The Mansuri Collection at the Library of Congress: An Underutilized Resource for the Study of Muslim Religious, Intellectual, and Social History

2010 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-32

Late in 1945, officials in the U.S. government were pondering the lessons of the recently concluded wars with Germany and Japan. It is no surprise that the principal concern of policymakers was to prevent circumstances arising that would again imperil the nation and its ever-increasing interests abroad. From the Allied perspective, preventing the resurgence of German and Japanese imperialism required a prolonged military occupation. Together with a view toward deterring other military threats to U.S. power, the consequence was the building-up of a vast peacetime military apparatus, what President Eisenhower termed a “military-industrial complex,” for the first time in U.S. history. At this same time, the Librarian of Congress, Luther Harris Evans, argued that American security and hegemony demanded another kind of national commitment as well, to the acquisition and assembling of data throughout the world. In his words:

2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 79-87
Author(s):  
Veniamin V. Alekseev ◽  

The article traces the role of the Ural-Siberian region in Russia’s responses to historical challenges in the era of modernization. It is concluded that this role has been steadily increasing over the course of four centuries — from traditional society to the end of the historical period of modernization. Such a chronologically large and meaningfully diverse process is revealed for the first time in historiography. Addressing it made it possible to assess the strategy of a particular region in ensuring the country’s responses to world challenges at the expense of its own resources. Historical experience has shown that the region stayed in history as a reserve territory of the deep rear. These tendencies are traced on the materials of the procurement of furs, extraction of silver and gold, and ferrous metallurgy products. These resources contributed to Russia’s entry into the world market, the formation of its military-industrial complex, and responses to the challenges of the times and global competitors. The exploitation of such wealth controversially influenced the modernization processes and overcoming the country’s lag behind the advanced states of the world, although imperial Russia sometimes outstripped its opponents in some indicators, in particular, in the production of ferrous metals. Each of the five macro problems posed in this text requires further elaboration precisely from the standpoint of challenges. It is necessary to continue studying the perception of these problems in our country and the ways of organizing responses to them, as well as the reaction of the world community to Russia’s responses. This is the task for specialists in both Russian and general history.


Author(s):  
Peter Baldwin

Americans Are Patriotic And Nationalist, but not more than some Europeans (figure 173). Unsurprisingly, Germans are least proud of their nation, and rather unexpectedly and cheerily, the Portuguese—not the Americans—are most proud, with the Irish tied for second place. A 2007 survey reveals that a larger proportion of Italians consider their culture superior than any other nationalities surveyed, including the Americans. Another survey finds that only the Irish feel more uniformly proud to be of their nation. Proportionately more Austrians, Irish, French, and Danes claim they feel very close to their nation than do Americans. Americans are more likely than any Europeans to think that their country is better than most others. But proportionately more Portuguese, Danes, and Spaniards feel that the world would be improved if other people were like them. And any U.S. tendency to boosterism is tempered by the finding that a larger fraction of Americans admits that certain aspects of their country shame them than do the Germans, Austrians, Spanish, French, Danes, or Finns. No country more robustly projects its own nationalist aspirations in the products it sells abroad than the supposedly postnational Swedes. Swedish manufacturers, or at least their advertising agencies, seem convinced that the sheer fact of being Swedish is a selling point. Ikea’s walls are adorned with musings on the preternaturally close relationship between Swedes and nature that allegedly sets them apart from the rest of humanity, as are packets of Wasa crispbread. Asko’s slogan, “Made In Sweden,” is festooned prominently on its products. Though it does not necessarily inspire confidence that the company’s dishwashers are better than the competition, it certainly makes clear Asko’s national origins. Absolut Vodka’s tag—in uncharacteristically unidiomatic English—“Country of Sweden,” does much the same. Saab hawks its cars as “Born from Jets,” an unsubtle allusion to the company’s standing as a pillar of the Swedish military-industrial complex.


2020 ◽  
pp. 151-162
Author(s):  
Melvin Delgado

Viewing the military as a major state-sanctioned violence mechanism brings challenges, and not because of the absence of scholarly material or varied perspectives to craft an analysis. Rather, the challenge is how to narrow the scope and still do justice to the broadness of this subject. This chapter may well be the first time that readers have been exposed to the military in state-sanctioned violence, particularly when focused on people of color. Historical material gives context to state violence manifestation in the military–industrial complex and veterans, and a natural follow-up to the chapter on law enforcement and criminal justice. It may seem odd to include the military alongside subjects typically found within a state-sanctioned violence paradigm focused on cities and youth of color; although the military–industrial complex may have escaped attention in social work education, there are increasing numbers of veterans entering our profession. At first glance, it simply does not fit, but upon closer examination when viewing the military as (1) a prime source for recruiting police officers, (2) providing equipment meant for wars that find their way to the nation’s streets, (3) a system that relies on the young, (4) having a role in foreign conflicts causing population displacements, and (5) increasingly a source for recruits of color, it becomes worthy of attention. It is easy to view the military as its own separate category of state-sponsored violence with minimal interactions with other forms of state violence due to the enormity of its influence.


Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith

This book documents the institutional history of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), the U.S. Army organization responsible for chemical warfare, from its origins in 1917 through Amos A. Fries's departure as CWS chief in 1929. It examines the U.S. chemical warfare program as it developed before the nation began sending soldiers to fight in France during World War I; the American Expeditionary Force's experiences with poison gas on the Western Front; the CWS's struggle to continue its chemical weapons program in a hostile political environment after the war; and CWS efforts to improve its public image as well as its reputation in the military in the first half of the 1920s. The book concludes with an assessment of the CWS's successes and failures in the second half of the 1920s. Through the story of the CWS, the book shows how the autonomy of the military-industrial complex can be limited when policymakers are confronted with pervasive, hostile public opinion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Jeremy Kuzmarov ◽  
John Marciano

The present Russia panic follows an entire century of fearmongering and "threat inflation," dating to the Russian Revolution, that has long served the interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex and security state. It has had little to do with either Russian or American realities, which have been consistently distorted.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.


Author(s):  
John A. Alic

The three large military services—Army, Navy, and Air Force—comprise the core of the U.S. politico–military–industrial complex. They dominate decision making on multi-billion dollar weapon systems and the operational concepts these are intended to embody. The armed forces need private firms to realize their visions of new weaponry, since government has limited capacity in engineering design and development and limited production facilities. Running a successful defense business means giving the services what they want, or think they want, whether this makes technical and operational sense or not; thus industry caters to the views of the services, and while it seeks to influence them, does so mostly at the margins. The political dynamics of the complex take place in two primary domains, only loosely coupled. The first is largely contained within the Defense Department. This is the main arena for conflict and bargaining within and among the services and between the services, individually and collectively, and Pentagon civilians. Most of what happens here stays hidden from outsiders. Service leaders generally seek to resolve disagreements among themselves; the goal, often although not always achieved, is to present a united front to civilian officials and the public at large. The second domain extends to the rest of government, chiefly Congress, with its multiple committees and subcommittees, and the White House, home of the powerful Office of Management and Budget among other sources of policy leverage. The complex as a whole is an artifact of the Cold War, not greatly changed over the decades. Repeated efforts at restructuring and reform have led to little. The primary reason is that military leaders, senior officers who have reached the topmost ranks after lengthy immersion in generally conservative organizational cultures, usually have the upper hand in bureaucratic struggles. They believe the military’s views on choice of weapons—the views of seasoned professionals—should have precedence over those of civilians, whether Pentagon appointees and their staffs, elected officials, or outside experts. They usually prevail, since few of the political appointees on the civilian side of DoD and in policy-influencing positions elsewhere can command similar authority. If they do not prevail on a particular issue, service leaders expect to outwait their opponents; if they lose one battle over money or some cherished weapon system, they anticipate winning the next.


Leonardo ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 319-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheila Pinkel

The author traces the evolution of her installations about the military-industrial complex during the 1980s and early 1990s and artworks that emerged as a result of her research. In addition to national and international data, maps, graphs and statistics about the industry, the author over time progressively added regional, site-specific information in order to empower viewers. The process of creating these works revealed the place of the nuclear industry in the author's own family, which ultimately facilitated the design of later installations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 547-565
Author(s):  
Maarten Zwiers

Segregationist politicians from the U.S. South played key roles in devising plans for the reconstruction of Germany, the Marshall Plan and the drafting of displaced persons legislation. This article discusses how their Jim Crow ideology calibrated the global and domestic order that emerged from the ashes of World War II. Southern advocates of this ideology dealt with national and foreign issues from a regional perspective, which was based on the protection of agricultural interests and a nascent military-industrial complex, but above all, on the defence of white supremacy. In general, they followed a lenient course toward Germany after the country’s defeat in World War II, for various reasons. The shared experience of post-war reconstruction, containment of communism and feelings of kinship between the Germanic people and the Anglo-Saxons of the U.S. South were some of the motives why many white southerners did not endorse punitive measures against the former enemy. For them, an obvious connection existed between the local and the global, which strongly reverberated in the formation of U.S. foreign and domestic policy in the post-war world. The rebuilding of Germany and the fugitive question were shaped on the basis of a Jim Crow blueprint.


Author(s):  
V.V. Kanshaev ◽  
D.G. Maksimov ◽  
N.G. Sokolova

Competition is one of the driving forces of economic development, an important element of the progressive development of both public and private enterprises. It is believed that competition creates the prerequisites to produce higher-quality products, with less time and resources. Considering the current financial and political climate in the world, the struggle for markets is intensifying. The branch of Russia, which is competitive in the world market, is a military-industrial complex. The goal of the state is to support this industry. One of the priorities is the creation of a transparent system of distribution of defense orders among enterprises that compete in the domestic market. It is necessary to develop a mechanism that would provide access for defense industry enterprises to financial resources, which is one of the key factors necessary for conducting research and development works to create a scientific product that can be used for both military and civilian purposes. Among other things, it is necessary to help defense industry enterprises to find and acquire advanced foreign technologies that are poorly developed in Russia. This article is devoted to a small analysis of the competitiveness of enterprises of the military-industrial complex in the world market of countries producing military products. A brief description of the share of research in the total share of the gross product of countries is given.


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