scholarly journals Studi Kritis Terhadap Teori Identitas Pikiran-Otak Mario Bunge: Perspektif Neo-Sadrian

Author(s):  
Cipta Bakti Gama

<div><p><strong>Abstract :</strong> The aim of this research is to conduct a critical analysis of Mario Bunge’s view that mental reality is identical with the reality of brain function known as mind-brain identity theory. The analysis is performed using Neosadrian perspective, i.e. a new form of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy which is developed by Tabataba‘i and his disciples. The author tries to elucidate the main claims held by Bunge and to launch some critiques upon those claims. The main conclusions achieved through this research include the following. Firstly, mind-brain identity theory cannot be accepted. Secondly, current development of scientific studies corroborating certain relations between brain and mental states does not justify the validity of the identity theory, also does not falsify its opposition. Thirdly, a religious-sufistical philosophy, such the Neosadrian, can be consistent with current development of scientific research.</p><p><em>Keywords :</em> <em>Mind-brain  identity  theory,  Mario  Bunge, Neo-Sadrian,  science,  religious-sufistical philosophy.</em></p><p> </p><p><strong>Abstrak :</strong> Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk melakukan analisis kritis atas pandangan Mario Bunge bahwa realitas pikiran identik dengan realitas fungsi otak, yang dikenal dengan teori identitas pikiran- otak. Analisis tersebut dilakukan dengan menggunakan sudut pandang Neosadrian, yaitu bentuk baru filsafat Mulla Sadra yang dikembangkan oleh Tabataba‘i dan murid-muridnya. Penulis mencoba menguraikan sejumlah klaim utama yang dipegang oleh Bunge tentang teori identitas tersebut dan melancarkan kritik terhadapnya. Sejumlah kesimpulan utama yang bisa dicapai melalui penelitian ini mencakup hal-hal berikut. Pertama, teori identitas pikiran-otak tidak bisa diterima. Kedua, perkembangan studi saintifik yang menguatkan adanya relasi antara status otak dan status mental tidak menjustifikasi validitas teori identitas pikiran-otak, juga tidak memfalsifikasi dualitas esensi keduanya. Ketiga, filsafat yang bercorak religius-sufistik seperti Neo-Sadrian bisa konsisten dengan perkembangan sains mutakhir.</p><p>Kata kunci : <em>teori identitas pikiran-otak, Mario Bunge, Neo-Sadrian, sains, filsafat religius-sufistik.</em></p></div>

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 343
Author(s):  
Saiful Hakam

This study aims to explain about the rise of the Chinese trading culture, which is considered original at first then change progressively based on the internal process, and become damaged after making contacts with the native civilizations, is completely dissatisfying, though part of the truth is explained. Based on the critical analysis approach from the historical facts written by some scholars, the result of this study shows that the political and cultural changes were absolutely a sign of remarkable shock. Mongol conquests were contributed to these changes, though indirectly. Indian civilization was accepted by the native people, which then also influenced by the native culture. While the Islamic Nuance in Indian Ocean had been colored by Islamic nuance for approximately two centuries, wherein the trades in the middle and Chinese oceans were united naturally. Meanwhile Southeast Asia had grown rapidly after being involved in the hectic trading traffic. There were new social groups with the wealth of mobile capital, with a new spirit as the trades, in which in its development, there was a new form of state which was called as sultanate. One of the most important facts of that period is the rise of Java as a great sea power. Keywords:Chinese politic, Trading, Civilization


Author(s):  
Frank Jackson

We know that the brain is intimately connected with mental activity. Indeed, doctors now define death in terms of the cessation of the relevant brain activity. The identity theory of mind holds that the intimate connection is identity: the mind is the brain, or, more precisely, mental states are states of the brain. The theory goes directly against a long tradition according to which mental and material belong to quite distinct ontological categories – the mental being essentially conscious, the material essentially unconscious. This tradition has been bedevilled by the problem of how essentially immaterial states could be caused by the material world, as would happen when we see a tree, and how they could cause material states, as would happen when we decide to make an omelette. A great merit of the identity theory is that it avoids this problem: interaction between mental and material becomes simply interaction between one subset of material states, namely certain states of a sophisticated central nervous system, and other material states. The theory also brings the mind within the scope of modern science. More and more phenomena are turning out to be explicable in the physical terms of modern science: phenomena once explained in terms of spells, possession by devils, Thor’s thunderbolts, and so on, are now explained in more mundane, physical terms. If the identity theory is right, the same goes for the mind. Neuroscience will in time reveal the secrets of the mind in the same general way that the theory of electricity reveals the secrets of lightning. This possibility has received enormous support from advances in computing. We now have at least the glimmerings of an idea of how a purely material or physical system could do some of the things minds can do. Nevertheless, there are many questions to be asked of the identity theory. How could states that seem so different turn out to be one and the same? Would neurophysiologists actually see my thoughts and feelings if they looked at my brain? When we report on our mental states what are we reporting on – our brains?


1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-238
Author(s):  
George Sher

In his influential “Naming and Necessity,” Saul Kripke has deployed a new sort of analytical apparatus in support of the classical Cartesian argument that minds and bodies must be distinct because they can be imagined separately. In the initial section of this paper, I shall first paraphrase Kripke's version of that argument, and then suggest a way in which even one who accepts all of its philosophical presuppositions may avoid its conclusion. In the second section, I shall defend this suggestion against some of the possible objections to it.Recent materialists have not been overly impressed by the Cartesian claim that minds and bodies (mental states and physical states, etc.) can be imagined or conceived separately from each other. Their usual reply is that this is only to be expected, given the contingent nature of the identify involved. Kripke, however, has argued persuasively that such a reply is unacceptable because it overlooks a crucial fact about the terms in which the identity theory is couched.


1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-592
Author(s):  
George S. Pappas

Central-state materialism ( = CSM) is a very strong, but also very exciting theory of mind according to which each mental state is identical with a state of the central nervous system. CSM thus goes considerably beyond early versions of the identity theory of mind, since those early accounts (e.g., those of Place and Smart) held only that sensations are to be identified with neural events. CSM, by contrast, is a thesis about all mental states; every mental state is held to be a state of the central nervous system. In fact, as we will see shortly, CSM is an even more sweeping thesis than this formulation of it suggests, since it is not concerned simply with mental states.One prominent defender of CSM, David Armstrong, has maintained that CSM can be established by means of a two-step argument.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-218
Author(s):  
Iwona Bąk ◽  
Katarzyna Cheba

The main purpose of this article is the presentation of the relationships of coopetition among the internal stakeholders of a cluster that could contribute to the development of tourism in its area of operation. This analysis is based on the case study of the Historical Tourism Cluster, which operates on the Polish-German border. This article is theoretical and conceptual in nature. In it, the following research methods have been used: a critical analysis of the literature, logical inference, and observation. Currently, clusters are considered to be among the organizations with promising perspectives for development. The EU has decided to support transnational clusters in its latest strategy (after 2020). In this case, the specialization of the cluster (historical tourism) could be an obstacle. However, this article indicates how the cluster described here could make use of the existing development opportunities.


2009 ◽  
pp. 67-73
Author(s):  
Serge Latouche

- Fragments of reflexive modernity The conception of development focused more on the quantity than on the quality, more on competition than on cooperation, more on utilitarian exchanges than on reciprocity is showing all its limits. In this context, the concept of the relationship of care highlights what has been slowly and progressively compressed and eliminated, thus creating the condition of instability of our social systems: the essentially and "existentially" relational dimension of human experience and of social life. This dimension, through a logic of comparative counterposition, is used for a critical analysis of the model of the current development.


1973 ◽  
Vol XXIV (2) ◽  
pp. 355-366
Author(s):  
BARNABAS LINDARS
Keyword(s):  

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 233-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neal Feigenson

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is currently the most advanced technique for measuring and depicting brain function. Functional MRI studies abound in neuroscience, psychiatry and psychology. Inevitably, fMRI-based evidence will be offered in court as proof of matters involving parties’ mental states and capabilities. This paper analyses the likely admissibility of fMRI testimony and images. Cases involving other types of functional neuroimaging (PET and SPECT), which may shed light on judges’ receptivity to fMRI evidence, are briefly surveyed. The conceptual and methodological underpinnings of fMRI are then explored, prompting basic questions about the evidentiary reliability and relevance of fMRI results. The first reported case involving fMRI evidence, which raises several of these questions, is described. Finally, the admissibility and probative value of the fMRI images themselves are discussed. Assuming that the expert testimony that the images are offered to illustrate is admissible, it is argued that the law can obtain the benefits of fMRI science while minimising the judgmental risks by allowing triers of fact to see the images and encouraging experts and lawyers to educate the triers to interpret the images properly.


2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 1116-1124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert P. Spunt ◽  
Meghan L. Meyer ◽  
Matthew D. Lieberman

Humans readily adopt an intentional stance to other people, comprehending their behavior as guided by unobservable mental states such as belief, desire, and intention. We used fMRI in healthy adults to test the hypothesis that this stance is primed by the default mode of human brain function present when the mind is at rest. We report three findings that support this hypothesis. First, brain regions activated by actively adopting an intentional rather than nonintentional stance to a social stimulus were anatomically similar to those demonstrating default responses to fixation baseline in the same task. Second, moment-to-moment variation in default activity during fixation in the dorsomedial PFC was related to the ease with which participants applied an intentional—but not nonintentional—stance to a social stimulus presented moments later. Finally, individuals who showed stronger dorsomedial PFC activity at baseline in a separate task were generally more efficient when adopting the intentional stance and reported having greater social skills. These results identify a biological basis for the human tendency to adopt the intentional stance. More broadly, they suggest that the brain's default mode of function may have evolved, in part, as a response to life in a social world.


2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-484
Author(s):  
Paul Morrow

Abstract Philosophical accounts of moral progress commonly acknowledge the problem of mass atrocities. But the implications of such events for our ability to perceive, and achieve, progress are rarely considered in detail. This paper aims to address this gap. The paper takes as its starting point Allen Buchanan’s evolutionary theory of moral progress in his 2020 book Our Moral Fate. Through critical analysis of Buchanan’s theory, the paper shows that moral philosophers seeking to draw evidence from atrocities must pay closer attention to social scientific research into such crimes, and particularly to findings concerning the diverse motives, intentions, and ideological influences on perpetrators. At the same time, the paper suggests that mass atrocities exhibit the action-guiding influence not only of moral norms, but also of social and legal norms. The paper concludes by briefly considering the significance of mass atrocities for theories of moral progress beyond Our Moral Fate.


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