Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison

Legal Theory ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Raz
Keyword(s):  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Legal Practice ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Semantic Account ◽  
General Part ◽  
Theory Of Law

In Law's Empire Prof. Ronald Dworkin has advanced a new theory of law, complex and intriguing. He calls it law as integrity. But in some ways the more radical and surprising claim he makes is that not only were previous legal philosophers mistaken about the nature of law, they were also mistaken about the nature of the philosophy of law or jurisprudence. Perhaps it is possible to summarize his main contentions on the nature of jurisprudence in three theses: First, jurisprudence is interpretive: “General theories of law… aim to interpret the main point and structure of legal practice” (LE, 90). Second, legal philosophy cannot be a semantic account of the word “law.” Legal philosophers “cannot produce useful semantic theories of law” (id.). Third, legal philosophy or jurisprudence “is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law” (id.).

Ambivalent assimilation

2006 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 336-340
Author(s):  
David A. J. Richards
Keyword(s):  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Criticism ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Social Rules ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Truth Claims ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Theory Of Law

Legal philosophy as a discipline, was, at best, a marginal topic of philosophical inquiry before H. L. A. Hart turned his attention to it. It may be said of Hart that no philosopher after Hart's work in the philosophy of law could ever reasonably regard legal philosophy as marginal again. Before Hart, legal positivism had, of course, its important advocates, but Hart's The Concept of Law showed that its earlier proponents had been wedded either to a command theory of law that was clearly indefensible (Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin) or a conception of norms that was inadequately defended (Kelsen, Hagerstrom, Alf Ross). In the place of the foundational concepts of command or norm, Hart rigorously defended a sociologically informed account of the operation of legal systems (marked by certain indicia of observance and acceptance) and an illuminating distinction between primary and secondary rules that explained important distinctions in law, for example, between the criminal and civil law and the constitutional law establishing the scope and limits of the competence of officials. On this basis, Hart offered an account of law as a subset of social rules, marked by its monopoly of coercive power over a well-defined territory and the finality of its authority over matters involving the scope and limits of such power. Since truth claims about law are made on the basis of ascertaining such rules, determined by observance and acceptance, such claims in law truthfully can be and are made without knowing whether such rules are substantively just according to a philosophically defensible theory of justice. For this reason, Hart argued that legal positivism is the better philosophy of law, since law can be known without knowing its justice, and positivism makes clear the responsibility of independent ethical criticism of law's sometime amorality and immorality. No one after Hart wrote about these matters, would ever think of law in the same way, and the case for legal positivism, as a philosophy of law, had been placed on an altogether sounder philosophical basis.

THEORY OF LAW AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AS THEORETICAL DISCOURSES: SPECIFICS AND RELATIONSHIP

2020 ◽  
pp. 9-17
Author(s):  
Вадим Леонидович Афанасьевский
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Theoretical Concept ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
The West ◽  
Scientific Creativity ◽  
Key Characteristics ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
The Relationship

В статье анализируется проблема взаимоотношений философии права и научной теории права. Рассматриваемая проблема стала особенно актуальной в российском образовательном пространстве в связи с введением после длительного перерыва в государственный образовательный стандарт магистратуры по юриспруденции учебной дисциплины «Философия права». Автор статьи в качестве базисного принимает тезис, согласно которому философия права, являясь сферой философской мысли, и теория права как область научного социогуманитарного знания представляют собой разные типы теоретического дискурса. Исходя из этого, в статье выстраивается теоретическая концепция, согласно которой задачей философии права как философского типа мышления является конструирование или экспликация онтологических, эпистемологических, аксиологических, феноменологических оснований для формирования и функционирования научных теоретико-правовых и историко-правовых построений. Для реализации поставленной в статье задачи подробно рассматриваются ключевые характеристики как теории философского типа, так и идеалов, норм и характеристик научного знания. Выявленное различие экстраполируется на взаимоотношение теории права как продукта научного творчества и философии права как конструкции, задающей базовые мировоззренческие смыслы. В качестве примера выработанных философией права и государства оснований научных теорий прогресса, государства, морали и права, автор приводит взгляды мыслителей западноевропейской философской классики: Т. Гоббса, Ж.-Ж. Руссо, И. Канта, Г.В.Ф. Гегеля. Именно их философские концепции предопределили образы теоретико- и историко-правовых учений XVIII, XIX, XX и даже начала XXI в. Таким образом, отношение философии права и теории права выстраивается по «вертикали»: от онтологического основания к возведению теоретико-правовых и историко-правовых научных построений. The article analyzes the problem of the relationship between the philosophy of law and the scientific theory of law. The problem under consideration has become especially urgent in the Russian educational space in connection with the introduction of the Philosophy of Law discipline master's degree in law after a long break. The author of the article takes as the basis the thesis that the philosophy of law, being the sphere of philosophical thought, and the theory of law as a field of scientific socio-humanitarian knowledge are different types of theoretical discourse. Based on this, the article builds a theoretical concept according to which the task of the philosophy of law as a philosophical type of thinking is the construction or explication of ontological, epistemological, axiological, phenomenological grounds for the formation and functioning of concrete scientific theoretical and legal and historical and legal constructions. To implement the task posed in the article, the key characteristics of both a theory of a philosophical type and ideals, norms and characteristics of scientific knowledge are examined in detail. The revealed difference is extrapolated to the relationship between the theory of law as a product of scientific creativity and the philosophy of law as a construction that sets basic philosophical meanings. As an example of the foundations of the scientific theories of progress, state, morality and law developed by the philosophy of law and the state, the author gives the views and thinkers of the West European philosophical classics T. Hobbes, J.-J. Russo, I. Kant, G.V.F. Hegel. It was their philosophical concepts that predetermined the images of theoretical and historical-legal doctrines of the XVIII, XIX, XX and even the beginning of the XXI centuries. Thus, the attitude of the philosophy of law and the theory of law is built along the «vertical»: from the ontological foundation to the construction of theoretical and historical and historical legal scientific constructions.

Interpretivism in Jurisprudence: What Difference Does the Philosophy of History Make to the Philosophy of Law?

2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-393
Author(s):  
Naomi Choi
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of History ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Authority ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Historical Interpretation ◽  
Interpretive Theory ◽  
Legal Positivist ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Positivist Approach

AbstractTo answer the question of what difference the philosophy of history makes to the philosophy of law this paper begins by calling attention to the way that Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law is supposed to upend legal positivism. My analysis shows how divergent theories about what law and the basis of legal authority is are supported by divergent points of view about what concepts are, how they operate within social practices, and how we might best give account of such meanings. Such issues are widely debated in the philosophy of history but are often overlooked in jurisprudential circles. When the legal positivist approach to meanings is contrasted with Dworkin's interpretivism it is clear that what is needed is an alternative to both, in the form of what we might call "historical meanings" and "historical interpretation". While Dworkin's interpretivism gets it right that legal positivism is an inadequate philosophy of law to the extent that it is committed to a "criterial semantics" view of concepts, this paper argues that post-positivism in the philosophy of law need not entail a normative jurisprudence, as Dworkin would have it.

scholarly journals Law and aesthetics: critical note

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 631-640 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Satie
Keyword(s):  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Legal Form ◽  
Critical Note ◽  
Art Form ◽  
Conservative Approximation ◽  
Conditions Of Possibility ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Way

It is thought in the theory and philosophy of law, aimed at discussing the conditions of possibility of rapprochement between the art form and legal form. The text investigates, dialectically, the implications for the legal philosophy of the impossibility of such approximation, and the problems in a conservative approximation. It follows that: 1) would be a loss for a reason and therefore to legal philosophy, not to communicate between art and law; 2) the relationship between legal and aesthetic standards should be guided by the critical, especially in terms of Adorno's thought. It is by overcoming the dichotomy between possibility and impossibility, opening on the idea of constellation of methodological categorical fields of law and aesthetics in their current forms, paving the way for understanding the legal form as a tragic way.

scholarly journals Phenomenological Concept of Law from the Perspective of Carlos Cossio

2020 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 119-140
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Goździalski
Keyword(s):  
Strong Relationship ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Philosophy Of Culture ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Concept Of Law

The originality of Cossio’s works is expressed by a strong relationship between philosophy of law and his philosophical assumptions. The starting point for deliberating on law are widely recognized ontological and epistemological contentions. Cossio justifies his legal theses basing them on his philosophical views. Egology derives from Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology which is related to some elements of William Dilthey’s philosophy of culture. Martin Heiddeger’s and Immanuel Kant’s philosophies are the basis too. The first part describes Cossio’s ontologies of subjects otherwise known as regional ontologies. Methods for examining the above subjects and gnoseological acts are presented here too. The second part presents the characteristics of law as a cultural subject. The article is not only a report. Its aim is also to show that Carlos Cossio’s legal philosophy is semantic in character.

scholarly journals BRIDGING THE GAPS : A PARADIGMATIC INSIGHT INTO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erlyn Indarti
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Legal Science ◽  
Insight Into

Paradigm represents a worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature of theworld, the individual's place in it, and the range of possible relationships to thatworld and its parts. It comprises of four main elements, i.e. ontology, epistemology,methodology, and methods. Within the discipline of law, there seem to be two setsof gaps separating philosophy of law's building blocks that dissociate, first, legalpractice from legal theory and, second, legal science from legal philosophy. It isthe purpose of this article, with the help of paradigmatic insight, to bridge thosegaps.Keywords: law, philosophy of law, paradigm, paradigmatic study of law

The nature of law as an interpretive practice and its associated modes of inquiry

Legal Studies ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 576-591
Author(s):  
Nathan Gibbs
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Instrumental Rationality ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Critical Survey ◽  
Legal Practice ◽  
Legal Research

The paper provides a critical survey of certain methodological debates in the field of legal philosophy in order to assess their implications for legal research in general. Underpinning this survey is a concern to establish the independence and integrity of both legal practice and legal research in the light of the risks posed by preponderant forms of instrumental rationality. Thus, Brian Leiter's recent call for a ‘naturalised’ jurisprudence is criticised for the instrumentalist basis upon which he claims to privilege forms of legal research apparently ‘continuous with’ the natural and empirical social sciences. As against Leiter, it is argued that there are in fact a range of distinct but interrelated modes of legal research. In this respect, the work of HLA Hart is interpreted as an example of a distinctively theoretical mode of inquiry into law. In addition, an account of the nature of a distinctively practical mode of legal inquiry is developed from a critique of Ronald Dworkin's excessively ‘theoretical’ reading of the interpretive character of legal practice. A constitutive practical feature of both modes of inquiry is their capacity to take up a certain distance from any exclusive concern with instrumental or pragmatic action.

John Austin and Constructing Theories of Law

2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 431-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian H. Bix
Keyword(s):  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Theory Construction ◽  
Legal Practice ◽  
Lack Of Fit ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
The Way ◽  
John Austin

One of the standard criticisms of John Austin’s work is that his portrayal of law, as essentially the command of a sovereign to its subjects, does not fit well with the way law is practiced or perceived by lawyers, judges, and citizens; and since the theory “fails to fit the facts,” Austin’s theory must be rejected in favor of later theories that have better fit. Many influential modern approaches to the nature of law, including Joseph Raz’s exclusive legal positivism and Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivism, while they criticize the lack of fit of theories like Austin’s, themselves unapologetically offer characterizations of legal practice that deviate in significant ways from the way most people practice or perceive law. Thus, it appears that many contemporary legal theorists wish to have it both ways: they use the deviations from conventional understandings as grounds for dismissing some theories by other scholars, but forgive or overlook comparable deviations in their own theories. This article explores what general principles can be learned, or developed, regarding when or to what extent deviation from the way law is practiced and perceived can be justified in a theory of the nature of law by other theoretical gains. Additionally, the article considers whether, in light of the proper approach to fit and mistake in theory-construction, Austin’s theory of law might be a more viable alternative than is conventionally assumed.

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