The Conferral of Power to the Commission Put to the Test

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camilla Buchanan

Case C-427/12 Commission v European Parliament and Council (not yet reported)- Article 290 TFEU- Article 291(2) TFEU- Article 80(1) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products, OJ 2012 L 167/11.The EU legislature has discretion when it decides to confer a delegated power on the Commission pursuant to Article 290(1) TFEU or an implementing power pursuant to Article 291(2) TFEU. Consequently, judicial reviewis limited tomanifest errors of assessment (official headnote)2.The Commission appears to have more liberty under Article 290 TFEU than Article 291(2) TFEU, however this may be misleading. The difference between adding “further details” (implementing act) and supplementing or amending non-essential elements to a basic act (delegated act) is difficult to gauge. Furthermore, the control foreseen to be exercised by the Member States and the Parliament and Councilmay not function as planned (author's headnote).

Author(s):  
T. Romanova ◽  
E. Pavlova

The article examines how the normative power, which the EU puts forward as an ideological basis of its actions in the world, manifests itself in the national partnerships for modernization between Russia and EU member states. The authors demonstrate the influence of the EU’s normativity on its approach to modernization as well as the difference in the positions of its member countries. It is concluded that there is no unity in the EU’s approach to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and the new classification of EU member states, which is based on their readiness to act in accordance with the Union’s concept of normative power, is offered.


2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska

Abstract In reaction to the sharp deterioration of fiscal positions and a sovereign debt crisis in the majority of EU member states, EU leaders have been strengthening the EU economic governance framework, in particular for the eurozone member states. This has been reflected mainly through a reinforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) within the so-called six-pack and through the recent adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG). The objective of this paper is to present the main decisions taken to address intensifying problems in the EU and assess them from the point of view of stability of the eurozone. The paper argues that the recent adoption of the six-pack and of the TSCG has created a legal basis for more effective governance structure that is much stronger than previously, and closer fscal coordination among EU member states in order to ensure public fnance sustainability. The practical results will depend, however, on the political willingness of countries to accept the new rules and rigorous enforcement of those rules. Most of the new solutions continue the previous approach: stricter preventive and punishing rules, and their more rigorous application. TSCG has adopted a new element: parallel to EU rules, there should be enhanced national rules (possibly in the form of constitutional commitments) and national institutions responsible for fscal discipline. This approach implies that international rules are not strong enough for sovereign countries, which agree to be subject to democratically elected national authorities but do not want to follow decisions by “outside” institutions. In addition, reverse voting in the Council encourages for more pragmatic, economically justifed use of the modifed SGP. In view of a lack of political will to move forward into a political union, this seems the only realistic approach to ensure fscal stabilization and keep the eurozone alive in the short and medium run. Two main research methods have been applied: (a)Statistical analysis of data on changes of the public fnances in the EU member states (budgetary defcit and public debt), (b)comparative analysis of successive EU documents on strengthening economic governance and identifcation of strong and weak aspects of the new documents from the point of view of stability of the eurozone. The main conclusion is that in a situation of a lack of political will to move forward into a political union, the only realistic approach to ensure fscal stabilization and keep the eurozone alive in the short and medium term seems to be to enforce rigorously the recently adopted new commitments aiming at better fscal control of euro area members.


Author(s):  
Petr YAKOVLEV

The decision on Britain’s secession from the European Union, taken by the British Parliament and agreed by London and Brussels, divided the Union history into “before” and “after”. Not only will the remaining member states have to “digest” the political, commercial, economic and mental consequences of parting with one of the largest partners. They will also have to create a substantially new algorithm for the functioning of United Europe. On this path, the EU is confronted with many geopolitical and geo-economic challenges, which should be answered by the new leaders of the European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jakub Charvát

Modern democratic political systems are hardly conceivable without political representation. This also applies to the European Union, a unique international organisation with a directly elected and fully-fledged assembly representing the EU citizens. Because geography is central to the operation of almost all electoral systems and the European Parliament is the first transnational assembly based on the Member States representation, the paper explores the spatial aspect of the composition of the European Parliament resulting from the 2019 election. The representation in the European Parliament may be degressively proportional, which implies malapportionment of seats across the EU Member States. The paper, thus, seeks to quantify the malapportionment in the 2019 election at both the aggregate level (by the adaption of Loosemore and Hanby´s distortion index) and individual level (advantage ratio and the value of a vote). It concludes malapportionment was just below 14,5% of the total seats in 2019 while the 2019 election did not bring the degressively proportional representation in the European Parliament as required by the Lisbon Treaty.


1968 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 324-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Kohoutek

It is well known that the central star of the planetary nebula NGC 1514 (α50 = 4h06m.1, δ50 = +30°39'; lII= 165·5, bII = −15·3) differs from the other planetary nuclei by its high brightness (relative to the nebula) and late-type spectrum. The difference B∗ – Bn = 1m.9, and especially the A0-spectral type (Chopinet, 1963) are quite atypical for central stars. For these reasons we began a complex study of this object (Kohoutek, 1967; Kohoutek and Hekela, 1967) on the basis of the following sources of observational material: (1)Palomar Sky-Survey prints (Schmidt-camera, Palomar Observatory);(2)direct photographs in UBV system with the 2-m Schmidt-camera in Tautenburg (1962);(3)photoelectric UBV photometry with the 65-cm reflector at Ondřejov (1964–65),(4)(4) spectrograms of the central star using the 122-cm reflector in Asiago (1965), and relatively infrequent observational data from the older literature.


Author(s):  
Maksymilian Kosma Jabłecki

The aim of the study is to analyze if the subsidiarity principle in the context of the law solutions introduced by the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2018/957 amending Directive 96/71 concerning the posting of employees in the framework of the provision of services should be considered justified and proportionate. The arguments presented will show the opinion that the subsidiarity principle is one of the basic rules for conducting economic policy in the European Union. On this basis it will be investigated whether policy powers should be delegated to the lowest possible level of government, close to the citizens concerned by the policy, unless there are undeniable benefits to running it at a higher level in closer policy coordination. It should be considered if the European Commission proposal pursues a purpose other than the declared one and thus violates the principle of proportionality. It will be proved that smart and clear rules are needed that are adapted to the rapidly growing mobility of EU businesses and citizens, which will prevent the progressive loss of competitiveness of the EU market, while accelerating social convergence and preventing illegal activities affecting intra-EU migrant workers.The issues mentioned above and the conclusions may lead, according to the author, to reflection on the importance of the fact, that the division of competences between Member States and the EU institutions is ultimately a political decision that arises in the context of a conflict of interest and indicate that economic analyzes can only provide arguments for or against policy centralization. Furthermore, it should be noted that the integration is a dynamic process and therefore the results of the analysis regarding the justification for the application of the subsidiarity principle may lead to divergent assessments by the Member States, as the conditions of the functioning of economies are rapidly changing.


IG ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-100
Author(s):  
Nicolai von Ondarza

The Brexit negotiations constituted unchartered political and institutional territory for the European Union (EU). This analysis shows how a new institutional approach enabled the EU-27 to present an unusually united front. The “Barnier method” is characterised by five elements: a strong political mandate from the European Council, a single EU negotiator based in the European Commission in the person of Michel Barnier, very close coordination with the Member States and the European Parliament, and a high degree of transparency. Lessons can also be drawn from this for the next phase of the Brexit negotiations and the EU’s relations with other third countries.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-56
Author(s):  
Judit Csizmásné Tóth ◽  
Zsolt Hollósy ◽  
Judit Poór

This paper presents the expansion of renewable energy sources of electricity generation over the last 10-15 years, based on statistical data for Hungary and for the EU-28 member states. The share of renewable energy in electricity production was almost 30% in the EU28 in 2016, while in Hungary it was only 7%, which is the second lowest share in EU member states. In Hungary, the share of nuclear energy is still high in electricity production, and the proportion of biomass in renewable energy in Hungary is very high compared to the EU-28 average. An important issue for Hungary is how to reduce the share of nuclear energy in the longer term. Finally, the paper highlights the essential elements of the Hungarian METAR subsidy system aimed at encouraging the production of electricity (and heat) energy from renewable energy sources while minimizing the burden on end users.


Author(s):  
Andrii Martynov

The politics of the European Union are different from other organizations and states due to the unique nature of the EU. The common institutions mix the intergovernmental and supranational aspects of the EU. The EU treaties declare the EU to be based on representative democracy and direct elections take place to the European Parliament. The Parliament, together with the European Council, works for the legislative arm of the EU. The Council is composed of national governments thus representing the intergovernmental nature of the European Union. The central theme of this research is the influence of the European Union Political system the Results of May 2019 European Parliament Election. The EU supranational legislature plays an important role as a producer of legal norms in the process of European integration and parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the EU executive. The European Parliament, as a representative institution of the European Union, helps to overcome the stereotypical notions of a “Brussels bureaucracy” that limits the sovereignty of EU member states. The European Parliament is a political field of interaction between European optimists and European skeptics. The new composition of the European Parliament presents political forces focused on a different vision of the strategy and tactics of the European integration process. European federalists in the “European People’s Party” and “European Socialists and Democrats” consider the strategic prospect of creating a confederate “United States of Europe”. The Brexit withdrawal from the EU could help the federalists win over European skeptics. Critics of the supranational project of European integration do not have a majority in the new composition of the European Parliament. But they are widely represented in many national parliaments of EU Member States. The conflicting interaction between European liberals and far-right populists is the political backdrop for much debate in the European Parliament. The result of this process is the medium term development vector of the European Union.


Author(s):  
Gijs Jan Brandsma ◽  
Jens Blom-Hansen

This chapter turns from preferences on delegation regimes to decisions and examines how differing preferences are turned into decisions. It focuses on two factors in addition to preferences. First, legislation in the EU is decided under different procedures which provide the actors with different powers to act on their preferences. Second, legislation comes with transaction costs. Controlling delegated powers takes time and requires staff with technical insight. These costs are bearable to the member states in the Council of Ministers because they can rely on their national ministerial systems to exercise control. However, for the European Parliament, exercising control in practice is demanding. The Parliament is therefore likely to choose its battles with more care than the Council. The aim of this chapter is to understand the overall post-Lisbon pattern of delegation and control structures resulting from the numerous negotiations in daily legislative practice.


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