Playing by the informal rules

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 688-690
Author(s):  
H. Christoph Steinhardt
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Fernando Rosenblatt

This chapter, focusing on Uruguay, reviews the trajectory of the oldest parties in the study, PC and PN. This analysis presents the clearest example of the theorized evolution of the causal factors: the waning effect of Trauma, the difficulty of sustaining Purpose, the importance of formal and informal Channels of Ambition, and the consolidation of moderate Exit Barriers as a combination of institutional and organizational formal and informal rules. The chapter also discusses the case of the FA, a vibrant party that faces the challenge of consolidating Channels of Ambition. Finally, the Uruguayan case illustrates the trade-off between Trauma and Channels of Ambition and is the only one of the three countries in this study where all the major parties, at the time of fieldwork, could be considered vibrant.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Rachel A. Schwartz

ABSTRACT The coexistence of predatory informal rules alongside formal democratic institutions is a defining, if pernicious, feature of Latin America’s political landscape. How do such rules remain so resilient in the face of bureaucratic reforms? This article explicates the mechanisms underlying the persistence of such rules and challenges conventional explanations through process-tracing analysis in one arena: Guatemala’s customs administration. During Guatemala’s period of armed conflict and military rule, military intelligence officers introduced a powerful customs fraud scheme that endured for more than 20 years, despite state reforms. Its survival is best attributed to the ability of the distributional coalition underwriting the predatory rules to capture new political and economic spaces facilitated by political party and market reforms. This illustrates that distributional approaches to institutional change must attend to how those with a stake in the status quo may continue to uphold perverse institutional arrangements on the margins of state power.


1994 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
CAROL A. MERSHON

Why do informal rules emerge alongside—and at variance with—the formal constitutional constraints that shape bargaining over coalition governments? The presence of informal rules at odds with formal rules appears as an anomaly within both institution-free and institution-focused theories of coalitions. The author argues that politicians create informal rules in order to alter formal institutions that do not function to their benefit. The costs of a formal change in institutions offer incentives to politicians to invent informal rules as alternatives to such change, and repeated interactions teach politicians what to expect and then invent. The author's emphasis on the manipulability of rules echoes long-standing themes in the study and practice of politics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
Fotios Fitsilis ◽  
Athanasia Pliakogianni

Because of their particular nature, representative institutions around the globe are usually well equipped, both legally and capacity-wise, to adequately respond to political crises; this is what political evolution has taught them. Responses to political crises have been developed and take the form of formal or informal rules of procedure that lie at the disposal of the Speaker or other parliamentary functionaries. On the contrary, battling a health crisis does not immediately belong to the issues a parliament under normal circumstances deals with. Hence, the scattered responses by the world’s parliaments, as pointed out by recent studies, come as no surprise. This article showcases the Hellenic Parliament, which constitutes a classic example of a legislature combating the pandemic situation through a gradual and multidimensional response. Its relevant actions are displayed and analysed vis à vis the average global response. As the pandemic seems far from being over, the article attempts a series of future projections on how to deal with it in the long run.


Author(s):  
Vadim A. Maksimov ◽  

Introduction. V. N. Tatishchev, one of the founders of the Russian history studies, was notable for his broad views on the evolution of society and economic order. His economic views were not widely discussed during his lifetime and were not much in demand afterwards. Familiarity with his major works is hampered by the fact that they were almost never published in the form of notes, letters, and manuscripts. The ambiguity of his approaches, conclusions, recommendations and, accordingly, their evaluation was noted by many researchers who took diametrically opposed views. Deep erudition, reliance on Western European philosophy and Russian theology allowed the enlightener to create the conceptual milestones of the future institutional program. Theoretical analysis. Modernization of society should be based on constant changes in existing legislative and economic practices, ideological perceptions, and cultural patterns. This approach allows us to identify the most effective institutions (formal and informal rules), taking into account national specifics. Methodologically, the relationship between changes in public administration and social ethos “vertically and horizontally” is established; the importance of societal economic culture as a factor of sustainable development is emphasized. Empirical analysis. Considered chronologically consecutive works on purely economic topics and legal foundations of power are supported by a significant array of letters to Peter I, the Academy of Sciences, the Berg Collegium, and public figures of the first half of the 18th century. According to the thinker, economic policy, both at micro and macro levels, should be based on regulations, organizational adaptation and rational borrowing. The qualitative description of the structure of social relations of absolutist Russia, in the form of “physiology of society”, which resonates with the modern concepts in economic sociology and new institutional economic theory, is highlighted. Results. V. N. Tatishchev can reasonably be considered the conceptual forerunner of the modern theory of institutionalism. As an enlightener, in the spirit of eighteenth-century social thought, he created an introduction to the importance of permanent changes in Russian economic and social structures. The imperative of state construction of the economy at the macro level is supported by attention to micro-changes in the form of regular economic practices, combining elements of originality and creative borrowing of foreign innovations. Evolutionary approach of the thinker echoes the formation and development of economic views of the XIX and XX centuries, especially in the prerequisites of the theory of history periodization and the transition from one political order to another on the basis of changes in institutions (formal and informal rules).


2022 ◽  
pp. 000276422110660
Author(s):  
Jalia Joseph

In this article, the author relies on a narrative based format to explore the interactions between everyday race-making processes and the white space of academia. Recognizing the unique ways systems of power interact with their experiences in the social world, they chronicle their engagements detailing the pervasive ways rules of white space are placed. The article recognizes three informal rules of white space in academia: the accepted reification of white sociological thought; the acceptance of white professional standards; and the continued centering of white comfort.


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