Comparison of Two Different Sized Small-Break LOCAs on the Passive Safety Injection Line Using SMART-ITL Data

2020 ◽  
Vol 206 (9) ◽  
pp. 1421-1435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jin-Hwa Yang ◽  
Hwang Bae ◽  
Sung-Uk Ryu ◽  
Byong Guk Jeon ◽  
Sung-Jae Yi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Passive Safety ◽  
Injection Line

scholarly journals Simulation of the Westinghouse AP1000 Response to SBLOCA Using RELAP/SCDAPSIM

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayah Elshahat ◽  
Timothy Abram ◽  
Judith Hohorst ◽  
Chris Allison
Keyword(s):  
Driving Forces ◽  
Natural Circulation ◽  
Safety System ◽  
Operating Conditions ◽  
Severe Accident ◽  
Passive Safety ◽  
System Component ◽  
Pressurized Water ◽  
Loss Of Coolant Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions

Great interest is given now to advanced nuclear reactors especially those using passive safety components. The Westinghouse AP1000 Advanced Passive pressurized water reactor (PWR) is an 1117 MWe PWR designed to achieve a high safety and performance record. The AP1000 safety system uses natural driving forces, such as pressurized gas, gravity flow, natural circulation flow, and convection. In this paper, the safety performance of the AP1000 during a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) is investigated. This was done by modelling the AP1000 and the passive safety systems employed using RELAP/SCDAPSIM code. RELAP/SCDAPSIM is designed to describe the overall reactor coolant system (RCS) thermal hydraulic response and core behaviour under normal operating conditions or under design basis or severe accident conditions. Passive safety components in the AP1000 showed a clear improvement in accident mitigation. It was found that RELAP/SCDAPSIM is capable of modelling a LOCA in an AP1000 and it enables the investigation of each safety system component response separately during the accident. The model is also capable of simulating natural circulation and other relevant phenomena. The results of the model were compared to that of the NOTRUMP code and found to be in a good agreement.

iB1350: A Generation III.7 Reactor After the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takashi Sato ◽  
Keiji Matsumoto ◽  
Kenji Hosomi ◽  
Keisuke Taguchi
Keyword(s):  
Cooling System ◽  
Boiling Water ◽  
Passive Safety ◽  
Active Safety ◽  
Water Reactor ◽  
Airplane Crash ◽  
Passive Safety Systems ◽  
Active Safety Systems ◽  
Fukushima Daiichi ◽  
Safety Systems

iB1350 stands for an innovative, intelligent and inexpensive boiling water reactor 1350. It is the first Generation III.7 reactor after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. It has incorporated lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and Western European Nuclear Regulation Association safety objectives. It has innovative safety to cope with devastating natural disasters including a giant earthquake, a large tsunami and a monster hurricane. The iB1350 can survive passively such devastation and a very prolonged station blackout without any support from the outside of a site up to 7 days even preventing core melt. It, however, is based on the well-established proven Advance Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) design. The nuclear steam supply system is exactly the same as that of the current ABWR. As for safety design it has a double cylinder reinforced concrete containment vessel (Mark W containment) and an in-depth hybrid safety system (IDHS). The Mark W containment has double fission product confinement barriers and the in-containment filtered venting system (IFVS) that enable passively no emergency evacuation outside the immediate vicinity of the plant for a severe accident (SA). It has a large volume to hold hydrogen, a core catcher, a passive flooding system and an innovative passive containment cooling system (iPCCS) establishing passively practical elimination of containment failure even in a long term. The IDHS consists of 4 division active safety systems for a design basis accident, 2 division active safety systems for a SA and built-in passive safety systems (BiPSS) consisting of an isolation condenser (IC) and the iPCCS for a SA. The IC/PCCS pools have enough capacity for 7-day grace period. The IC/PCCS heat exchangers, core and spent fuel pool are enclosed inside the containment vessel (CV) building and protected against a large airplane crash. The iB1350 can survive a large airplane crash only by the CV building and the built-in passive safety systems therein. The dome of the CV building consists of a single wall made of steel and concrete composite. This single dome structure facilitates a short-term construction period and cost saving. The CV diameter is smaller than that of most PWR resulting in a smaller R/B. Each active safety division includes only one emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump and one emergency diesel generator (EDG). Therefore, a single failure of the EDG never causes multiple failures of ECCS pumps in a safety division. The iB1350 is based on the proven ABWR technology and ready for construction. No new technology is incorporated but design concept and philosophy are initiative and innovative.

Thermal hydraulic challenges of Gas Cooled Fast Reactors with passive safety features

2009 ◽  
Vol 239 (5) ◽  
pp. 840-854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A. Pope ◽  
Jeong Ik Lee ◽  
Pavel Hejzlar ◽  
Michael J. Driscoll
Keyword(s):  
Passive Safety ◽  
Fast Reactors ◽  
Safety Features

The relevance of creating a methodology analysis to assess the passive safety of armored civil vehicles

Trudy NAMI ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 59-67
Author(s):  
T. A. Viunov ◽  
D. Yu. Solopov
Keyword(s):  
Research Methods ◽  
Work Load ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Passive Safety ◽  
Problem Statement ◽  
Euro Ncap ◽  
Regulatory Documents ◽  
Expert Analysis ◽  
Armored Vehicles ◽  
Crash Tests

Introduction (problem statement and relevance). At present, there are no international standards for the passive safety of armored vehicles. This means that the developers themselves choose the conditions for conducting crash tests and the requirements for their results.The purpose of the study was to conduct a brief expert analysis of the historical domestic experience in the fi eld of passive safety, as well as to analyze the applicability of the methods included in the requirements of the UN Regulation and Euro NCAP for the passive safety of the armored civil vehicles.Methodology and research methods. The crash tests results of armored vehicles ZIS-110SO and ZiL-4105 were analyzed by experts. The analyses included the requirements of regulatory documents concerning the testing of vehicles for passive safety (UN Regulation, Euro NCAP).Scientifi c novelty and results. It has been established that the armored vehicles ZIS-110SO and ZiL-4105 did not meet the UN Regulation No. 94. It was also found that not all of the UN Regulations and Euro NCAP standards could be applied to assess the passive safety of armored civil vehicles.Practical signifi cance. In this work, load modes which could be taken as a test matrix basis for armored vehicles have been selected from the regulatory documents. In addition, the inexpediency of using some of the tests was substantiated.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document