The dynamics of responsibility judgment: Joint role of causal explanations based on dependence and transference

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Sofia Bonicalzi ◽  
Eugenia Kulakova ◽  
Chiara Brozzo ◽  
Sam J. Gilbert ◽  
Patrick Haggard
Keyword(s):  
BJGP Open ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. BJGPO.2021.0008
Author(s):  
Caroline Pearce ◽  
Geoff Wong ◽  
Isla Kuhn ◽  
Stephen Barclay

BackgroundBereavement can have significant impacts on physical and mental health, and a minority of people experience complicated and prolonged grief responses. Primary care is ideally situated to offer bereavement care, yet UK provision remains variable and practitioners feel uncertain how best to support bereaved patients.AimTo identify what works, how, and for whom, in the management of complicated grief (CG) in primary care.Design & settingA review of evidence on the management of CG and bereavement in UK primary care settings.MethodA realist approach was taken that aims to provide causal explanations through the generation and articulation of contexts, mechanisms, and outcomes.ResultsForty-two articles were included. Evidence on the primary care management of complicated or prolonged grief was limited. GPs and nurses view bereavement support as part of their role, yet experience uncertainty over the appropriate extent of their involvement. Patients and clinicians often have differing views on the role of primary care in bereavement. Training in bereavement, local systems for reporting deaths, practitioner time, and resources can assist or hinder bereavement care provision. Practitioners find bereavement care can be emotionally challenging. Understanding patients’ needs can encourage a proactive response and help identify appropriate support.ConclusionBereavement care in primary care remains variable and practitioners feel unprepared to provide appropriate bereavement care. Patients at higher risk of complicated or prolonged grief may fail to receive the support they need from primary care. Further research is required to address the potential unmet needs of bereaved patients.


2016 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-17
Author(s):  
David W. Montgomery ◽  
John Heathershaw ◽  
Adeeb Khalid ◽  
Edward Lemon ◽  
Tim Epkenhans

AbstractAs researchers in Central Asian Studies, we discuss the different perspectives our methodological approaches provide to understanding the content and context of Islam, security, and the state in the region. We acknowledge the role of bias in creating narratives that dominate regional and international discourse and question mono-causal explanations of Islamic practice and the roots of radicalism. As such, we offer insights into the challenges and best practices of doing research on Islam and security and posit Central Asian Studies as a case for the value of multi-disciplinary research.


Author(s):  
Brad Skow

This chapter argues that the notion of explanation relevant to the philosophy of science is that of an answer to a why-question. From this point of view it surveys most of the historically important theories of explanation. Hempel’s deductive-nomological, and inductive-statistical, models of explanation required explanations to cite laws. Familiar counterexamples to these models suggested that laws are not needed, and instead that explanations should cite causes. One theory of causal explanation, David Lewis’s, is discussed in some detail. Many philosophers now reject causal theories of explanation because they think that there are non-causal explanations; some examples are reviewed. The role of probabilities and statistics in explanation, and their relation to causation, is also discussed. Another strategy for dealing with counterexamples to Hempel’s theory leads to unificationist theories of explanation. Kitcher's unificationist theory is presented, and a new argument against unificationist theories is offered. Also discussed in some detail are Van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory, and Streven’s and Woodward’s recent theories of causal explanation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (9) ◽  
pp. 788-809
Author(s):  
Caroline Silva ◽  
Chia-Jung Tsay

Introduction: Drawing from literature in social and clinical psychology, we explore mechanisms associated with the lack of empathy for people who engage in self-injurious behaviors. Methods: Using implicit and explicit measures across three samples, we tested whether knowledge of prior self-injury impacts observers' empathy, perceived agency, perspective taking, and willingness to help a target individual. Results: We found in Studies 1-2 that observers report decreased empathy, perceive less agency, and make more dispositional attributions toward a person who engages in deliberate self-injury, compared to accidental injury. Study 3 indicates that observers perceive a target who engaged in deliberate self-injury to have lower agency. Furthermore, when evaluating a target who has been victimized, observers report less empathy, compassion, and likelihood of helping if the target has a history of deliberate self-injury. Perceived agency accounted for decreased empathy, whereas empathy accounted for lower likelihood of helping. Discussion: Our findings imply that observers may be better able to empathize with people with a history of self-injury if they focus on the agency of the indi-vidual and situational causal explanations for the behavior.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Kirfel ◽  
Thomas Icard ◽  
Tobias Gerstenberg

What do we communicate with causal explanations? Upon being told, "E because C", one might learn that C and E both occurred, and perhaps that there is a causal relationship between C and E. In fact, causal explanations systematically disclose much more than this basic information. Here, we offer a communication-theoretic account of explanation that makes specific predictions about the kinds of inferences people draw from others' explanations. We test these predictions in a case study involving the role of norms and causal structure. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that people infer the normality of a cause from an explanation when they know the underlying causal structure. In Experiment 2, we show that people infer the causal structure from an explanation if they know the normality of the cited cause. We find these patterns both for scenarios that manipulate the statistical and prescriptive normality of events. Finally, we consider how the communicative function of explanations, as highlighted in this series of experiments, may help to elucidate the distinctive roles that normality and causal structure play in causal judgment, paving the way toward a more comprehensive account of causal explanation.


Author(s):  
Mirian Donat

This article evaluates Wittgenstein’s possible contributions to an epistemology of psychology. Although the author admittedly neither proposes an epistemology nor examines specific issues of psychology as a science, we understand that his reflections on the meaning of psychological concepts may contribute to a better understanding of psychology as a science, which involves understanding its object and methods. With that goal in mind and based on the concept of language developed in his second phase, especially in his work Philosophical Investigations, we retrace his efforts to obtain a picture of the grammar of psychological concepts, emphasizing two of its aspects: first, the place and role of first‑person expressive propositions in the psychological language-game and second, how this understanding of the perspective of the first person implies in refusing to reduce explanations of human behavior to causal explanations in favor of explanations based on reasons.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate E. Lynch

Abstract Much microbiota-gut-brain research focuses on the causal role of microbiomes as a whole, rather than their component parts: microbes. Hooks et al. find these whole-community explanations inadequate; however, they do not provide suggestions for better explanations. By appealing to proportionality – a criterion that can be used to develop more appropriate causal explanations – more accurate causal claims can be made.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Birch

HRG has been criticized for being an ‘empty statement’ or tautology, for failing to yield predictions, and for failing to yield causal explanations of change. There is some justification for these charges, yet they do not undermine the value of HRG as an organizing framework. In response to the ‘tautology’ complaint, we should admit that HRG is tautology-like, in that it avoids detailed dynamical assumptions. But this is an advantage in an organizing framework, because it ensures its compatibility with a wide range of more detailed models. In response to the ‘prediction’ complaint, we should concede that HRG is not very useful for prediction, but the role of an organizing framework is not predictive. In response to the ‘causal explanation’ complaint, this chapter argues that HRG, by organizing our thinking about ultimate causes, generates understanding of those causes. It also compares favourably to other possible organizing frameworks.


Author(s):  
Richard Bensel

Scholars in the American political development community have constructed an understanding of political economy that differs significantly from the approaches of neo-classical and institutional economists. Those differences are examined with respect to (a) the causal primacy of states and markets; (b) the reliance on collectives or individuals as primary units of analysis; (c) the selection and comprehension of alternative strategies and goals; (d) the primary motivations of political and economic actors; and (e) the role of ideation and ideology in the formation of causal explanations and social values. Although the American political development conception of political economy might subsume and even go beyond the conventional neo-classical or institutional models, American political development research has resembled a tapestry in which some areas of the American experience are very well represented while other areas remain relatively unexplored.


2020 ◽  
Vol 375 (1796) ◽  
pp. 20190318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lina Jansson

Network explanations raise foundational questions about the nature of scientific explanation. The challenge discussed in this article comes from the fact that network explanations are often thought to be non-causal, i.e. they do not describe the dynamical or mechanistic interactions responsible for some behaviour, instead they appeal to topological properties of network models describing the system. These non-causal features are often thought to be valuable precisely because they do not invoke mechanistic or dynamical interactions and provide insights that are not available through causal explanations. Here, I address a central difficulty facing attempts to move away from causal models of explanation; namely, how to recover the directionality of explanation. Within causal models, the directionality of explanation is identified with the direction of causation. This solution is no longer available once we move to non-causal accounts of explanation. I will suggest a solution to this problem that emphasizes the role of conditions of application. In doing so, I will challenge the idea that sui generis mathematical dependencies are the key to understand non-causal explanations. The upshot is a conceptual account of explanation that accommodates the possibility of non-causal network explanations. It also provides guidance for how to evaluate such explanations. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Unifying the essential concepts of biological networks: biological insights and philosophical foundations’.


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