Mind, identity theory of

We know that the brain is intimately connected with mental activity. Indeed, doctors now define death in terms of the cessation of the relevant brain activity. The identity theory of mind holds that the intimate connection is identity: the mind is the brain, or, more precisely, mental states are states of the brain. The theory goes directly against a long tradition according to which mental and material belong to quite distinct ontological categories – the mental being essentially conscious, the material essentially unconscious. This tradition has been bedevilled by the problem of how essentially immaterial states could be caused by the material world, as would happen when we see a tree, and how they could cause material states, as would happen when we decide to make an omelette. A great merit of the identity theory is that it avoids this problem: interaction between mental and material becomes simply interaction between one subset of material states, namely certain states of a sophisticated central nervous system, and other material states. The theory also brings the mind within the scope of modern science. More and more phenomena are turning out to be explicable in the physical terms of modern science: phenomena once explained in terms of spells, possession by devils, Thor’s thunderbolts, and so on, are now explained in more mundane, physical terms. If the identity theory is right, the same goes for the mind. Neuroscience will in time reveal the secrets of the mind in the same general way that the theory of electricity reveals the secrets of lightning. This possibility has received enormous support from advances in computing. We now have at least the glimmerings of an idea of how a purely material or physical system could do some of the things minds can do. Nevertheless, there are many questions to be asked of the identity theory. How could states that seem so different turn out to be one and the same? Would neurophysiologists actually see my thoughts and feelings if they looked at my brain? When we report on our mental states what are we reporting on – our brains?

Armstrong's Materialism

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00455091.1977.10717033 ◽

1977 ◽

Vol 7 (3) ◽

pp. 569-592

Author(s):

George S. Pappas

Keyword(s):

Central Nervous System ◽

Nervous System ◽

Theory Of Mind ◽

Mental State ◽

Identity Theory ◽

Mental States ◽

Central State ◽

David Armstrong

Central-state materialism ( = CSM) is a very strong, but also very exciting theory of mind according to which each mental state is identical with a state of the central nervous system. CSM thus goes considerably beyond early versions of the identity theory of mind, since those early accounts (e.g., those of Place and Smart) held only that sensations are to be identified with neural events. CSM, by contrast, is a thesis about all mental states; every mental state is held to be a state of the central nervous system. In fact, as we will see shortly, CSM is an even more sweeping thesis than this formulation of it suggests, since it is not concerned simply with mental states.One prominent defender of CSM, David Armstrong, has maintained that CSM can be established by means of a two-step argument.

Sensations, Experiences and Brain Processes

Philosophy ◽

10.1017/s0031819100063117 ◽

1970 ◽

Vol 45 (173) ◽

pp. 221-226

Author(s):

John Heil

Keyword(s):

Identity Theory ◽

Mental States ◽

Physical Processes ◽

Ancient Greek ◽

Eyes Open ◽

Fundamental Objection ◽

Brain States ◽

The Mind ◽

The Brain ◽

Yellowish Orange

In his defence of the identity theory, Professor Smart has attempted to show that reports of mental states (for example, sensation reports) are strictly topic-neutral. If this were the case then it would follow that there is nothing logically wrong with the claim that the mind is the brain (and nothing more) or that mental states are really nothing but brain states. Some phillosophers have argued that a fundamental objection to any form of materialism is that the latter makes an obvious logical blunder in identifying the mental with the physical. This is the view that dualism is enshrined in our language. If this is true then of course statements such as ‘the mind is actually nothing but the brain’ and ‘mental states are really nothing but physical processes’ would be quite unacceptable on strictly logical grounds. Smart's claim that talk about mental states is topic-neutral, however, appears to exempt materialism from such objections. The question is, does it? That is to say, are sensation reports and the like topic-neutral in the required sense? Are they analogous in principle to statements of the form ‘someone is in the room’? Smart's point is that expressions such as ‘someone phoned: it was the doctor’ are logically similar to those of the form ‘I am having a red after-image: it is a brain process.’ ‘Someone’ is not logically equivalent to ‘the doctor’ (and it even sounds strange to say ‘someone is the doctor’), but it may, of course, be true that the doctor is the someone who phoned. Does this analogy hold and is it correct to say that sensation reports and mentalistic expressions in general are topic-neutral, that they refer only to experienced ‘somethings’? Smart's claim runs as follows:When a person says, ‘I see a yellowish-orange after-image’, he is saying something like this: ‘There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me, that is, when I really see an orange’. (And there is no reason why a person should not say the same thing when he is having a veridical sense-datum, so long as we construe the ‘like’ in the last sentence in such a sense that something can be like itself.) Notice that the italicised words, namely ‘there is something going on which is like what is going on when’, are all quasi logical or topic neutral words. This explains why the ancient Greek peasant's reports about his sensations can be neutral between dualistic metaphysics and my materialistic metaphysics. It explains how sensations can be brain processes and yet how a man who reports them need know nothing about brain processes. For he reports them only very abstractly as ‘something going on which is like what is going on when…’ Similarly, a person may say ‘someone is in the room’, thus reporting truly that the doctor is in the room, even though he has never heard of doctors.

Decellularised extracellular matrix-based biomaterials for repair and regeneration of central nervous system

Expert Reviews in Molecular Medicine ◽

10.1017/erm.2021.22 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 23 ◽

Author(s):

Burcu Yaldiz ◽

Pelin Saglam-Metiner ◽

Ozlem Yesil-Celiktas

Keyword(s):

Spinal Cord ◽

Central Nervous System ◽

Extracellular Matrix ◽

Nervous System ◽

Cell Function ◽

Acellular Matrix ◽

Repair Mechanisms ◽

The Mind ◽

Brain And Spinal Cord ◽

Abstract The central nervous system (CNS), consisting of the brain and spinal cord, regulates the mind and functions of the organs. CNS diseases, leading to changes in neurological functions in corresponding sites and causing long-term disability, represent one of the major public health issues with significant clinical and economic burdens worldwide. In particular, the abnormal changes in the extracellular matrix under various disease conditions have been demonstrated as one of the main factors that can alter normal cell function and reduce the neuroregeneration potential in damaged tissue. Decellularised extracellular matrix (dECM)-based biomaterials have been recently utilised for CNS applications, closely mimicking the native tissue. dECM retains tissue-specific components, including proteoglycan as well as structural and functional proteins. Due to their unique composition, these biomaterials can stimulate sensitive repair mechanisms associated with CNS damages. Herein, we discuss the decellularisation of the brain and spinal cord as well as recellularisation of acellular matrix and the recent progress in the utilisation of brain and spinal cord dECM.

Glucuronyl 3-sulfate occurs exclusively on distal unmyelinated terminals of selected sensory neurons in the peripheral nervous system

Proceedings, annual meeting, Electron Microscopy Society of America ◽

10.1017/s0424820100141160 ◽

1995 ◽

Vol 53 ◽

pp. 958-959

Author(s):

S.S. Spicer ◽

B.A. Schulte

Keyword(s):

Central Nervous System ◽

Nervous System ◽

Cerebral Cortex ◽

Peripheral Nervous System ◽

Sensory Neurons ◽

Sensory Nerves ◽

Tissue Antigens ◽

The Brain ◽

Leu 7

Generation of monoclonal antibodies (MAbs) against tissue antigens has yielded several (VC1.1, HNK- 1, L2, 4F4 and anti-leu 7) which recognize the unique sugar epitope, glucuronyl 3-sulfate (Glc A3- SO4). In the central nervous system, these MAbs have demonstrated Glc A3-SO4 at the surface of neurons in the cerebral cortex, the cerebellum, the retina and other widespread regions of the brain.Here we describe the distribution of Glc A3-SO4 in the peripheral nervous system as determined by immunostaining with a MAb (VC 1.1) developed against antigen in the cat visual cortex. Outside the central nervous system, immunoreactivity was observed only in peripheral terminals of selected sensory nerves conducting transduction signals for touch, hearing, balance and taste. On the glassy membrane of the sinus hair in murine nasal skin, just deep to the ringwurt, VC 1.1 delineated an intensely stained, plaque-like area (Fig. 1). This previously unrecognized structure of the nasal vibrissae presumably serves as a tactile end organ and to our knowledge is not demonstrable by means other than its selective immunopositivity with VC1.1 and its appearance as a densely fibrillar area in H&E stained sections.

Complex Trauma and Prenatal Alcohol Exposure: Clinical Implications

Perspectives on School-Based Issues ◽

10.1044/sbi13.2.32 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 13 (2) ◽

pp. 32-42 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

Yvette D. Hyter

Keyword(s):

Central Nervous System ◽

Nervous System ◽

Child Development ◽

Academic Outcomes ◽

Complex Trauma ◽

Prenatal Alcohol Exposure ◽

Alcohol Exposure ◽

Clinical Implications ◽

Prenatal Alcohol ◽

Abstract Complex trauma resulting from chronic maltreatment and prenatal alcohol exposure can significantly affect child development and academic outcomes. Children with histories of maltreatment and those with prenatal alcohol exposure exhibit remarkably similar central nervous system impairments. In this article, I will review the effects of each on the brain and discuss clinical implications for these populations of children.

Central Nerve System Impairment, AMA Guides, Sixth Edition: An Overview

Guides Newsletter ◽

10.1001/amaguidesnewsletters.2018.janfeb03 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 23 (1) ◽

pp. 10-13

Author(s):

James B. Talmage ◽

Jay Blaisdell

Keyword(s):

Spinal Cord ◽

Central Nervous System ◽

Nervous System ◽

Neurological Impairment ◽

Sixth Edition ◽

Central Nerve System ◽

The One ◽

Nerve System ◽

Abstract Injuries that affect the central nervous system (CNS) can be catastrophic because they involve the brain or spinal cord, and determining the underlying clinical cause of impairment is essential in using the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides), in part because the AMA Guides addresses neurological impairment in several chapters. Unlike the musculoskeletal chapters, Chapter 13, The Central and Peripheral Nervous System, does not use grades, grade modifiers, and a net adjustment formula; rather the chapter uses an approach that is similar to that in prior editions of the AMA Guides. The following steps can be used to perform a CNS rating: 1) evaluate all four major categories of cerebral impairment, and choose the one that is most severe; 2) rate the single most severe cerebral impairment of the four major categories; 3) rate all other impairments that are due to neurogenic problems; and 4) combine the rating of the single most severe category of cerebral impairment with the ratings of all other impairments. Because some neurological dysfunctions are rated elsewhere in the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition, the evaluator may consult Table 13-1 to verify the appropriate chapter to use.

Faculty Opinions recommendation of The brain as an immune privileged site: dendritic cells of the central nervous system inhibit T cell activation.

Faculty Opinions – Post-Publication Peer Review of the Biomedical Literature ◽

10.3410/f.1014090.200835 ◽

2003 ◽

Author(s):

Magdalena Plebanski

Keyword(s):

Central Nervous System ◽

Nervous System ◽

Dendritic Cells ◽

T Cell ◽

T Cell Activation ◽

Cell Activation ◽

The Brain ◽

Privileged Site

RAS in the Central Nervous System: Potential Role in Neuropsychiatric Disorders

Current Medicinal Chemistry ◽

10.2174/0929867325666180226102358 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 25 (28) ◽

pp. 3333-3352 ◽

Cited By ~ 21

Author(s):

Natalia Pessoa Rocha ◽

Ana Cristina Simoes e Silva ◽

Thiago Ruiz Rodrigues Prestes ◽

Victor Feracin ◽

Caroline Amaral Machado ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Blood Pressure ◽

Central Nervous System ◽

Nervous System ◽

Therapeutic Potential ◽

Neuropsychiatric Disorders ◽

Extensive Literature ◽

Ang Ii ◽

Mas Receptor ◽

Background: The Renin-Angiotensin System (RAS) is a key regulator of cardiovascular and renal homeostasis, but also plays important roles in mediating physiological functions in the central nervous system (CNS). The effects of the RAS were classically described as mediated by angiotensin (Ang) II via angiotensin type 1 (AT1) receptors. However, another arm of the RAS formed by the angiotensin converting enzyme 2 (ACE2), Ang-(1-7) and the Mas receptor has been a matter of investigation due to its important physiological roles, usually counterbalancing the classical effects exerted by Ang II. Objective: We aim to provide an overview of effects elicited by the RAS, especially Ang-(1-7), in the brain. We also aim to discuss the therapeutic potential for neuropsychiatric disorders for the modulation of RAS. Method: We carried out an extensive literature search in PubMed central. Results: Within the brain, Ang-(1-7) contributes to the regulation of blood pressure by acting at regions that control cardiovascular functions. In contrast with Ang II, Ang-(1-7) improves baroreflex sensitivity and plays an inhibitory role in hypothalamic noradrenergic neurotransmission. Ang-(1-7) not only exerts effects related to blood pressure regulation, but also acts as a neuroprotective component of the RAS, for instance, by reducing cerebral infarct size, inflammation, oxidative stress and neuronal apoptosis. Conclusion: Pre-clinical evidence supports a relevant role for ACE2/Ang-(1-7)/Mas receptor axis in several neuropsychiatric conditions, including stress-related and mood disorders, cerebrovascular ischemic and hemorrhagic lesions and neurodegenerative diseases. However, very few data are available regarding the ACE2/Ang-(1-7)/Mas receptor axis in human CNS.

Ethanolamine: A Potential Promoiety with Additional Effects in the Brain

CNS & Neurological Disorders - Drug Targets ◽

10.2174/1871527319999201211204645 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 19 ◽

Author(s):

Asfree Gwanyanya ◽

Christie Nicole Godsmark ◽

Roisin Kelly-Laubscher

Keyword(s):

Central Nervous System ◽

Nervous System ◽

Drug Design ◽

Cell Signaling ◽

Blood Brain Barrier ◽

Brain Barrier ◽

Bioactive Molecule ◽

Positive Functions ◽

Abstract: Ethanolamine is a bioactive molecule found in several cells, including those in the central nervous system (CNS). In the brain, ethanolamine and ethanolamine-related molecules have emerged as prodrug moieties that can promote drug movement across the blood-brain barrier. This improvement in the ability to target drugs to the brain may also mean that in the process ethanolamine concentrations in the brain are increased enough for ethanolamine to exert its own neurological ac-tions. Ethanolamine and its associated products have various positive functions ranging from cell signaling to molecular storage, and alterations in their levels have been linked to neurodegenerative conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease. This mini-review focuses on the effects of ethanolamine in the CNS and highlights the possible implications of these effects for drug design.

Sex Differences in Cognition

The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology and Behavioral Endocrinology ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190649739.013.23 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 41-66

Author(s):

Elizabeth Hampson

Keyword(s):

Central Nervous System ◽

Nervous System ◽

Sex Differences ◽

Spatial Cognition ◽

Sex Steroids ◽

Cognitive Functions ◽

Laboratory Animals ◽

Human Central Nervous System ◽

Organizational and activational effects of sex steroids were first discovered in laboratory animals, but these concepts extend to hormonal actions in the human central nervous system. This chapter begins with a brief overview of how sex steroids act in the brain and how the organizational-activational hypothesis originated in the field of endocrinology. It then reviews common methods used to study these effects in humans. Interestingly, certain cognitive functions appear to be subject to modification by sex steroids, and these endocrine influences may help explain the sex differences often seen in these functions. The chapter considers spatial cognition as a representative example because the spatial family of functions has received the most study by researchers interested in the biological roots of sex differences in cognition. The chapter reviews evidence that supports an influence of both androgens and estrogens on spatial functions, and concludes with a glimpse of where the field is headed.