Shaping the Arrow of the Will: Skorupski on Moral Feeling and Rationality

Utilitas ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theo Van Willigenburg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
The Will ◽  
Moral Feeling ◽  
Moral Stance ◽  
The Way

I oppose the way John Skorupski characterizes morality in terms of the blameworthy and the role he consequently assigns to punitive feelings in directing one's will and shaping one's character. Skorupski does not hold that the punishment involved in blame- and guilt-feelings grounds the normativity of moral obligation. He defends a specific view of moral psychology and moral practice in which the blame-feeling disposes to the withdrawal of recognition, which involves some sort of casting the transgressor out of the community resulting in the suffering of repentance which is necessary to make atonement (at-one-ment) possible. I argue that this picture threatens to socialize morality. I defend the Kantian idea that the will is not aligned to obligation through castigation, but through our consciousness of our vocation as takers and givers of reasons. This highlights very different feelings as essential to the typically moral stance, feelings that are not necessarily punitive, like feelings of respect and reverence.

scholarly journals Moral hypocrisy and the hedonic shift: A goal-framing approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siegwart Lindenberg ◽  
Linda Steg ◽  
Marko Milovanovic ◽  
Anita Schipper
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Situational Cues ◽  
Moral Hypocrisy ◽  
Goal Framing ◽  
Normative Consensus ◽  
Moral Stance ◽  
Do So ◽  
The Way

The most investigated form of moral hypocrisy is pragmatic hypocrisy in which people fake moral commitment for their own advantage. Yet there is also a different form of hypocrisy in which people take a moral stance with regard to norms they endorse without thereby also expressing a commitment to act morally. Rather they do it in order to feel good. We call this hedonic moral hypocrisy. In our research, we posit that this kind of hypocrisy comes about when people’s overarching goals are shifted in a hedonic direction, that is, in the direction of focusing on the way one feels, rather than on moral obligation. Hedonic shifts come about by cues in the environment. People are sometimes sincere when expressing a moral stance (i.e. they mean it and also act on it), and sometimes, when they are subject to a hedonic shift, they express a moral stance just to make them feel good. This also implies that they then decline to do things that make them feel bad, such as behaving morally when it takes unrewarded effort to do so. In two experimental studies, we find that there is such a thing as hedonic moral hypocrisy and that it is indeed brought about by hedonic shifts from cues in the environment. This seriously undermines the meaning of a normative consensus for norm conformity. Seemingly, for norm conformity without close social control, it is not enough that people endorse the same norms, they also have to be exposed to situational cues that counteract hedonic shifts. In the discussion, it is suggested that societal arrangements that foster the focus on the way one feels and nurture a chronic wish to make oneself feel better (for example, in the fun direction through advertisements and entertainment opportunities, or in the fear direction by populist politicians, social media, economic uncertainties, crises, or wars and displacements) are likely to increase hedonic hypocrisy in society.

Schopenhauer, Buddhism, and Compassion

2020 ◽  
pp. 327-346
Author(s):  
Richard Reilly
Keyword(s):  
Metaphysical Explanation ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Middle Way ◽  
Perfect Duties ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Way

The focus of this chapter is Schopenhauer’s On The Basis of Morality (1841). His distinctive views are that compassion marks one’s being as spontaneously motivated to relieve another’s suffering as one’s own and that this requires a metaphysical explanation for how one identifies with another. The author defends these views and shows in some detail how they mirror the Mahayana account of compassion in Shantideva’s The Way of the Bodhisattva. Next, the author outlines Schopenhauer’s case for compassion being the sole basis of moral value and defends this claim against the Kantian view that acting beneficently cannot (rationally) override so-called perfect duties to others. Finally, the author explores how Buddha Shakyamuni’s teachings cohere with Schopenhauer’s account of suffering and how mystical consciousness, as represented in Mahayana Buddhism’s “Middle Way,” coheres with Schopenhauer’s asceticism—the “denial of the will”—as the path to overcoming suffering.

Belief and the Will

Philosophy ◽  
1972 ◽  
Vol 47 (180) ◽  
pp. 95-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony O'Hear
Keyword(s):  
Long Period ◽  
General Account ◽  
The Will ◽  
Will Power ◽  
The Way

In this article, we will consider how far we might be said to be active in forming our beliefs; in particular, we will ask to what extent we can be said to be free in believing what we want to believe. It is clear that we ought to believe only what is really so, at least in so far as it lies in our power to determine this, but reflection shows that, regrettably, we do not confine our beliefs to what we have evidence for, nor do we always believe in accordance with the evidence we do have. So it is natural to conclude that non-intellectual factors may be at work here; such, at least, was the view of Descartes, who attributed error to the influence of our will in leading us to assent to judgments which go beyond the evidence presented by our infallible intellect. This view has some initial plausibility when we think of cases in which emotional considerations lead people to take up and genuinely believe things they have no evidence for, but it is not a view which has received much support from modern philosophers. So, in Part 1 we will look at criticisms levelled against Descartes' view by J. L. Evans, and in Part 2 we will see how far Descartes can be defended. Our conclusions here will lead us to give in Part 3 a general account of the influence of the will in beliefs. We will suggest that we are always responsible for our explicit beliefs, even though it is not true that we can simply believe what we like. Thus we will reject the idea that a man can consciously know something, and at the same time, by will power, believe the opposite. Belief is not then totally free, but we will argue that people do sometimes form beliefs which go against what they should and could believe, and that this can in a way be put down to the influence of the will. Finally we will consider some of the ways in which it is possible to influence our beliefs by willed acts over a long period of time, though this is not the way that we clami that the will might be said to play a part in every judgment that we make.

Physical Pleasure and Moral Action: An Analogy in Augustine’s Thought

2021 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-184
Author(s):  
Amanda Knight
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Physical Mechanism ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Conceptual System ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
The Will

Abstract The present essay argues that Augustine’s understanding of the physical mechanism of pain and pleasure bears an analogous relationship to the internal mechanics of his moral psychology. The significance of this analogy is threefold. It corroborates emerging consensus positions regarding Augustine’s moral psychology, including recognizing the significance of Stoic influences as well as construing Augustine’s psychology as monistic; it draws attention to a greater consistency between Augustine’s earlier and later accounts of moral psychology than is typically recognized in scholarship; and it offers a schema that organizes the significant components of Augustine’s moral psychology, like his theory of action, habit, the will, and conversion, in relation to one another within a single conceptual system.

scholarly journals MAKING THE CONTENTS OF LETTERS IN THE NOTARIS IN ISLAM'S LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 234
Author(s):  
Tubus Tubus
Keyword(s):  
Islamic Law ◽  
Field Research ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Legal Perspective ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Ideal ◽  
The Way

This paper aims to examine the making of the contents of wills examined from the point of view of Islamic law, in practice the reality in the lives of many people who have not heed the word basmallah as an incantation in the contents of the will for the followers of Islam. In this study using sociological juridical method, where the primary data obtained directly from field research, while secondary data obtained from the literature. The results obtained that the way of making the contents of the will and the absence of public legal awareness is optimal for the making of the contents of wills in accordance with Islamic law. And there are still weaknesses in the Making and Implementation of the contents of the current will, when the testament is oral, namely: The absence of the sacred intention or the noble intention of the collector must not necessarily occur; unsecured rights of the recipient, in the event of any problems of the future heirs of the pewasiat; there is a difficulty of proof in the absence of witnesses, when the will is brought before the Court. Law renewal in the making of the contents of the will in the presence of a notary in the perspective of Islamic law are: the reconstruction of its value, the Ideal Formation of the Will, the testament is done in writing witnessed by two witnesses and before the Notary. Ideal Construction Format of Testament Creation. The testament is written in the presence of two witnesses or in the form of a Deed or a Notary Deed. At the head of the will or the Deed or Notarial deed is included a sentence “Basmallah”.

Having the will and finding the way: A review and meta-analysis of hope at work

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 292-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca J. Reichard ◽  
James B. Avey ◽  
Shane Lopez ◽  
Maren Dollwet
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Way

Temperance and Epistemic Purity in Plato’s Phaedo

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Marechal
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
The Body ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Epistemic Stance ◽  
Philosophical Life ◽  
The Way

Abstract In this paper I examine the moral psychology of the Phaedo and argue that the philosophical life in this dialogue is a temperate life, and that temperance consists in exercising epistemic discernment by actively withdrawing assent from incorrect evaluations the body inclines us to make. Philosophers deal with bodily affections by taking a correct epistemic stance. Exercising temperance thus understood is a necessary condition both for developing and strengthening rational capacities, and for fixing accurate beliefs about value. The purification philosophers strive for, and the purifying role of philosophy, should then be understood as a clarificatory act consisting in making one’s thoughts clear and withdrawing assent from erroneous evaluative content in our desires and pleasures. Along the way, I argue that philosophers must neither avoid situations and activities that cause bodily affections as much as possible, nor ignore or care little about them.

On Clean, Soiled, and Spattered Hands

Equity ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 152-188
Author(s):  
Irit Samet
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Dirty Hands ◽  
Vast Number ◽  
Ad Hominem ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Judicial Reasoning ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines the clean hands doctrine, according to which a claimant who knocks on the court’s door with a hand tainted by illegality or immorality will not be given her day in court. Instead of listening to her potentially successful claim, Equity resorts to its characteristic ad hominem, flexible, morally sensitive, and ex post approach to drive him/her away. The doctrine, despite its effect on a vast number of disputes, is under-theorised and fraught with lack of clarity. The chapter first considers the sources of the considerable legal anxiety caused by the way this powerful gatekeeper operates, before discussing the underpinnings of the three traditional justifications for keeping the clean hands gatekeeper in place: coherence, deterrence, and integrity. I then make the argument that by interpreting the integrity justification as a concept rooted in moral psychology, we can understand how the incommensurable justifications relate to each other and operate in judicial reasoning. I conclude by showing how the clean hands gatekeeper creates a ‘dirty hands’ type dilemma for judges and what they can do about it.

Nerve Ending

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan K. Rode
Keyword(s):  
Nerve Ending ◽  
Box Office ◽  
Will Rogers ◽  
Assistant Director ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Way

Curtiz directedI’ll See You in My Dreams (1951), starring Doris Day and the newcomer Danny Thomas. The picture was his last box-office hit at Warner Bros.His long-cherished project,The Will Rogers Story, starring the commentator-actor’s son, was a handsome picture but a commercial failure. A remake of The Jazz Singer(1952) with Danny Thomas turned out even worse, though he cast the singer Peggy Lee in the film.Curtiz was becoming increasingly angry with Warners for refusing to hire his brother David as an assistant director and stonewalling his inquiries concerning the profit percentages on his films. After Curtiz directed John Wayne in Trouble Along the Way(1953), the studio claimed that all Curtiz’s films but onehad lost money.It then attempted to cheat him out of those minuscule profits by legally parsing his contract.The author also notes two sets of differing financial figures that Warner Bros. maintained on Curtiz’s films.After Warner informed him that he would have to accept a salary reduction and rejected his profit claims, Curtiz threatened a lawsuit. The suit was dropped and Jack Warner eventually paid him off to settle the matter. Curtiz finished his last Warner movie,The Boy from Oklahoma(1954),and moved on to Paramount Pictures.

What Made Pompeius Fight in 49 B.c.?

1959 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. G. Pocock
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
World Order ◽  
Great Majority ◽  
European History ◽  
Western Civilization ◽  
Old World ◽  
Small Minority ◽  
Highly Educated ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Way

The Civil War of 49 B.c. is one of the most important wars of European history, if only for the fact that it ended an old world order and paved the way for a new one which was to endure in Europe for nearly two thousand years. It is also one of the most dramatic wars of history, perhaps the most truly ‘tragic’, in the Greek sense of the word, of them all—so ‘tragic’ that it has never found a poet to do it justice, or to bring its leading characters fairly upon the stage. It was certainly the most unnecessary of wars. It involved the whole of Western civilization, and yet no really deep-seated emotions or animosities, racial, national, social, or even individual, caused the conflagration. It was, in fact, nothing but a trial of strength, with no constructive objective in view, between two men, highly educated, humane, related by marriage, not unfriendly to one another, members of the same society and the same clubs, as it were, whose interests, even, need not have been incompatible. It is generally agreed that the great majority of the senatorial aristocracy very definitely did not want the war; and it seems quite clear that the small minority, of some twenty-two, who did were powerless to commence it or wage it without the will and leadership of Pompeius. It is also agreed that Caesar, while prepared to fight for his skin and his dignitas, and to that extent responsible, did not want war and made sincere efforts both to avoid it and to stop it.

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