In the wake of the sovereign debt crisis, some of the most advanced economies in the world turned to the IMF for financial assistance. Not only did the Eurozone countries ask for the Fund’s help; they also incorporated the IMF into the institutional architecture for handling crises in the European Monetary Union. This chapter uses competence–control theory to shed light on the puzzles raised by the decision to enlist the IMF in Eurozone crisis management. Firstly, the chapter argues that the Eurozone’s motivation for enlisting the IMF can be found in the competence deficit its governors confronted in managing the crisis. In particular, Eurozone countries lacked sufficient competence (including expertise, money, and credibility) to formulate and enforce adjustment in crisis-hit countries. By enlisting the IMF, Eurozone countries acquired the necessary competence but had to share control. Secondly, the chapter shows that the tradeoff between competence and control shifted over time: even after creating their own crisis management competencies, member states continued to enlist the IMF as a way to reduce the control problems that creditor states confronted in enforcing adjustment in debtor countries.
Die Zukunft der europäischen Wirtschaftsintegration
