Expectations and Informal Rules in Coalition Formation

1994 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
CAROL A. MERSHON
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Formal Institutions ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Constitutional Constraints ◽  
Informal Rules ◽  
Formal Rules

Why do informal rules emerge alongside—and at variance with—the formal constitutional constraints that shape bargaining over coalition governments? The presence of informal rules at odds with formal rules appears as an anomaly within both institution-free and institution-focused theories of coalitions. The author argues that politicians create informal rules in order to alter formal institutions that do not function to their benefit. The costs of a formal change in institutions offer incentives to politicians to invent informal rules as alternatives to such change, and repeated interactions teach politicians what to expect and then invent. The author's emphasis on the manipulability of rules echoes long-standing themes in the study and practice of politics.

Slovenia

2019 ◽  
pp. 475-521
Author(s):  
Alenka Krašovec ◽  
Tomaž Krpič
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Dropping Out ◽  
The Political ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Frequent Use ◽  
The Government

Under the proportional representation (PR) electoral system in Slovenia, after elections, coalition governments have formed. However, the coalition partners have also adopted a ‘dropping out from government’ strategy between elections, which in some cases has led to minority governments. This has occurred despite a frequent use of several conflict-prevention and conflict-resolution mechanisms. One such mechanism, coalition agreements, are mostly understood in terms of policy agreements. After each election in the period 1992–2000, the leading party, the LDS, signed a coalition agreement with each coalition partner. Since 2013, such coalition agreements include a mechanism of explicitly stating in coalition agreements that certain issues are to be avoided. Regardless, governments termination in majority cases happened due to different (policy or personal) conflicts within the government. Early in the period, government coalitions were ideologically mixed. This was characteristic for governments under LDS leadership from 1992 to 2004, while after the 2004 elections, the governmental coalitions were much more ideologically homogenous. Alternation between like-minded ideological coalitions (centre-left or centre-right) took place. Simultaneously, the main lines of conflict changed. In the 1990s, initially a mostly ideological cleavage between ‘transformed’ and ‘newly established’ political parties was present, while after the 2004 elections, the economic cleavage became more salient. All parliamentary parties, except the Slovenian National Party, have at least briefly participated in governments, while the Democratic Party of Retired Persons have been since the mid-1990s the party with the biggest coalition potential. Since 2011, small parties have received pivotal roles in coalition formation. Generally speaking, participation in the government has not been electorally rewarding for the political parties.

Formal and Informal Rules in Post-Communist Transition

1998 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Winiecki
Keyword(s):  
Codes Of Conduct ◽  
Transition Paths ◽  
Informal Rules ◽  
Communist Countries ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Formal Rules

Abstract The article analyzes the extent of the impact that informal rules (customs, beliefs, internalized codes-of-conduct, etc.) may have on the course of post-communist transition from plan to market as they affect die ways individuals react to formal rules of transition. The article is in two major parts. The first deals with the impact of informal rules on behavior in a range of areas (law, morals, politics); the second considers alternative transition paths pursued in various post-communist countries as well as die relative probabilities of success of major alternatives.

scholarly journals The radical left in coalition government: Towards a comparative measurement of success and failure

2011 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 488-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dunphy ◽  
Tim Bale
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
Comparative Measurement ◽  
Cautious Approach ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Measurement Of Success ◽  
Radical Left

This article raises questions about how best to assess the performance of radical left parties participating in coalition governments. Drawing in part on interviews (see Appendix 1), it covers parties that have participated in coalition government (Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway), or have acted as ‘support parties’ (Denmark, Sweden), or are debating the ‘pros and cons’ of coalition participation (Netherlands). It undertakes a comparative analysis of how radical left parties themselves evaluate the measure of their achievements and failings in coalition government — a critical exercise for such parties that can influence their tactical and strategic decisions about future government participation, as well as the ability of the parties to survive political and electoral setbacks. The approach we adopt is one that takes the policy, office and votes triad developed by political scientists seriously, but also factors in the principles, political outlook and goals of the parties themselves. It concludes that the experience of coalition government for radical left parties is far from encouraging to date. Their few achievements have to be set against many potential pitfalls. Whilst there may be no alternative to government participation if these parties wish to be taken seriously as actors, a more strategic and cautious approach to coalition formation seems advisable in many instances.

“Why Can’t We Be Friends?” The Coalition Potential of Presidents in Semi-presidential Republics—Insights from Romania

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veronica Anghel
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Presidential Regimes ◽  
Depth Interviews

Coalition governments are a regularly studied feature of parliamentary democracies. Debates still linger in the field as to what extent the outcomes of these studies are also applicable in determining who has the upper hand over coalition formation in semi-presidential regimes. This article explores the dynamics of government formation under semi-presidential regimes using evidence from Romania (1990–2016) and discusses the formal and informal potential of the president to shape coalitions. It covers a lacuna in qualitative studies by using evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with prime ministers, cabinet members, and key party decision makers and shows that under certain circumstances presidents can play an influential role in government formation, but these are rather the exception than the rule. Using a case that presents the incentives for an increase in the presidentialization of politics, I show that the mechanisms of a multiparty regime mostly limit the president’s exclusive bargaining advantage to nominating the prime minister and then, much as in a parliamentary democracy, render him or her dependent on the coalition potential of his or her own party.

Authoritarian Regimes

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Schlumberger
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Formal Institutions ◽  
Knowledge Accumulation ◽  
Genuine Knowledge

This article first discusses the term “authoritarian regimes” and makes a claim for studying such regimes. An overview of the young but burgeoning research on authoritarian regimes structures the field in eight thematic clusters: (1) typological efforts and regime characteristics such as coalition formation and origins, (2) institutionalist approaches, (3) state-society relations beyond formal institutions, (4) repression, (5) political economy approaches, (6) international dimensions, (7) performance, and (8) linking the concepts of regimes and states. Although this wave of research has been extremely prolific, it still remains unsystematic and disparate in various regards. It is therefore necessary for this field of research to consolidate and thereby to contribute to genuine knowledge accumulation.

scholarly journals Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945–83

1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Schofield ◽  
Michael Laver
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
Practical Application ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
The Past ◽  
Payoff Distribution ◽  
The Subject

Coalition formation has been the subject of much theoretical and empirical work in the past decade or so. The theories that have been tested all rest, one way or another, upon assumptions about the ways in which the payoff accruing to a particular coalition is distributed among its members. Yet much less empirical work has been done on the process of payoff distribution. Thus some of the fundamental assumptions of coalition theories, at least in terms of their practical application to coalition governments, have been more scantily tested. Several theories of payoff distribution have been recently developed, however. It is the purpose of this article to test the application of these theories to the practice of coalition government in Europe.

scholarly journals Formal rules, informal rules, and economic performance

2001 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Winiecki
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Economic Performance ◽  
Institutional Characteristics ◽  
Wealth Creation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Informal Rules ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Formal Rules

In this article the author tries consider a question important for economic development: what happens when formal rules and informal rules of economic behaviour are in conflict. Under such circumstances even the best, wealth creation-enhancing rules must bring about different outcomes if introduced in the different political, economic, and socio-cultural environments. These considerations begin with the overview of possible balances and imbalances in the relationships between formal and informal rules and potential conflicts that may arise in the latter cases. The next step is the selection of institutional characteristics that facilitate the explanation and prediction of outcomes of formal rules&informal rules interactions. The third, and final, step considered in the article concerns the adjustment of rules (formal, informal, or both) over time and possible patterns of adjustment.

scholarly journals The uneven results of institutional changes in Central and Eastern Europe: The role of culture

2004 ◽  
Vol 49 (163) ◽  
pp. 7-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svetozar Pejovic
Keyword(s):  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Cultural Values ◽  
Central And Eastern Europe ◽  
The Other ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Informal Rules ◽  
Communist Countries ◽  
Formal Rules

It has been widely observed that the same formal rules, enacted in the parliaments in the form of written laws, give vastly different results in different social and cultural environments. This phenomenon came to be particularly pronounced in the process of transition of the formerly communist countries to market economies and politically pluralized societies. Highly similar and occasionally identical institutional changes turned out to be unequally accepted by the societies under consideration and produced widely different results in the material restructuring of the economies. It became clear that the notion of institutions had to be widened so as to encompass the informal rules: the customs, the traditions, cultural values and national myths. Informal rules define the constraints for implementing the formal ones and, on the other hand, determine the actual effects of the latter once they are implemented. Forcing the formal rules upon the transition societies cannot be successful unless preceding and/or contemporaneous changes of informal rules are provided for. The paper ends with a design of the strategy for the decisively important changes in values and other components of informal rules.

Party Competition in the 2013 Italian Elections: Evidence from an Expert Survey

2014 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aldo Di Virgilio ◽  
Daniela Giannetti ◽  
Andrea Pedrazzani ◽  
Luca Pinto
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Policy Space ◽  
Expert Survey ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Quantitative Estimates ◽  
Spatial Approach ◽  
Italian Context ◽  
The Eu

In this article, we examine the structure of party competition in Italy in the February 2013 elections. We rely on the spatial approach to party competition to analyse the most salient dimensions of the policy space in the Italian context. Our analysis is based on quantitative estimates from expert survey data. These data highlight the salience of the socioeconomic policy dimension and capture the change in the importance of the EU dimension. Finally, this study provides an analysis of potential coalition governments in the aftermath of the 2013 general election that is grounded on the spatial approach to coalition formation.

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