Coming to Understand the Social and Physical Worlds

Author(s):  
Sydney Hopkins

Children’s conceptual development has been described as a process of“theory change.” Specifically, children begin with an idea and then iteratively update that idea by combining existing and new information, making and testing predictions and then revising their idea based on new data again. Similar processes have been postulated to account for adaptive phenomenon in perceptual psychology and motor control. The similarities between the two processes suggest that performance on tasks that measure conceptual and sensory‐motor “theory change”respectively may be related. The goal of the present study is to determine whether children’s development in a complex conceptual domain, theory of mind, is associated with children’s performance in a load force adaptation paradigm. Theory of mind is broadly defined as the ability to understand how mental states, such as beliefs and desires, motivate ourown and other people’s actions. In contrast, load force adaptation is the ability to gradually adjust the amount of force exerted on an object in order to smoothly lift it up, as experience with the weight of the object is gained. To explore the mechanisms underlying these two processes, children between the ages of 3.5 and 4.5 years participate in a load force adaptation task and a battery of theory of mind tasks. We predict that since the underlying processes appear to be theoretically similar, the individual differences in the ability to adapt load force and in theory of mind ability will be positively correlated.   

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 105-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest Mandel

Professor Jon Elster advances the proposal that Marx – and Marxists–really stand for ‘methodological individualism,’ as opposed to ‘methodological collectivism.’ He defines ‘methodological individualism’ in the following terms: Social science explanations are seen as three-tiered. First, there is a causal explanation of mental states, such as desires and beliefs … Next, there is intentional explanation of individual action in terms of the underlying beliefs and desires … Finally, there is causal explanation of aggregated phenomena in terms of the individual actions that go into them. The last form is the specifically Marxist contribution to the methodology of the social sciences.1


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arab World English Journal ◽  
Ronnie Goodwin

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a conceptual theory that is credited with enabling individuals to anticipate the mental states of others, including their beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, and additional emotive circumstances (Flavell, 2004). Linguistic acquisition is a natural development that begins to develop in children from birth and enables communication. The cognitive domains necessary to comprehend language is also required in order for the formation of ToM to develop. The interpretations made through ToM presumptions can contain the discernment of another’s false belief. In this context, the individual must be aware that the literal interpretation could be an inaccurate symbol or manufactured belief. This understanding requires a certain level of cognitive development in the child since the intention may be to signify something else and the child must be able to correctly process idiomatic expressions in order to accurately make ToM determinations (Caillies & Le Sourn-Bissaoui, 2008). This paper explores the relationship between ToM and linguistic acquisition in normally developing children, as well as those with various disabilities to ascertain the degree of cognitive development necessary in order to make ToM determinations. Exploration of this relationship reveals that linguistic and cognitive development are both essential in the construct of ToM perceptions in early childhood.


2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (11) ◽  
pp. 1803-1814 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Ida Gobbini ◽  
Aaron C. Koralek ◽  
Ronald E. Bryan ◽  
Kimberly J. Montgomery ◽  
James V. Haxby

We compared two tasks that are widely used in research on mentalizing—false belief stories and animations of rigid geometric shapes that depict social interactions—to investigate whether the neural systems that mediate the representation of others' mental states are consistent across these tasks. Whereas false belief stories activated primarily the anterior paracingulate cortex (APC), the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/PC), and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)—components of the distributed neural system for theory of mind (ToM)—the social animations activated an extensive region along nearly the full extent of the superior temporal sulcus, including a locus in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), as well as the frontal operculum and inferior parietal lobule (IPL)—components of the distributed neural system for action understanding—and the fusiform gyrus. These results suggest that the representation of covert mental states that may predict behavior and the representation of intentions that are implied by perceived actions involve distinct neural systems. These results show that the TPJ and the pSTS play dissociable roles in mentalizing and are parts of different distributed neural systems. Because the social animations do not depict articulated body movements, these results also highlight that the perception of the kinematics of actions is not necessary to activate the mirror neuron system, suggesting that this system plays a general role in the representation of intentions and goals of actions. Furthermore, these results suggest that the fusiform gyrus plays a general role in the representation of visual stimuli that signify agency, independent of visual form.


Author(s):  
Yana Raievska

The article considers aspects of professional development of social sphere specialists; professional roles, functions and content of professional activity are described; the leading principles of organizational and methodological assistance of the social specialists training process are determined. The development of interprofessional interaction ideas is connected with the interprofessional group characteristics, professional and external image, competency areas, activity range and different status in the social work system. The concept of dialogic-competence approach forms the basic principles of interprofessional interaction: system, comprehensiveness, relevance, consistency, mutual enrichment, prospects, and self-efficacy. Interprofessional interaction involves mutual acceptance, dialogic orientation of specialists, psychological equality between all participants, the availability and sufficiency of space to build a workflow, compliance with the rules, ensuring a friendly atmosphere in joint activities. Development of readiness for interprofessional interaction includes communicative (efficiency of interpersonal and intrapersonal communications), cooperative (productive partnership in joint activity), personal-reflexive (analysis of own mental states, own actions; ability to allocate, analyze and compare own actions with the subject situation), social, team, system, mediation competences. Mechanisms for interprofessional interaction are cooperation, communication, coordination, specialists’ consistency actions, emotional, cognitive-analytical, regulatory functions of the individual. The development of psychological readiness components for interprofessional interaction among respondents is expressed at the average level with a general tendency among Master students with motivational and emotional component and among specialists with activity-practical component to a high-level indicators and a general tendency among Bachelor students with cognitive-semantic, actively practical and regulatory components to a low-level indicators.


1992 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Brothers ◽  
Brian Ring

The cognition that constructs mental features such as intention, disposition, and character is an aspect of theory of mind. This aspect of representation of minds, which inherently has valence, is viewed from cognitive, evolutionary, and neural perspectives. It is proposed that this cognition is modular, and that it normally operates in association with a valence-free cognition able to represent mental states such as belief. Examples of neural activity capable of supporting the social representations macaque monkeys are believed to possess (understanding of affective displays, purposeful movement, and elemental social interactions) are presented.


2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (12) ◽  
pp. 2025-2046 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Michel ◽  
Laurence Dricot ◽  
Renaud Lhommel ◽  
Cécile Grandin ◽  
Adrian Ivanoiu ◽  
...  

The temporal poles (TPs) are among the brain regions that are often considered as the brain network sustaining our ability to understand other people's mental states or “Theory of Mind” (ToM). However, so far the functional role of the left and right TPs in ToM is still debated, and it is even not clear yet whether these regions are necessary for ToM. In this study, we tested whether the left TP is necessary for ToM by assessing the mentalizing abilities of a patient (C.M.) diagnosed with semantic dementia. Converging evidence from detailed MRI and 18F-fluoro-2-deoxy-d-glucose PET examinations showed a massive atrophy of the left TP with the right TP being relatively unaffected. Furthermore, C.M.'s atrophy encompassed most regions of the left TP usually activated in neuroimaging studies investigating ToM. Given C.M.'s language impairments, we used a battery of entirely nonverbal ToM tasks. Across five tasks encompassing 100 trials, which probed the patient's ability to attribute various mental states (intentions, knowledge, and beliefs), C.M. showed a totally spared performance. This finding suggests that, despite its consistently observed activation in neuroimaging studies involving ToM tasks, the left TP is not necessary for ToM reasoning, at least in nonverbal conditions and as long as its right counterpart is preserved. Implications for understanding the social abilities of patients with semantic dementia are discussed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Arias

How does media influence beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors? While many scholars have studied the effect of media on social and political outcomes, we know surprisingly little about the channels through which this effect operates. I argue that two mechanisms can account for its impact. Media provides new information that persuades individuals to accept it (individual channel), but also, media informs listeners about what others learn, thus facilitating coordination (social channel). Combining a field experiment with a plausibly natural experiment in Mexico, I disentangle these effects analyzing norms surrounding violence against women. I examine the effect of a radio program when it is transmitted privately versus when it is transmitted publicly. I find no evidence supporting the individual mechanism. The social channel, however, increased rejection of violence against women and increased support for gender equality, but unexpectedly increased pessimism about whether violence would decline in the future.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Sabbagh ◽  
Lindsay Bowman

Everyday understanding of the social world relies, at least in part, on having a theory of mind—an understanding of how mental states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions cause human behavior. After introducing the core conceptual distinctions to frame discussion of the issues, we review a wide range of literature pertaining to the development of a range of theory of mind understandings; the cognitive, neurobiological, and experiential factors that contribute to those developments; and how the development of theory of mind affects a variety of social competencies, in typical and atypical development. Finally, we discuss various theories of theory of mind development and broader importance of theory of mind research for the field.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah I Mossad ◽  
Marlee M Vandewouw ◽  
Mary Lou Smith ◽  
Margot J Taylor

Abstract Neurodevelopmental difficulties emerge in very preterm born children (<32-week gestation) in infancy and continue to early adulthood but little is known about their social-cognitive development. This study utilized the complementary methodological advantages of both functional MRI and magnetoencephalography to examine the neural underpinnings of Theory of Mind in very preterm birth. Theory of Mind, one of the core social-cognitive skills, is the ability to attribute mental states to others, and is crucial for predicting others’ behaviours in social interactions. Eighty-three children (40 very preterm born, 24 boys, age = 8.7 ± 0.5 years, and 43 full-term born, 22 boys, age = 8.6 ± 0.5 years) completed the study. In functional MRI, both groups recruited classic Theory of Mind areas, without significant group differences. However, reduced Theory of Mind connectivity in the very preterm born group was found in magnetoencephalography in distinct theta, alpha and beta-band networks anchored in a set of brain regions that comprise the social brain. These networks included regions such as the angular gyrus, the medial pre-frontal cortex, the superior temporal gyrus and the temporal poles. Very preterm born children showed increased connectivity compared to controls in a network anchored in the occipital gyri rather than classical social-processing regions. Very preterm born children made significantly more attribution errors and mis-construed the social scenarios. Findings offer novel insight into the neural networks, supporting social cognition in very preterm born children and highlight the importance of multimodal neuroimaging to interrogate the social brain in clinical populations.


1970 ◽  
pp. 305-325
Author(s):  
Chen Eden

The aim of this article is to examine whether the attitude towards the deficiency of people with the Autistic Spectrum Disorder relies on the Theory of Mind concept and the symbolic interaction approach. Autism is a deficiency hampering the ability to receive messages from others and develop appropriate mutual relations. The deficiencies are apparent in three areas of development – social functioning, communication and behaviour. The study population are high functioning people with autism – ASD. TOM is a concept of consciousness, the ability to understand and interpret human behaviour in interactions and social contexts, including the ability to identify mental states such as: emotions, thoughts, intentions and desires of the individual and those around him. There are three components within this interaction: cognitive (thoughts, beliefs), emotional (exhibiting and understanding emotions, empathy), and the behavioural component (the actual interaction). Symbolic interactionism is a sociological paradigm claiming that social reality is based on the interactions between individuals in society, based on symbols and interpretations. When we examine the interaction of people with ASD, in order to understand their social thinking, emotions and behaviours we want to have a framework focusing on the interaction within a group. One of important and meaningful groups is the peer group, which has an important general and specific role in youth and young adults. The peer group has a significant role in integrating personal identity, establishing a different status within the family, and acquiring greater autonomy in the world outside the family. Work within the peer group enables familiarization with the deficiency and different parts of the “self”, thus con-structing a solid identity and closer relations with the environment. Group work will include aspects such as projection, giving and receiving feedback, learning about emotional mirroring, and defending oneself.


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