Defining the International Public Enemy: The Political Struggle behind the Legal Debate on International Terrorism

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
JÖRG FRIEDRICHS

Who shall have the power to define international terrorism? To answer this question, which means determining the international public enemy, is an eminently political task. According to Carl Schmitt, politics is essentially about determining the public enemy. When it comes to a situation of emergency, whoever is in the position to distinguish friend from enemy holds ultimate power. While Schmitt was still thinking primarily in terms of the nation-state, the determination of the public enemy has now become an international issue. To demonstrate this point, this article examines the political struggle behind the legal debate on the definition of international terrorism. This is done by comparing two debates on international terrorism, one held in the 1970s and the other in the 2000s. Both these debates had, and still have, their institutional locus in the UN General Assembly and its Legal Committee. In the 1970s the non-aligned countries tried to challenge the discretion of the West in determining the international public enemy. In the 2000s the incumbent regimes of the Third World agree with Western states that terrorism is a common threat. The main cleavage is now between the leading Western powers that would like to determine the public enemy on a case-by-case basis (the United States and the United Kingdom), and the status quo states that would like to tie these hegemonic powers by a legal definition. It is precisely the absence of such a legal definition that makes it possible for the hegemonic powers and their followers to determine the international public enemy on a case-by-case basis. A legal definition would increase the coherence of the international coalition against terrorism and serve as a limitation on the discretionary power of the hegemonic states.

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eko Wahyono ◽  
Rizka Amalia ◽  
Ikma Citra Ranteallo

This research further examines the video entitled “what is the truth about post-factual politics?” about the case in the United States related to Trump and in the UK related to Brexit. The phenomenon of Post truth/post factual also occurs in Indonesia as seen in the political struggle experienced by Ahok in the governor election (DKI Jakarta). Through Michel Foucault's approach to post truth with assertive logic, the mass media is constructed for the interested parties and ignores the real reality. The conclusion of this study indicates that new media was able to spread various discourses ranging from influencing the way of thoughts, behavior of society to the ideology adopted by a society.Keywords: Post factual, post truth, new media


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-38
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Rosow

Contestation over war memorialization can help democratic theory respond to the current attenuation of citizenship in war in liberal democratic states, especially the United States. As war involves more advanced technologies and fewer soldiers, the relation of citizenship to war changes. In this context war memorialization plays a particular role in refiguring the relation. Current practices of remembering and memorializing war in contemporary neoliberal states respond to a dilemma: the state needs to justify and garner support for continual wars while distancing citizenship from participation. The result is a consumer culture of memorialization that seeks to effect a unity of the political community while it fights wars with few citizens and devalues the public. Neoliberal wars fought with few soldiers and an economic logic reveals the vulnerability to otherness that leads to more active and critical democratic citizenship.


2018 ◽  
pp. 8-15
Author(s):  
Іvan Pobochiy

The level of social harmony in society and the development of democracy depends to a large extent on the level of development of parties, their ideological and political orientation, methods and means of action. The purpose of the article is to study the party system of Ukraine and directions of its development, which is extremely complex and controversial. The methods. The research has led to the use of such scientific search methods as a system that allowed the party system of Ukraine to be considered as a holistic organism, and the historical and political method proved to be very effective in analyzing the historical preconditions and peculiarities of the formation of the party system. The results. The incompetent, colonial past and the associated cruel national oppression, terror, famine, and violent Russification caused the contradictory and dramatic nature of modernization, the actual absence of social groups and their leaders interested in it, and the relatively passive reaction of society to the challenges of history. Officials have been nominated by mafia clans, who were supposed to protect their interests and pursue their policies. Political struggle in the state took place not between influential political parties, but between territorial-regional clans. The party system of Ukraine after the Maidan and the beginning of the war on the Donbass were undergoing significant changes. On the political scene, new parties emerged in the course of the protests and after their completion — «Petro Poroshenko Bloc», «People’s Front», «Self-help»), which to some extent became spokespeople for not regional, but national interests. Pro-European direction is the main feature of the leading political parties that have formed a coalition in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Conclusion. The party system of Ukraine as a result of social processes is at the beginning of a new stage in its development, an important feature of which is the increase in the influence of society (direct and indirect) on the political life of the state. Obviously, there is a demand from the public for the emergence of new politicians, new leaders and new political forces that citizens would like to see first and foremost speakers and defenders of their interests.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-63
Author(s):  
Ingrid Nielsen ◽  
Russell Smyth

Existing studies for the United States examine the extent to which the public is knowledgeable about US courts, arguing that knowledge of the courts is linked to public support for their role. We know little, though, about the Australian public’s awareness of the High Court of Australia. We report the results of a survey of a representative sample of the Australian adult population, administered in November 2017. We find that few Australians know the names of the Justices, the number of Justices on the Court, how the Justices are appointed or for how long they serve. Awareness of recent cases decided by the Court is mixed. We find that age and education are better predictors of awareness levels than is gender. Our findings are important because in the absence of awareness of the High Court, the potential exists for the public to see the Court as having a more overt political role than it has, which may lower esteem for the Court. The potential for this to occur is exacerbated if, and when, politicians attempt to drag the High Court into the political fray, by attributing political motives to it that it does not have.


2007 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob N. Shapiro ◽  
Dara Kay Cohen

An effective terrorism alert system in a federal government has one central task: to motivate actors to take costly protective measures. The United States' color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) failed in this mission. In federal systems, national leaders cannot compel protective actions by setting an alert level; they must convince constituent governments and private parties that the desired actions are worth the costs. Such beliefs can be generated either by sharing the information behind an alert or by developing enough confidence in the alert system that the government's word alone suffices. The HSAS did neither, largely because it was not designed to generate confidence. Rather, the system's creators assumed that the public would trust the national leadership and believe in the utility of the system's information. Over time, as the HSAS became increasingly perceived as politically manipulated, there was no built-in mechanism to recover confidence in the system. An alternative, trust-based terrorist alert system could solve this problem. Building on the notion of “procedural fairness” from the psychological and legal traditions, this system would retain the political advantages of the HSAS, facilitate greater compliance among the requisite actors, and ameliorate many of the strategic problems inherent in terror alert systems.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Oosterhoff ◽  
Laura Wray-Lake ◽  
Daniel Hart

Several US states have proposed bills to lower the minimum local and national voting age to 16 years. Legislators and the public often reference political philosophy, attitudes about the capabilities of teenagers, or past precedent as evidence to support or oppose changing the voting age. Dissenters to changing the voting age are primarily concerned with whether 16 and 17-year-olds have sufficient political maturity to vote, including adequate political knowledge, cognitive capacity, independence, interest, and life experience. We review past research that suggests 16 and 17-year-olds possess the political maturity to vote. Concerns about youths’ ability to vote are generally not supported by developmental science, suggesting that negative stereotypes about teenagers may be a large barrier to changing the voting age.


2021 ◽  
pp. 146-160
Author(s):  
David Madland

This chapter explores whether a new labor system could ever become law and overcome the massive political hurdles standing in the way. The path to victory is quite narrow. There needs to be sufficient grassroots activism to push labor issues to the top of the agenda, a strong majority of politicians willing to vote for pro-union policy, champions to drive the policy forward, and a favorable intellectual climate. As difficult as these are to achieve, they are possible if favorable trends continue and rise in intensity. The public must increasingly and more forcefully demand change, and the political and intellectual climate must continue shifting in favor of labor modernization. The chapter concludes by echoing the theme of the book — that a new labor system with broad-based bargaining and encouragement for union membership would help address the fundamental economic and political challenges that the United States faces. The more people recognize this, the better the chances for creating a new labor system.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162199422
Author(s):  
Benjamin Oosterhoff ◽  
Laura Wray-Lake ◽  
Daniel Hart

Several U.S. states have proposed bills to lower the minimum local and national voting age to 16 years. Legislators and the public often reference political philosophy, attitudes about the capabilities of teenagers, or past precedent as evidence to support or oppose changing the voting age. Dissenters to changing the voting age are primarily concerned with whether 16- and 17-year-olds have sufficient political maturity to vote, including adequate political knowledge, cognitive capacity, independence, interest, and life experience. We review past research that suggests 16- and 17-year-olds possess the political maturity to vote. Concerns about youths’ ability to vote are generally not supported by developmental science, suggesting that negative stereotypes about teenagers may be a large barrier to changing the voting age.


Author(s):  
Ivo Svoboda ◽  
Tymur O. Loskutov ◽  
Oleksandra B. Severinova ◽  
Olha M. Peresada ◽  
Andriy O. Shulha

The study examines the development of international terrorism and the problem of its definition. Consequently, the objective of the study was to generate a systemic view of international terrorism and to identify current trends in its development. A structural and functional analysis of international terrorism as a political phenomenon was used. Based on the analytical model provided, the development of international terrorism was divided into periods based on political and geographical zoning. Three consistent principles determine the key characteristics of international terrorism as a rational strategy of unconventional political struggle: the transition to asymmetrical actions, attacks on symbolic objects, and influencing public opinion as the main objective. This triality of characteristics linked to a model of the political process defines the existence of international terrorism as a phenomenon and provides a key to understanding its dynamics. It is concluded that there are four periods in the development of international terrorism, divided into two cycles with breaking points, ascending, and descending phases. The proposed periodization of the development of international terrorism is based on the identification of the centers as political-geographical areas, where contradictions are configured and the political struggle that is part of the logic of the terrorist strategy.


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