Universalizing and the we: endogenous game theoretic deontology

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Paul Studtmann ◽  
Shyam Gouri Suresh
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Autonomous Agents ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Moral Framework ◽  
Interacting Agents ◽  
Game Theoretic

Abstract The Nash counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were I to change my behaviour assuming no one else does. By contrast, the Kantian counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were everyone to deviate from some behaviour. We present a model that endogenizes the decision to engage in this type of Kantian reasoning. Autonomous agents using this moral framework receive psychic payoffs equivalent to the cooperate-cooperate payoff in Prisoner’s Dilemma regardless of the other player’s action. Moreover, if both interacting agents play Prisoner’s Dilemma using this moral framework, their material outcomes are a Pareto improvement over the Nash equilibrium.

scholarly journals Sensitivity to Context in Human Interactions

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (21) ◽  
pp. 2784
Author(s):  
Oliver Waddup ◽  
Pawel Blasiak ◽  
James M. Yearsley ◽  
Bartosz W. Wojciechowski ◽  
Emmanuel M. Pothos
Keyword(s):  
Probability Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Quantum Model ◽  
Classical Probability ◽  
Human Interactions ◽  
State Of Affairs

Considering two agents responding to two (binary) questions each, we define sensitivity to context as a state of affairs such that responses to a question depend on the other agent’s questions, with the implication that it is not possible to represent the corresponding probabilities with a four-way probability distribution. We report two experiments with a variant of a prisoner’s dilemma task (but without a Nash equilibrium), which examine the sensitivity of participants to context. The empirical results indicate sensitivity to context and add to the body of evidence that prisoner’s dilemma tasks can be constructed so that behavior appears inconsistent with baseline classical probability theory (and the assumption that decisions are described by random variables revealing pre-existing values). We fitted two closely matched models to the results, a classical one and a quantum one, and observed superior fits for the latter. Thus, in this case, sensitivity to context goes hand in hand with (epiphenomenal) entanglement, the key characteristic of the quantum model.

The Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Cooperation in the Rat

1984 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 687-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick M. Gardner ◽  
Terry L. Corbin ◽  
Janelle S. Beltramo ◽  
Gary S. Nickell
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Visual Communication ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Cooperation in pairs of rats playing the prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Six pairs of animals were taught to make either cooperative or uncooperative responses by running to one or the other end of a T-maze. Two T-mazes were joined together such that animals could respond simultaneously. Animals were run under conditions in which visual communication was present and absent. Mutually uncooperative responses were the most common and mutually cooperative behaviors the least preferred. Introduction of a barrier between the mazes, which removed visual communication between pairs, sharply accentuated uncooperative behavior. Similarities of the present findings to results with human subjects and the implications of using game theory for studying cooperative behavior in animals are discussed.

Lesser Antilles Lines: The Island of San Huberto (A)

2010 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
James V. Gelly ◽  
Phillip E. Pfeifer
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Equilibrium Price ◽  
Lesser Antilles ◽  
Caribbean Island ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Price War

In this case, the situation is a classic duopoly. Two shipping firms are in a price war over the market for containerized shipping to and from a small Caribbean island. The case presents a table of contributions to both firms as a function of their prices. This table serves as a basis by which the class can explore the concepts of Nash equilibrium, price leadership, and prisoner’s dilemma. It is also available with the case as a student spreadsheet (QA-0355X). See also “Lesser Antilles Lines (B)” (UVA-QA-0641) and “Lesser Antilles Lines (C)” (UVA-QA-0670).

scholarly journals Translucent players: Explaining cooperative behavior in social dilemmas

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-408
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Joseph Y Halpern
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Equity And Efficiency

In the past few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when noncooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass call translucent players. Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that a deviation by one player in a normal-form game does not affect the strategies used by other players. However, a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Traveler’s Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game. The approach can also be extended to take into account a player’s concerns that his social group (or God) may observe his actions. This extension helps explain prosocial behavior in situations in which previous models of social behavior fail to make correct predictions (e.g. conflict situations and situations where there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency).

scholarly journals Punishment Effect of Prisoner Dilemma Game Based on a New Evolution Strategy Rule

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Dehui Sun ◽  
Xiaoliang Kou
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
External Factor ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Strategy ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Evolution Game ◽  
Stability Of Structure ◽  
Cooperation Structure

We discuss the effect of the punishment in the prisoner’s dilemma game. We propose a new evolution strategy rule which can reflect the external factor for both players in the evolution game. In general, if the punishment exists, the D (defection-defection) structure (i.e., both of the two players choose D-D strategy) which is the Nash equilibrium for the game can keep stable and never let the cooperation emerge. However, if a new evolution strategy rule is adopted, we can find that the D-D structure can not keep stable and it will decrease during the game from the simulations. In fact, the punishment mainly affects the C-D (cooperation-defection) structure in the network. After the fraction of the C-D structure achieved some levels, the punishment can keep the C-D structure stable and prevent it from transforming into C-C (cooperation-cooperation) structure. Moreover, in light of the stability of structure and the payoff of the individual gains, it can be found that the probability which is related to the payoff can affect the result of the evolution game.

scholarly journals Niṣkāmakarma: A Philosophical Analysis in Light of the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Concept of Degrowth

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 3-30
Author(s):  
Tommi Lehtonen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Personal Benefit ◽  
The Common ◽  
Harmful Effects

The prisoner's dilemma famously shows that individuals seeking their own benefit end up with a worse outcome than could be achieved through cooperation. This dilemma provides an effective but neglected method for the study of the Hindu principle of "desireless action" (niṣkāmakarma). In the context of the prisoner's dilemma, one or the other of the following decision-making strategies is feasible for prisoners who want to follow the principle of "desireless action": (1) to be indifferent and to leave the decision to chance (e.g. by arbitrarily drawing lots) or (2) to pursue the common good or the benefit of the other (by remaining silent) instead of seeking primarily to benefit oneself (by confessing). The second strategy is more appropriate assuming the following: the followers of the principle of "desireless action" can be goal-oriented and target-driven, as long as unselfish goals are considered, while remaining indifferent and non-attached in terms of personal benefit. This interpretation is tested and further discussed in this article in light of the values of the modem environmental and anti-consumerist degrowth movement. A non-profit orientation and the emphasis on duties are shared by the concepts of degrowth and niṣkāmakarma. Social- or reality-centredness rather than self-centredness is also common to both concepts. The degrowth movement focuses on economic contraction and deceleration, and thus its scope is narrower and more specific than that of niṣkāmakarma. Moreover, the degrowth movement rejects economic grovrth because of its ecologically and socially harmful effects, such as pollution and income inequality, but it is - at least in theory - indifferent to the harmless results of economic activities. On the contrary, the principle of niṣkāmakarma involves a critical stance toward both good and bad results of actions, insofar as they are pursued because of self-regarding desires.

scholarly journals Detecting Defectors When They Have Incentives to Manipulate Their Impressions

2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toko Kiyonari
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Hard Core ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
The Other ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Monetary Gain

We examined if naive observers can distinguish defectors from cooperators even when defectors may be motivated to present themselves positively. In Study 1, 150 participants played a “semi-sequential” Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) with real monetary incentives, half as first players and half as second players. First players decided to cooperate or defect, and second players made the same decision without knowing the first player’s choice. The first player was given a chance to present a video message to the second player before the latter made their decision. After the PDG, players played a separate one-shot, semi-sequential Stag Hunt Game (SHG), a coordination game where cooperation is the best choice insofar as the other also cooperates. In this game, the first player was not given a chance to send a video message. When the players had incentives to hide intentions or manipulate impressions of themselves, even motivated judges (whose monetary gain depended on the accuracy of cheater/cooperator detection) could not distinguish defectors from cooperators in either the PDG or SHG. However, they were able to discriminate “hard-core defectors” who defected in both games. In Study 2, however, in which judges had no monetary incentives to detect targets’ choices, participants were unable to discern even hard-core defectors. The contents of the messages did not provide help discerning defectors.

scholarly journals Games of Two Halves: Non-Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Defection and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-312
Author(s):  
Stephen Dobson ◽  
John Goddard
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Early Stages ◽  
Soccer Teams ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

We develop a stylized two-period game-theoretic model of the strategic choices made by soccer teams when selecting between defensive and attacking team formations, and between non-violent and violent styles of play. Cooperative behaviour during the early stages of matches is typically superseded by non-cooperation during the latter stages. The propensity for violent play to take place in the latter stages of soccer matches is interpreted as novel non-experimental evidence that players typically resort to mutually detrimental non-cooperative forms of behaviour when the payoffs assume a prisoner’s dilemma structure.

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