of (at least) three levels of explanation within legal philosophy, but—as will be argued—it is the most fundamental level. This paper analyzes the consequences of such understanding of concepts used in the field of legal philosophy. Special emphasis is put on the current debate on the analogical or amodal nature of concepts.

A multi-level file structure for information processing

1960 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Miller ◽  
J. Minker ◽  
W. G. Reed ◽  
W. E. Shindle
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
File Structure ◽  
Multi Level

Constructive realism: In defense of the objective reality of perspectives

Human Affairs ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Madzia
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
John Dewey ◽  
William James ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Objective Reality ◽  
Constructive Realism ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
The World ◽  
Epistemological Position ◽  
Epistemological Realism

AbstractThe paper proposes an outline of a reconciliatory approach to the perennial controversy between epistemological realism and anti-realism (constructionism). My main conceptual source in explaining this view is the philosophy of pragmatism, more specifically, the epistemological theories of George H. Mead, John Dewey, and also William James’ radical empiricism. First, the paper analyzes the pragmatic treatment of the goal-directedness of action, especially with regard to Mead’s notion of attitudes, and relates it to certain contemporary epistemological theories provided by the cognitive sciences (Maturana, Rizzolatti, Clark). Against this background, the paper presents a philosophical as well as empirical justification of why we should interpret the environment and its objects in terms of possibilities for action. In Mead’s view, the objects and events of our world emerge within stable patterns of organism-environment interactions, which he called “perspectives”. According to pragmatism as well as the aforementioned cognitive scientists, perception and other cognitive processes include not only neural processes in our heads but also the world itself. Elaborating on Mead’s concept of perspectives, the paper argues in favor of the epistemological position called “constructive realism.”

Précis ofUnified theories of cognition

1992 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Newell
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Convincing Evidence ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Unified Theories

AbstractThe book presents the case that cognitive science should turn its attention to developing theories of human cognition that cover the full range of human perceptual, cognitive, and action phenomena. Cognitive science has now produced a massive number of high-quality regularities with many microtheories that reveal important mechanisms. The need for integration is pressing and will continue to increase. Equally important, cognitive science now has the theoretical concepts and tools to support serious attempts at unified theories. The argument is made entirely by presenting an exemplar unified theory of cognition both to show what a real unified theory would be like and to provide convincing evidence that such theories are feasible. The exemplar is SOAR, a cognitive architecture, which is realized as a software system. After a detailed discussion of the architecture and its properties, with its relation to the constraints on cognition in the real world and to existing ideas in cognitive science, SOAR is used as theory for a wide range of cognitive phenomena: immediate responses (stimulus-response compatibility and the Sternberg phenomena); discrete motor skills (transcription typing); memory and learning (episodic memory and the acquisition of skill through practice); problem solving (cryptarithmetic puzzles and syllogistic reasoning); language (sentence verification and taking instructions); and development (transitions in the balance beam task). The treatments vary in depth and adequacy, but they clearly reveal a single, highly specific, operational theory that works over the entire range of human cognition, SOAR is presented as an exemplar unified theory, not as the sole candidate. Cognitive science is not ready yet for a single theory – there must be multiple attempts. But cognitive science must begin to work toward such unified theories.

scholarly journals From cognitive to neural models of working memory

2007 ◽  
Vol 362 (1481) ◽  
pp. 761-772 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark D'Esposito
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Functional Neuroimaging ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Cognitive Models ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Long Term Memory ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Internal Representations ◽  
Active Maintenance

Working memory refers to the temporary retention of information that was just experienced or just retrieved from long-term memory but no longer exists in the external environment. These internal representations are short-lived, but can be stored for longer periods of time through active maintenance or rehearsal strategies, and can be subjected to various operations that manipulate the information in such a way that makes it useful for goal-directed behaviour. Empirical studies of working memory using neuroscientific techniques, such as neuronal recordings in monkeys or functional neuroimaging in humans, have advanced our knowledge of the underlying neural mechanisms of working memory. This rich dataset can be reconciled with behavioural findings derived from investigating the cognitive mechanisms underlying working memory. In this paper, I review the progress that has been made towards this effort by illustrating how investigations of the neural mechanisms underlying working memory can be influenced by cognitive models and, in turn, how cognitive models can be shaped and modified by neuroscientific data. One conclusion that arises from this research is that working memory can be viewed as neither a unitary nor a dedicated system. A network of brain regions, including the prefrontal cortex (PFC), is critical for the active maintenance of internal representations that are necessary for goal-directed behaviour. Thus, working memory is not localized to a single brain region but probably is an emergent property of the functional interactions between the PFC and the rest of the brain.

Historical Cognition and Cognitive Sciences: New in Russian Historiography

Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (8 (106)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Lidia Sofronova
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Interdisciplinary Research ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Analytical Review ◽  
Science Disciplines

The article presents an analytical review of the recent literature on cognitive history, especially the Russian collective monograph “Cognitive Sciences and Historical Cognition”, published in 2020. It traces the patterns typical for interdisciplinary research not only within the humanitarian disciplines, but also at the “borders” between the humanities and the “natural sciences”. The article highlights the paradoxical and productive nature of the “mutual interventions” of cognitive science and the humanities, which contribute to overcoming “atomism” both within the humanities and at the “frontier” between them and the natural science disciplines.

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