CFD Pre-Test Analysis and Design of the NACIE-UP BFPS Fuel Pin Bundle Simulator

In the context of GEN-IV heavy liquid metal-cooled reactors safety studies, the flow blockage in a fuel sub-assembly is considered one of the main issues to be addressed and one of the most important and realistic accident for Lead Fast Reactors (LFR) fuel assembly. The blockage in a fast reactor Fuel Assembly (FA) may have serious effects on the safety of the plant leading to the FA damaging or melting. The temperature of the coolant leaving the FA is considered an important indicator of the health of the FA (i.e. the effective heat removal) and is usually monitored via a dedicated, safety-related system (e.g. thermocouple). The external or internal blockage of the FA may impair the correct cooling of the fuel pins, be the root cause of anomalous heating of the cladding and of the wrapper and potentially impact also fuel pins not directly located above or around the blocked area. In order to model the temperature and velocity field inside a wrapped FA under unblocked and blocked conditions, detailed experimental campaign as well as 3D thermal hydraulic analyses of the FA is required. The present paper is focused on the CFD pre-test analysis and design of the new experimental facility ‘Blocked’ Fuel Pin bundle Simulator (BFPS) that will be installed into the NACIE-UP (NAtural CIrculation Experiment-UPgrade) facility located at the ENEA Brasimone Research Center (Italy). The BFPS test section will be installed into the NACIE-UP loop facility aiming to carry out suitable experiments to fully investigate different flow blockage regimes in a 19 fuel pin bundle providing experimental data in support of the development of the ALFRED (Advanced Lead-cooled Fast Reactor European Demonstrator) LFR DEMO. In particular, the ‘Blocked’ Fuel Pin bundle Simulator (BFPS) cooled by lead bismuth eutectic (LBE), was conceived with a thermal power of about 250 kW and a uniform wall heat flux up to 0.7 MW/m2, relevant values for a LFR. It consists of 19 electrical pins placed on a hexagonal lattice with a pitch to diameter ratio of 1.4 and a diameter of 10 mm. The geometrical domain of the fuel pin bundle simulator was designed to reproduce the geometrical features of ALFRED, e.g. the external wrapper in the active region and the spacer grids. Pre-tests calculations were carried out by applying accurate boundary conditions; the conjugate heat transfer in the clad is also considered. The numerical simulation test matrix covered the envisioned experimental range in terms of mass flow rate; the wall heat flux was imposed in order to have a fixed temperature difference across the BFPS in unblocked conditions. The blockages investigated are internal blockages of different extensions and in different locations (central subchannel blockage, corner sub-channel blockage, edge subchannel blockage, one sector blockage, two sector blockage). High resolution RANS simulations were carried out adopting the ANSYS CFX V15 commercial code with the laminar sublayer resolved by the mesh resolution. The loci of the peak temperatures and their width as predicted by the CFD simulations are used for determining the location of the pin bundle instrumentation. The CFD pre-test analysis allowed also investigating the temperature distribution in the clad to operate the test section safely.

Analysis on Safety System Operating Characteristic of SCWR

In this paper, operating characteristics of the safety system of Chinese Supercritical Water-cooled Reactor (CSR1000) is described. Selecting CSR1000 as the focus of research, and it’s active and passive safety systems are analyzed in turn. A comparison is given between these two types of safety systems. Henceforth, the features of the safety control systems of CSR1000 are obtained. The results show that for the active systems, the control speed of the pressure control system is the fastest and that of the power control system is the slowest. It is observed that the active control system exhibits simple harmonic oscillation. On the other hand, the control feature of passive control system is stable. In addition, coupling the safety systems can ensure the safety of CSR1000 in the event of a loss of flow accident (LOFA).

Development of Transient and Safety Analysis Method for ATF With SiC

Based on lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, pursuit of accident tolerant fuel (ATF) has been discussed by many institutions in the world. Toshiba identified a silicon carbide (SiC) ceramic as the most promising material for accident tolerant fuel. Since SiC has less active characteristics in the presence of high temperature water steam (H2O) and is expected to be tolerant of severe accident conditions. Moreover, SiC has a smaller neutron absorption cross-section which is advantageous feature in terms of neutron economy. Zirconium alloys (Zry) are one of the main structural materials in LWR core. In high temperature H2O environment under severe accident conditions, Zry rapidly reacts with H2O and oxidation reaction accompanied by release of hydrogen gas occurs. Since SiC may inhibit the progress of oxidation reaction compared to Zry metal alloys, hydrogen and heat generation is expected to decrease in the case of core uncovered accident conditions. In order to confirm the advantage of SiC over Zry as core materials, transient analysis and safety analysis are carried out. For transient analysis, analyses of temperature behavior of cladding at plant transient condition are carried out with best-estimate transient analysis code. This analysis confirmed the effect of physical properties differences between SiC and Zry on cladding temperature behavior. Moreover to indicate the effectiveness of SiC under the core uncovered condition with oxidation reaction, safety analysis with latest “MAAP” code is carried out and the whole plant behavior during severe accident sequence is simulated. This analysis showed the effectiveness of SiC to mitigate the oxidation reaction. As the result of these analyses, the advantage of SiC over Zry can be perceived. And also, future challenges of SiC application as ATF can be clarified through these analyses.

Transient Analysis on Helium Coolant Tube Break Accident of Dual-Functional Lithium Lead Test Blanket Module

Dual-functional Lithium Lead Test Blanket Module (DFLL-TBM) was proposed by China for testing in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER).When an in-TBM helium coolant tube breaks, high pressure helium will discharge into the Pb-Li breeding zones. The pressure shock in the TBM will threaten the structural integrity and safety of ITER. Simulation and analysis on helium coolant tube break accident of DFLL-TBM was performed, and two cases with different break sizes were considered. Computational results indicate that intense pressure waves spread quickly from the break to the surrounding structures and the variation of pressure in the TBM breeding box is drastic especially when the pressure wave propagation encounters large resistance such as at the bending corner of the flow channel, the inlet and outlet of Pb-Li, etc. The maximum pressure in the TBM breeding box which is even higher than the operating pressure of helium also occurs in these zones. Although the pressure shock lasts for a very short time, its effect on the structural integrity of DFLL-TBM needs to be paid attention to.

Nuclear, Solar and Desalination Working Together Symbiotically

In many parts of the world, drinking water is not available except through desalination. Most of these areas have an abundance of solar energy, with few cloudy periods. Energy is required for desalination and for producing electricity. Traditionally this energy has been supplied by fossil fuels. However, even in those parts of the world that have abundant fossil fuels, using them for these purposes is being discouraged for two reasons: 1) the emission of greenhouse gases from combustion of fossil fuels, and 2) the higher value of fossil fuels when used for transportation. Nuclear power and solar power are both proposed as replacements for fossil fuels in these locations. Both of these energy systems have high capital costs, and negligible fuel costs (zero for solar) Instead of these two primary forms of energy competing, this paper shows how they can compliment each other, especially where a significant part of the electricity demand is used for desalination.

Dynamic Simulation Studies of Performed Additional Tests During FAT for Emergency Diesel Generators at Nuclear Power Plant

In 2004, a decision was made to perform a modernization and a new power uprate of unit 2 at Oskarshamn nuclear power plant in Sweden. Among the most important reasons for this decision were new safety regulations from Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and ageing of important components. A project was established and became the largest nuclear power modernization in the world. The modernization led to the need of analysing the auxiliary power system to ensure that it could supply the unit after the uprate, given tolerances on current, voltage and frequency. During the process of developing models for the diesel generator sets, it turned out that the suppliers could not deliver enough satisfactory material for modelling the diesel engines, the speed controllers and the magnetization systems. Therefore, Oskarshamn nuclear power plant with the help of the manufacturers of the diesel generator sets carried out additional measurements in order to collect data for modelling. Based on electric circuit diagrams provided by the manufacturers, block diagrams of the magnetization systems were made. For the speed controllers, no information was available at all so it was assumed that the controller was of PI-type. The parameters of the magnetization systems and the speed controllers were then tuned using the measurement results. Finally, a comparison between simulated results and the measurement results were made, showing good agreement. This is especially true in the most commonly used operating interval of the diesel generator sets.

Study on Typical Initial Event of ATWS for Small Modular Reactor

The method for ATWS (anticipated transient without scram) analysis was completely developed for commercial pressurized water (PWR) reactor plants, especially for selecting of typical initial events. For accident analysis of ATWS, it is different between PWR and small modular reactor (SMR), as different structures and characters, and it is necessary to study the typical initial events for these reactors. Based on the standard of PWR, the demanding for ATWS analysis was studied and the consequences for typical anticipated transient was calculated using RELAP5/MOD3.2 code, “maintain reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity” was selected as limiting criterion. The results shows for SMR, anticipated transient with the most serious consequence for ATWS are loss of offsite power and inadvertent control rod withdraw event, this conclusion will support to prepare the safety analysis report and optimum design of diversity activation system (DAS) for SMR.

iB1350: A Generation III.7 Reactor After the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

iB1350 stands for an innovative, intelligent and inexpensive boiling water reactor 1350. It is the first Generation III.7 reactor after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. It has incorporated lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and Western European Nuclear Regulation Association safety objectives. It has innovative safety to cope with devastating natural disasters including a giant earthquake, a large tsunami and a monster hurricane. The iB1350 can survive passively such devastation and a very prolonged station blackout without any support from the outside of a site up to 7 days even preventing core melt. It, however, is based on the well-established proven Advance Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) design. The nuclear steam supply system is exactly the same as that of the current ABWR. As for safety design it has a double cylinder reinforced concrete containment vessel (Mark W containment) and an in-depth hybrid safety system (IDHS). The Mark W containment has double fission product confinement barriers and the in-containment filtered venting system (IFVS) that enable passively no emergency evacuation outside the immediate vicinity of the plant for a severe accident (SA). It has a large volume to hold hydrogen, a core catcher, a passive flooding system and an innovative passive containment cooling system (iPCCS) establishing passively practical elimination of containment failure even in a long term. The IDHS consists of 4 division active safety systems for a design basis accident, 2 division active safety systems for a SA and built-in passive safety systems (BiPSS) consisting of an isolation condenser (IC) and the iPCCS for a SA. The IC/PCCS pools have enough capacity for 7-day grace period. The IC/PCCS heat exchangers, core and spent fuel pool are enclosed inside the containment vessel (CV) building and protected against a large airplane crash. The iB1350 can survive a large airplane crash only by the CV building and the built-in passive safety systems therein. The dome of the CV building consists of a single wall made of steel and concrete composite. This single dome structure facilitates a short-term construction period and cost saving. The CV diameter is smaller than that of most PWR resulting in a smaller R/B. Each active safety division includes only one emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump and one emergency diesel generator (EDG). Therefore, a single failure of the EDG never causes multiple failures of ECCS pumps in a safety division. The iB1350 is based on the proven ABWR technology and ready for construction. No new technology is incorporated but design concept and philosophy are initiative and innovative.

Analyses of Severe Accidents in GFR Demonstrator ALLEGRO With MELCOR 2.1

The helium-cooled Gas Fast Reactor (GFR) is one of the six reactor concepts selected for further development in the frame of the Generation IV International Forum (GIF). Since no gas cooled fast reactor has ever been built, a small demonstration reactor is necessary on the road towards the full-scale GFR reactor. A concept of this demonstrator is called ALLEGRO. The French Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA) developed between 2001–2009 a pre-conceptual design of both the full-scale GFR called GFR2400 and the small demonstration unit called ALLEGRO (75 MWt). Since 2013 ALLEGRO has been under development by several partners from Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. No severe accident study of ALLEGRO using a dedicated computer code has been published so far. This paper is the first attempt to perform computer simulations of the ALLEGRO CEA 2009 concept, using MELCOR version 2.1. A model of the ALLEGRO CEA 2009 concept has been developed with the aim to perform safety analyses; to confirm that MELCOR can be used for such a study, to investigate what scenarios lead to a severe accident and to study in detail the progression of the severe accident during the in-vessel phase. Several pressurized and depressurized protected scenarios were investigated; four of them are presented in this paper. It was observed that even long-lasting station blackout (SBO) without further failures of the passive safety systems does not lead to a severe accident as long as there is enough water in the decay heat removal (DHR) system. Loss of coolant (LOCA) transients with DHR system in the forced-convection mode can lead to peak cladding temperatures causing limited core damage in the early phase of the accidents, but without further development into core meltdown. On the other hand, LOCA combined with SBO leads to excessive core melting in orders of minutes, which represents a weak point of ALLEGRO 2009 concept. Recommendations were formulated for the further development of the ALLEGRO concept.

Safety Assessment of Fuel Storage Ponds Following Cooling Faults

For spent nuclear fuel stored within a cooling pond, the essential nuclear safety functions of control, cooling and containment are fulfilled by maintaining an appropriate depth of water above the fuel. External cooling systems remove the decay heat generated by the spent fuel stored within the pond, in order to maintain the temperature of the water at a constant level. In the event of a fault within these external cooling systems, there is the potential for a temperature excursion within the pond. Historically the UK nuclear industry has considered that such faults would pose no threat to the structural integrity of the pond containment and hence the only loss of water would be due to evaporation following a loss of cooling. However, more recently, it has been recognised that such temperature excursions may result in through-wall cracking leading to a loss of water and undermining of these essential safety functions. This paper outlines the safety case implications of these realisations and the way in which they are being addressed within the UK’s nuclear power stations. The paper considers the effects of thermal transient faults on the concrete pond structure and the potential nuclear safety issues which may occur as a result of this. In response to potential pond cooling faults, consideration is given to the requirement for engineered protection systems along with the safety role of the operator in identifying and responding to faults of this kind. Operators provide a versatile mechanism for identifying fault conditions and taking remedial actions, however, the benefit which can be formally claimed for their role within a safety case is generally limited by the availability or reliability of instrumentation to reveal a fault condition. Post fault operator actions may also be limited by the timescales available following a fault, or by other demands on the operators, which may occur in the event of an external hazard which affects multiple site systems. To quantify the timescales available for post fault remedial action, it is necessary to quantify the rate of water loss from the pond, along with the relationship between pond water depth and the radiological consequences both on-site and off-site. This paper investigates the difficulties which may be encountered in quantifying the role of post fault operator actions within such a safety case, and in demonstrating that the overall nuclear safety risk is acceptably low and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).