Translating into a new LSP

Target ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefanos Vlachopoulos

This paper deals with the translation of the English-language Common Law legislation of the Republic of Cyprus into Greek. The legislation introduced to Cyprus in 1935 was common law codified by the British for use in the colonies. The aim of the paper is threefold: (a) to research the historical background and highlight the communicative implications for a community where the language of the law is not the mother tongue of the people, (b) to reconstruct the methods the translators applied when they translated the Law of Civil Wrongs from English into Greek within the common law framework of the Republic of Cyprus, and (c) to establish how the actual process of translation affected the target LSP.

Author(s):  
Thomas Izbicki

During the Middle Ages, law loomed large in efforts to manage life situations, beginning with the adaptation of late imperial law to the successor or barbarian kingdoms of the West. Alongside local law and custom, the learned law was increasingly used to answer questions and settle disputes about family issues such as marriages and dowry, property and inheritance, contracts, and crime. Study of the law, not only as taught at the universities but as used to advise judges who lacked formal training, illuminates the status of women and children under patriarchy. Although Roman law was geared more to private than public law, political issues were addressed. Moreover, Romanistic procedure had a wide influence across Europe. Even where Roman law was not received, it had its influence via canon law and specialized courts. This is evident in England, where the common law governed real property, but canon law introduced the possibility of testamentary disposition of certain possessions. Similarly, the admiralty courts dealt with issues such as navigation and salvage on the basis of civil law. Roman law began in the Republic, beginning with the Twelve Tables of the Law (450 bce), resulting from struggles between patricians and plebeians. Under the Republic certain men knew the laws; but there were no legal careers. The most important judicial document was the praetor’s edict about procedure, the foundation of later jurisprudence. Both the popular assemblies and the Senate legislated for both the private and the public spheres, and the jurisconsults of the imperial period commented on their enactments. The Roman Empire produced jurisconsults able to give authoritative advice, and some wrote on the laws. Emperors legislated, and collections of their laws were compiled. The most important, the Theodosian Code (438–439 ce), influenced the Latin churches and the codes of the Western barbarian kingdoms. In the East, the study of law continued. Eventually Justinian I ordered systematization of centuries of jurisprudence. The Institutes served as a textbook. The works of the jurisconsults were divided topically in the Digest (Pandects). Imperial decrees were collected in Justinian’s Code with supplements in the Novellae. This Corpus iuris civilis (529–534 ce) was diffused throughout Justinian’s empire but had little influence in the West for centuries. The largest part of Justinian’s corpus is concerned with private, rather than public, law. Later jurists retained that focus in most of their writings. Revived study of Roman law in the West is tied traditionally to recovery of the Digest (c. 1070 ce). The teaching of law took root at the University of Bologna. The Glossators expounded texts and annotated (glossed) them. The Bolognese curriculum divided the Digest into Old Digest, Infortiatum, and New Digest. The first nine books of the Code were treated together, while the Institutes, last three books of the Code and Authenticum, a version of the Novellae, with two books on feudal law, made up the Volume. The direction of study changed in the 14th century. The Commentators (Post-Glossators) created detailed expositions of the entire corpus. The Commentators predominated even after humanists criticized their Latin and their interpretative methods. Works on procedure or specific topics, records of disputations, and opinions (consilia) on cases were written. All of these genres originated in the manuscript milieu, but many texts were printed beginning in the 15th century. Lawyers trained at the universities taught, provided advice, served as judges, and worked as bureaucrats. In much of Italy, the learned law was fused with elements of feudal law in the ius commune (common law). Most consilia engaged both the common law and the ius proprium of localities to be relevant in specific contexts. The Roman law was received through much of Europe in the late medieval and Early Modern periods, but its influence in England was mostly indirect.


Author(s):  
Hein Kötz

This chapter examines how the law deals with contracts that a party entered into by mistake. After a brief discussion of the historical background of the rules in the civil law and the common law, the question is raised whether there is a relevant mistake if a party’s ‘motive’ for entering into the contract turns out to be incorrect, if the party’s mistake refers to the value of what it promised or was to receive under the contract, or if the party’s mistake is due to its carelessness. Should the relevance of a mistake not depend on whether it was caused or shared by the other party? Finally, the chapter outlines some common threads in the development of a European law on mistake.


Author(s):  
J.-G. Castel

I Persons against whom the jurisdiction cannot be enforcedThe first part of this note deals with the persons who claim immunity from the compulsory jurisdiction of Canadian courts.(1) The Foreign State, Sovereign or Head of Foreign State as a DefendantThe law relating to the immunity of foreign states and sovereigns or heads of foreign states from Canadian jurisdiction is to be found in the common law and has been stated and re-stated in leading cases such as The Parlement Belge, The Porto Alexandre, The Cristina, Dessaulles v. The Republic of Poland and Mehr v. The Republic of China et al. Lord Atkin reduced this law to two propositions:The first is that the courts of a country will not implead a foreign sovereign, that is, they will not by their process make him against his will a party to legal proceedings whether the proceedings involve process against his person or seek to recover from him specific property or damages.The second is that they will not by their process, whether the sovereign is a party to the proceedings or not, seize or detain property which is his or of which he is in possession or control.


Author(s):  
Frederick Noel Zaal ◽  
Justin D'Almaine

Significant advances in cryogenic technology render it possible to freeze and store human gametes. Under appropriate laboratory conditions frozen gametes can remain viable for long periods of time. In consequence, it is possible for a child to be conceived and procreated after the death of one or both parents. This raises some challenging juristic problems. Amongst these are implications for the law of inheritance. Where a valid will expressly refers to a child who will be procreated after the testator's death, the child's right to inherit will be secured. However, where a will merely refers to children as a class, or with intestate succession, it becomes uncertain whether a posthumously procreated child has a right to inherit. South African legislation governing succession, the common law and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 all fail to provide definitive answers. Because of this and as the numbers of posthumously procreated children are likely to increase as artificial reproduction services become more widely available, there is a need for South African legislation to clarify their inheritance rights.


Author(s):  
Carolyn Sale

Much of the pleasure of Shakespeare’s comedy for early modern audiences derived from its invitation to them to understand the English common law as a law of ‘common reason’ arising from the people in their aggregate. The Comedy of Errors appeals to the audience to construe the ‘errors’ of the law in order to affirm the collective rationality of audiences as law-maker, while The Merchant of Venice’s trial scene affirms the importance of the ideals of common law jurisprudence by showing them abused. And in Measure for Measure’s extended spectacle of judicial authority in Act 5, the audience experiences the importance of the common law as a ‘discoursive’ phenomenon dependent upon the participation of the community for its vitality. Together the plays put audiences into active relation to law as it appeals to them as the common law’s makers.


2007 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Ian Duncanson

All political societies have peculiarities, and nothing special is to be concluded from the Anglophone focus of the present article. The theme here is that there was a schism between the fi rst and second British empires, not in itself an original thought, as the paper makes clear. The fi rst empire, as conceived by many historians, was an Atlantic empire governed by the British monarch and the Westminster legislature in the United Kingdom, and by the British monarch through his local representative, the colonial governor and the colonial assemblies. It appeared as a kind of confederation to many contemporaries, including Franklin and Washington, until as late as the mid-1770s. In each of the communities, the common law governed according to the customs of the people, subject to amendment by the appropriate legislature. The latter might be at London, Massachusetts or Philadelphia. For reasons outlined in the article, this system broke down when Westminster asserted ultimate sovereignty and the validity to override colonial assemblies and tax the colonies without their consent. The colonies objected and broke with Britain.In Britain itself and in the remaining colonies, Westminster’sassertion represented a new, stronger view of sovereignty, one in whichlaw no longer even notionally refl ected the slowly changing customs, habitsand expectations of the governed. Instead, sovereignty represented thewill of the sovereign. The legitimacy or validity of laws no longer referredto their content, or their conformity with a “balanced” constitution.Instead, the legitimacy rested in the pedigree of a law. To its practicalquestion, ‘is this a valid law?’ the British imperial world was ready forthe Benthamite answer. The latter was to remain culturally dominantfor many decades, and still dominates the dry fi elds of legal positivismand conservative social science. Bentham asked ‘is a law the sign of thevolition of the sovereign?’ Elsewhere, Bentham asserted that the contentof the law bore no relation to its validity. This article examines thischange from the earlier Whig thought which informed the AmericanRevolution and what became of it.


Author(s):  
Eva Steiner

This chapter examines the law of contract in France and discusses the milestone reform of French contract law. While this new legislation introduces a fresh equilibrium between the contracting parties and enhances accessibility and legal certainty in contract, it does not radically change the state of the law in this area. In addition, it does not strongly impact the traditional philosophical foundations of the law of contract. The reform, in short, looks more like a tidying up operation rather than a far-reaching transformation of the law. Therefore, the chapter argues that it is questionable whether the new law, which was also intended to increase France's attractiveness against the background of a world market dominated by the Common Law, will keep its promise.


Author(s):  
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling

This chapter studies intellectual property (IP). A hallmark of the New Private Law (NPL) is attentiveness to and appreciation of legal concepts and categories, including the traditional categories of the common law. These categories can sometimes usefully be deployed outside of the traditional common law, to characterize, conceptualize, and critique other bodies of law. For scholars interested in IP, for example, common law categories can be used to describe patent, copyright, trademark, and other fields of IP as more or less “property-like” or “tort-like.” Thischapter investigates both the property- and tort-like features of IP to understand the circumstances under which one set of features tends to dominate and why. It surveys several doctrines within the law of copyright that demonstrate how courts move along the property/tort continuum depending on the nature of the copyrighted work at issue—including, in particular, how well the work’s protected contours are defined. This conceptual navigation is familiar, echoing how common law courts have moved along the property/tort continuum to address disputes over distinctive types of tangible resources.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136571272110022
Author(s):  
Jennifer Porter

The common law test of voluntariness has come to be associated with important policy rationales including the privilege against self-incrimination. However, when the test originated more than a century ago, it was a test concerned specifically with the truthfulness of confession evidence; which evidence was at that time adduced in the form of indirect oral testimony, that is, as hearsay. Given that, a century later, confession evidence is now mostly adduced in the form of an audiovisual recording that can be observed directly by the trial judge, rather than as indirect oral testimony, there may be capacity for a different emphasis regarding the question of admissibility. This article considers the law currently operating in Western Australia, Queensland and South Australia to see whether or not, in the form of an audiovisual recording, the exercise of judicial discretion as to the question of the admissibility of confession evidence might be supported if the common law test of voluntariness was not a strict test of exclusion.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document