State-Empathic Concern Scale

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Johnson ◽  
Michael J. Karcher
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Xiangyi Zhang ◽  
Zhihui Wu ◽  
Shenglan Li ◽  
Ji Lai ◽  
Meng Han ◽  
...  

Abstract. Although recent studies have investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments, such an effect remains elusive. Furthermore, moral judgments have been conflated with the moral inclinations underlying those judgments in previous studies. Using a process dissociation approach to independently quantify the strength of utilitarian and deontological inclinations, the present study investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments. We found that deontological inclinations were significantly lower in the high alexithymia group than in the low alexithymia group, whereas the difference in the utilitarian inclinations between the two groups was nonsignificant. Furthermore, empathic concern and deontological inclinations mediated the association between alexithymia and conventional relative judgments (i.e., more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments), showing that people with high alexithymia have low empathic concern, which, in turn, decreases deontological inclinations and contributes to conventional relative judgments. These findings underscore the importance of empathy and deontological inclinations in moral judgments and indicate that individuals with high alexithymia make more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments possibly due to a deficit in affective processing.


Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson

The third new possibility returned attention to the first egoistic hypothesis: remove–empathy. Perhaps people feeling high empathy think that even if they escape physical exposure to the need, they will continue to feel empathic concern. If so, psychological escape is still difficult, and the results previously reported (see Chapter 4) are as consistent with remove–empathy as with the empathy–altruism hypothesis. Contrary to this possibility, some research suggested physical escape did provide psychological escape in the experiments in Chapter 4. Further, Eric Stocks conducted two experiments that manipulated psychological escape directly, and results of each supported the empathy–altruism hypothesis, not remove–empathy. Based on these data, it was necessary to reject the last of the three new possibilities. Left with no plausible egoistic account of the empathy–helping relationship—this time, nobody else had one either—there was no alternative but to conclude that empathic concern produces altruistic motivation. Our search was over.


Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson

Empathy-induced altruism provides benefits for (a) the person in need, (b) other similar people, and (c) the person feeling empathic concern. Specifically, there is evidence that it can produce the following: more and better help for those in need; less aggression toward them; less derogation and blaming of victims of injustice; increased cooperation in conflict situations (business negotiations, political conflicts, and tensions between students in school); less negative attitudes toward stigmatized groups; increased willingness to help these groups; more sensitive and responsive care in close relationships; increased happiness and self-esteem; less stress; more meaning in life; and greater longevity. The list of benefits of empathy-induced altruism for which there is at least preliminary evidence is impressive. Although not a panacea, it can be a powerful force for good.


Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson

This book provides an example of how the scientific method can be used to address a fundamental question about human nature. For centuries—indeed for millennia—the egoism–altruism debate has echoed through Western thought. Egoism says that the motivation for everything we do, including all of our seemingly selfless acts of care for others, is to gain one or another self-benefit. Altruism, while not denying the force of self-benefit, says that under certain circumstances we can care for others for their sakes, not our own. Over the past half-century, social psychologists have turned to laboratory experiments to provide a scientific resolution of this human nature debate. The experiments focused on the possibility that empathic concern—other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need—produces altruistic motivation to remove that need. With carefully constructed experimental designs, these psychologists have tested the nature of the motivation produced by empathic concern, determining whether it is egoistic or altruistic. This series of experiments has provided an answer to a fundamental question about what makes us tick. Framed as a detective story, the book traces this scientific search for altruism through the numerous twists and turns that led to the conclusion that empathy-induced altruism is indeed part of our nature. It then examines the implications of this conclusion—negative implications as well as positive—both for our understanding of who we are as humans and for how we might create a more humane society.


Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson

After rejecting the remove–empathy hypothesis (Chapter 4), attention turned to the other two classic egoistic explanations for the motivation to help produced by empathic concern: empathy-specific punishment and empathy-specific reward. This chapter considers two kinds of empathy-specific punishment, shame and guilt. The shame hypothesis claims that we help more when we feel empathic concern because we’re motivated to avoid disapproval and censure from others. The guilt hypothesis says that we’re motivated to avoid self-condemnation for failing to do what we should. Contradicting the shame hypothesis, experiments revealed that even when no one else will know if participants fail to help, empathy still increased helping. Contradicting the guilt hypothesis, participants induced to feel empathy helped more even when provided a good excuse for not helping. Given that neither form of empathy-specific punishment could account for the empathy–helping relationship, our search shifted to the third classic egoistic explanation: pursuing pride.


Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson

The first new possibility was that empathic concern simultaneously produces all five egoistic motives we have considered. This possibility raised three distinct but related concerns: (a) The search for altruism has focused on testing egoistic alternatives, not on testing the altruism hypothesis directly. (b) The egoistic alternatives have been tested one at a time. (c) The egoistic alternatives should be examined simultaneously, as a gang. Concerning the first concern, the reason for focusing on the egoistic alternatives was examined and found justified. Second, testing the egoistic motives one at a time wasn’t a problem because when examining each new egoistic motive, care was taken to make sure that previously dismissed motives couldn’t account for the new results predicted by the empathy–altruism hypothesis. Regarding simultaneous testing, several later experiments had addressed all five egoistic motives and failed to support the all-at-once alternative. The gang idea was dismissed.


Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson

Despite its virtues, empathy-induced altruism can at times harm those in need, other people, and the altruistically motivated person. Specifically, it can hurt those in need when acted on without wisdom and sensitivity or when a cool head is required. It can produce paternalism. It is less likely to be evoked by nonpersonalized, abstract, chronic needs. It can be a source of immoral action, leading us to show partiality toward those for whom we feel empathic concern even when we know that to do so is neither fair nor best for all. Indeed, when our behavior is public, empathy-induced altruism can pose a more serious threat to the common good than does self-interest. Finally, it can at times jeopardize our mental and physical health—even our life. Any attempt to call on empathy-induced altruism to build a more humane society needs to take these problems into account lest we do more harm than good.


Healthcare ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 158
Author(s):  
Naira Delgado ◽  
Helena Bonache ◽  
Moisés Betancort ◽  
Yurena Morera ◽  
Lasana T. Harris

It is generally accepted that empathy should be the basis of patient care. However, this ideal may be unrealistic if healthcare professionals suffer adverse effects when engaging in empathy. The aim of this study is to explore the effect of inferring mental states and different components of empathy (perspective-taking; empathic concern; personal distress) in burnout dimensions (emotional exhaustion; depersonalization; personal accomplishment). A total of 184 healthcare professionals participated in the study (23% male, Mage = 44.60; SD = 10.46). We measured participants’ empathy, the inference of mental states of patients, and burnout. Correlation analyses showed that inferring mental states was positively associated with perspective-taking and with empathic concern, but uncorrelated with personal distress. Furthermore, emotional exhaustion was related to greater levels of personal distress and greater levels of inferences of mental states. Depersonalization was associated with greater levels of personal distress and lower levels of empathic concern. Personal accomplishment was associated with the inference of mental states in patients, lower levels of personal distress, and perspective-taking. These results provide a better understanding of how different components of empathy and mental state inferences may preserve or promote healthcare professionals’ burnout.


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