scholarly journals (A349) The Role of Poison Centers in the 2010 Gulf Oil Spill Response

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S1) ◽  
pp. s97-s98
Author(s):  
M. Ryan

IntroductionThere are 60 Poison Centers in the United States that manage over 2.5 million poison exposure calls each year. A poison center can be reached 24 hours a day by dialing a national 800 hotline. Poison Centers are staffed by Specialists in Poison Information who are highly trained in clinical toxicology and are very skilled in telephone triage.DiscussionATSDR and the Poison Centers in HHS/FEMA Region 6 developed draft guidance for incorporating Poison Centers into the National Response Plan. That framework was used to incorporate Poison Centers into the gulf oil spill response of 2010. The National Poison hotline was promoted to provide medical support for those with health effects or health questions related to the spill. During the response the surveillance capabilities of the National Poison Data System (NPDS) were highlighted. The Louisiana Poison Center (LPC) and the other gulf states Poison Centers provided information on health effects related to the spill. Information was provided by the LPC to the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Office of Public Health Section of Epidemiology and Environmental Toxicology, public information officer to assist in briefing the Governor, the Louisiana Governors Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness to post to the Virtual Louisiana website, as well as ATSDR, CDC, EPA, and other agencies participating in the gulf response unified command. Poison Centers, for the first time, participated in a response on a national level, providing medical support for those with symptoms or medical questions related to the spill. In addition to assisting in the medical care of those exposed to substances related to the oil spill and the response efforts, Poison Centers also responded to questions about air and water quality and seafood safety.ConclusionPoison Centers are a valuable resource to assist in emergency response plans.

1985 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-26

Poisoning is an important cause of accidental death in children less than 5 years of age. The most frequently ingested poisons are those that are commonly available at home in pleasant-colored containers and are easily accessible. They are usually in containers that are not child-proof. Mouthwash contains varying concentrations of ethanol ranging from a high of 26.9% (53.8 proof) to 14% (28 proof). A potentially lethal dose of absolute ethanol is approximately 3 g/kg (3.8 mL/kg) in a small child. [See Table in the PDF] During an 18-month period, reports of 422 cases of mouthwash ingestions by children less than 6 years of age were collected by The National Poison Center Network from its member poison centers in selected areas of the United States (unpublished data, 1979).


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick H. Lovejoy ◽  
William O. Robertson ◽  
Alan D. Woolf

The first poison centers were established in the United States in the early 1950s, stimulated by an American Academy of Pediatrics' survey of office-based pediatric practices which ascertained that its members had no place to turn for ingredient information on medications and household products.1 With the help of the Academy, pediatrician Dr. Edward Press, the Illinois Department of Health, and several community hospitals, the first poison center emerged. Over the subsequent 40 years, remarkable progress has occurred in the fields of clinical toxicology, poison control, and poison prevention. Yet despite these accomplishments, challenging clouds are appearing on the horizon which threaten these gains. This commentary, by the authors who have viewed and participated in a large part of the history of this progress, will focus on these major accomplishments with an emphasis on (a) poison prevention utilizing the pre-event (primary prevention), (b) the event (secondary prevention), and (c) the postevent (tertiary prevention) model.2


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017027
Author(s):  
Tim Gunter

Among the variety of oil spill response countermeasures, including mechanical, chemical, in-situ burning and bioremediation, deployment of chemical dispersants has been successfully utilized in numerous oil spills. This paper will review the history of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges. ADDS consists of a large tank with dispersant(e.g., 51,000 pounds), owned and operated by an industry partner, used aboard USCG C-130 aircraft designed to be ADDS capable as specified in various agreements for marine environmental protection missions. ADDS is a highly complex tool to utilize, requiring extensive training by air crews and industry equipment technicians to safely and properly deploy during an oil spill response. In 2011, the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Papp reaffirmed the USCG's C-130 ADDS capability during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and the Coast Guard. The use of ADDS in remote areas creates unique challenges, such as logistical coordination between the USCG and spill response industry partners and maintaining proficiency with personnel. It is critical for federal, state, and local agencies, industry, and academia to understand the history and challenges of ADDS to ensure the successful utilization of this response tool in an actual oil spill incident.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Stacey L. Crecy ◽  
Melissa E. Perera ◽  
Elizabeth J. Petras ◽  
John A. Tarpley

ABSTRACT #2017-373 Federal agencies involved in oil spill response in the U.S. are required to comply with several environmental compliance laws. Where a Federal agency is operating in a way that may affect endangered species in the area, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the agency to “consult” with the two Federal agencies responsible for protecting those species and habitats – the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, nonprofit organizations filed several lawsuits against the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (the “Action Agencies”) for failure to comply with the ESA during oil spill contingency planning. In one case, a settlement required the Action Agencies to consult with the NMFS and USFWS (together, called the “Services”) on the plan to use oil spill dispersants in California waters. Perhaps responding to these developments, several Regional Response Teams across the country initiated or made plans to review the status of their ESA Section 7 consultations. These efforts have varied in cost, scope, composition of agency representatives involved, and success in completing a consultation for a variety of reasons. There have been numerous challenges for USCG and EPA in meeting the ESA Section 7 consultation requirements for oil spill planning. First, the most recent framework for cooperation between the Action Agencies and the Services regarding consulting on oil spill planning and response activities is contained in an Interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 2001. Although the agreement is still valid, some parts have been identified as outdated or in need of clarification. Secondly, there are no direct funding mechanisms or dedicated personnel assigned to the Action Agencies to work on pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations. Third, recommendations and consultation outcomes can vary between Service agencies as well as internally within each Service agency due to a high level of regional autonomy. In 2015, the National Response Team (NRT) formed a new, interagency subcommittee to improve the Federal Action Agencies’ ability to comply with environmental laws such as the ESA with respect to oil spill response and pre-spill planning. A workgroup of the NRT Subcommittee was formed to specifically address pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultation processes. The workgroup includes regional and national representatives from the Action Agencies and the Services. In addition to strengthening relationships and understanding among the participating agencies, the workgroup has identified gaps in the 2001 MOA and is in the process of developing tools and templates on how to conduct pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations to help fill some of the existing gaps. The workgroup ultimately hopes to facilitate the development of updated, complete, efficient, and consistent ESA Section 7 consultations across the nation.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 1881-1898 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradford Benggio ◽  
Debra Scholz ◽  
Dave Anderson ◽  
Joseph Dillon ◽  
Greg Masson ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT In the United States (U.S.), oil spill response planning, preparedness, and response requirements are dictated primarily by the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, a regulation that implements the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the Clean Water Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. At the planning stage, these regulations require the development of national, regional, and local response capabilities and promote overall coordination among responders. During a spill, these capabilities are utilized by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) to analyze whether response actions are likely to impact protected resources. The consultation process required under Federal statutes, charges the FOSC to consult with Federal, state, Tribal entities, and other Federal agencies to determine potential effects of response actions during an incident and to develop strategies to avoid, minimize, and mitigate those effects (40 CFR § 300.135(j); § 300.305(e); and § 300.322(a), 1994). Consultations should continue until response operations are concluded and may continue after operations are complete. Four key regulatory mandates that require an FOSC to initiate consultation during a response include:Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended requires consultation with US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) on federally listed species and designated critical habitats;Magnuson-Stevens Act requires consultation with NMFS on any action that may affect Essential Fish Habitats;National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended requires Federal agencies to consult with states, federally recognized tribes, and other stakeholders on potential impacts to historic and cultural resources; andTribal Consultations under Executive Order 13175 – Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments when federally recognized Indian Tribes and their interests are affected by a response. Consultation is also required under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act when Native American burial sites, human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, or items of cultural patrimony are identified on Federal or Tribal lands during a response and no pre-consultation plan of action has been developed.1 Consultation requirements are not universally understood, leading to uncertainty and inconsistencies across the response community and Trustees regarding when to initiate and how to conduct the consultations. This paper discusses the Federal consultation requirements and identifies areas of possible uncertainties in the consultation process throughout the pre-spill planning, response, and post-response phases of an incident. This paper will suggest resolutions and recommendations to further enhance the consultation process by the Federal spill response decision-makers and planning bodies.


2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (7) ◽  
pp. 705-712 ◽  
Author(s):  
MB Forrester

Poison centers advance knowledge in the field of toxicology through publication in peer-review journals. This investigation describes the pattern of poison center-related publications. Cases were poison center-related research published in peer-review journals during 1995–2014. These were identified through searching the PubMed database, reviewing the tables of contents of selected toxicology journals, and reviewing abstracts of various national and international meetings. The following variables for each publication were identified: year of publication, journal, type of publication (meeting abstract vs. other, i.e. full article or letter to the editor), and the country(ies) of the poison center(s) included in the research. Of the 3147 total publications, 62.1% were meeting abstracts. There were 263 publications in 1995–1999, 536 in 2000–2004, 999 in 2005–2009, and 1349 in 2010–2014. The publications were in 234 different journals. The journals in which the highest number of research was published were Clinical Toxicology (69.7%), Journal of Medical Toxicology (2.2%), and Veterinary and Human Toxicology (2.1%). The research was reported from 62 different countries. The countries with the highest number of publications were the United States (67.9%), United Kingdom (6.5%), Germany (3.9%), France (2.5%), and Italy (2.4%). The number of publications increased greatly over the 20 years. Although the publications were in a large number of journals, a high proportion of the publications were in one journal. While the research came from a large number of countries, the preponderance came from the United States.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (1) ◽  
pp. abs104
Author(s):  
Dave DeVitis ◽  
William Schmidt ◽  
Jane Delgado ◽  
Mike Crickard ◽  
Steve Potter

ABSTRACT The American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) subcommittee on skimmers recently adopted a standard methodology for measuring I skimmer performance, F 2709 - Standard Test Method for Determining Nameplate Recovery Rate of Stationary Oil Skimmer Systems. Current industry practice allows manufacturers to label skimmers with a nameplate capacity based solely on the skimmer's offload pump capability without regard to the recovery rate as a system. Additionally there is no consideration given to the degradation in recovery performance when pumping fluids with viscosities higher than water. Typically the manufacturer's claimed value is unrealistic when estimating the oil recovery rate (ORR) of a skimming system. Integrating actual performance data into the planning and regulation process is prudent from all perspectives. In the absence of third party data, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) will de-rate a manufacturer's claimed nameplate capacity by 80% or more when calculating the Effective Daily Recovery Capacity (EDRC). The USCG uses EDRC as a key component in rating and regulating the oil spill response capability of responsible parties and oil spill response organizations (OSROs). The ASTM's new skimmer protocol has been used recently at Ohmsett to evaluate four oleophilic skimmers as potential alternatives to the skimmers currently used in Alaska's Prince William Sound (PWS) oil spill response plan. The selected skimmer has undergone a number of modifications with improvements quantified over four additional tests series. This paper focuses on the most recent test of this skimmer, conducted in cold-water conditions using both fresh and weathered Alaska North Slope (ANS) crude oil. During the latest testing, two newly introduced tests were performed: a 24-hour endurance test and a qualitative recovery test in the presence of seaweed.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 971-973
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Hall ◽  
Barry A. McFarland

ABSTRACT Spill prevention is working. The United States is experiencing fewer and fewer spills and the spills that do occur have involved smaller volumes (USCG, 1999). This fact is an overwhelming positive. There is, however, one area where this gain can be seen as a minor setback for oil spill response preparedness. Fewer spills means less experience, fewer people who have responded to a spill, and fewer yet that have practical experience in making the critically important interpretations of what is observed in the field during an actual event. For this reason, training of the field observer is an increasingly important area of response preparation. The single most difficult aspect of field training is the lack of an actual oil spill. This paper explores some of the challenges of training field observers as well as sharing some of the successes. The emphasis is on training of aerial observers and shoreline assessment teams. The poster session will present photos, training aids, and response kits from several realistic courses, including those highlighted below.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 1345-1365
Author(s):  
Paul Meyer

Abstract 2017-321 The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) National Oil Spill Response Research and Renewable Energy Test Facility, Ohmsett, plays a critical role in advancing oil spill response capabilities through research, development, testing, and training. Ohmsett’s 10 million liter (l) saltwater wave tank provides an independent venue to conduct research and development with full-size response equipment using real oil, in realistic, repeatable conditions. This paper will discuss recent research and development conducted at Ohmsett, including: Remote sensing of surface oil by BSEE, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the United States Army, the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA); using acoustics to measure oil slick thickness; creating large volumes of emulsions for Ohmsett tests; mechanical recovery of chemically treated, undispersed oil; skimmer testing in diminishing slick thickness; a USCG and BSEE test of a skimmer ice management system; and an autonomous skimmer development. This paper will summarize the setup and methodology used during recent testing, training, and research conducted at Ohmsett. Reports of BSEE funded oil spill response research can be found at https://www.bsee.gov/site-page/master-list-of-oil-spill-response-research.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1055-1058
Author(s):  
Joseph Gleason

ABSTRACT Historically, many response exercises conducted by the United States Coast Guard and other oil spill response stakeholders have been conducted as functional or full-scale exercises. With the increased demands placed on many U.S. agencies as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11’ 2001, there is a greater need than ever to ensure that time spent in training and exercises produces positive and tangible results for the participants. In preparation for the joint US/Canadian response exercise, CANUSLANT 2002, the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards decided to take a step back and look at the lessons learned from previous exercises. Based on this review, the Joint Response Team (JRT) decided to focus CANUSLANT 2002 as a training opportunity and to work on the lessons learned that were repeatedly identified in earlier CANUSLANT exercises. Perhaps the most common exercise conducted in oil spill response is the functional “command post” exercise where exercise participants are assigned to ICS (Incident Command System) staff elements. Participants then respond to an exercise scenario and prescripted injects that are provided to drive participant actions. With personnel turnover, transfers, and increased operational demands, many exercise participants struggle through the crisis phase of an incident scenario and never have the opportunity to learn what it is they are supposed to be doing. When all is said and done, many exercise participants are often simply go home happy that the exercise is over and done with. The goal for CANUSLANT 2002 was to produce an exercise where the participants accomplished something tangible; that long pending issues would be discussed and perhaps even resolved. The Exercise Design Team hoped that the participants walked away from the exercise saying that it was time well spent and not simply thankful that the exercise was over. This paper outlines the factors that led to the success of the CANUSLANT 2002 cross border response exercise. This paper also highlights some of the fundamentals for varying your approach to exercises to achieve tangible results while providing personnel the skills and training required to respond in the event of a real disaster.


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