Street-Level Bureaucrats and Ethical Conflicts in Service Provision to Sex Workers

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theresa Anasti
Author(s):  
Nadine Raaphorst

Street-level bureaucrats’ discretionary powers play an increasingly important role in public service provision and law enforcement. In order to deal with societal challenges, legislators and policy-makers leave room for professional judgment by formulating open laws, rules, and policies. In making responsive decisions, however, that is, when treating different cases differently, street-level bureaucrats do not necessarily attach less value to treating similar cases alike. This chapter discusses how two notions of fairness—treating similar cases alike and treating dissimilar cases differently—are studied in street-level bureaucracy literature, and sheds light on the factors that influence how bureaucrats behave in this regard. Subsequently, it is explored how street-level bureaucrats could enhance equality of treatment when rules run out. The chapter concludes with an agenda for future research.


2021 ◽  
Vol 70 (99) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Monika Senghaas ◽  
Sarah Bernhard

Zusammenfassung Arbeitsvermittler*innen wenden als Street-Level Bureaucrats die Bestimmungen des Sozialgesetzbuches II auf einzelne Bürger*innen an. Sie handeln dabei im Spannungsfeld der institutionellen Logiken von Dienstleistung und Kontrolle, die über die sogenannte Eingliederungsvereinbarung – einem Vertrag zwischen Jobcenter und Arbeitsuchenden – handlungsrelevant werden. Der Beitrag untersucht anhand standardisierter und qualitativer Befragungen von Arbeitsvermittler*innen, wie diese mit dem „doppelten Mandat“ des Dienstleistungs- und Kontrollauftrags umgehen und wie sie die Mehrdeutigkeiten der Eingliederungsvereinbarung in der Interaktion mit Arbeitsuchenden verarbeiten. Die Analyse zeigt, dass Arbeitsvermittler*innen fall- und prozessbezogen kooperative oder direktive Elemente der Eingliederungsvereinbarung akzentuieren. Sie beschreiben jedoch auch Fallkonstellationen, in denen sie ihren Entscheidungsspielraum zum Einsatz der Eingliederungsvereinbarung als unzureichend wahrnehmen oder in denen die Eingliederungsvereinbarung zu einer bürokratisch-leeren Übung wird. Abstract: Job Placement Between Service Provision and Control. A Multi-Method Study on Back-to-Work Agreements As street-level bureaucrats, jobcentre advisors apply the legal provisions of the Social Code II to individual cases. In doing so, they act along the institutional logics of counselling and control, which become relevant for action through the back-to-work agreement – a contract between jobcentre and jobseeker. Based on a standardised survey and qualitative interviews and group discussions in jobcentres, this article examines how jobcentre advisors reconcile the logics of service provision and control in their interaction with clients. It is shown that jobcentre advisors accentuate cooperative or directive elements of the back-towork-agreement on a case-by-case basis. They also describe constellations in which they perceive their discretion regarding the back-to-work agreement as insufficient or in which the back-to-work agreement becomes a bureaucratic and empty exercise.


Author(s):  
Tony Evans

In 1980 Michael Lipsky published “Street-level Bureaucracy,” arguing that public policy is often vague and imprecise, and relies on frontline workers to make sense of it on the ground in delivering public services. At the same time, the book is critical of frontline workers for not complying with policy in their use of discretion. Lipsky’s approach has influenced a great deal of subsequent analysis of public service provision, but continues to contain an unresolved tension at its core. If policy is vague, how can discretion be judged non-compliant against it? The street-level bureaucracy approach has tended to seek to resolve this tension by assuming that all public services are fundamentally the same and that all public service workers should use discretion in a particular way. While street-level bureaucracies—front line public services—are similar in that they are subject to policies, operate under conditions of inadequate resources, and afford frontline workers discretion in their work, there are also significant differences between types of public services in the ways they work with policy and the nature and extent of discretion of staff delivering the service. Different services do different things; the nature of the policy they work with varies, and the logic of provision and priorities vary between services. Policy, for instance, may refer to a precise set of instructions, or to setting out particular concerns or broad-brush commitments. Some services, such as benefits provision, are specified in detailed policy which not only sets out what they can do but also how decisions should be made. Others services, such as policing, are subject to a range of policies and concerns often expressed as conflicting demands that have to be balanced and managed in the particular circumstances of their application. And others, mainly human services, are primarily thought of in terms what the professionals within provide, and assumes a logic of service provision to be located in those providing the service. Policy is sometimes more explicit and discretion narrower; it is sometimes looser and relies more on discretion. It may, in some circumstances, be sufficient to refer to policy to understand what services are supposed to do; in other circumstances, policy alone provides a poor picture of what’s expected. Street-level bureaucracy analysis is too broad-brush and cannot capture the range of ideas of compliance in public services. It tends to equate policy with instruction and judgement with organizational thinking, and to see non-compliance as endemic in the use of discretion. In doing this, it fails to appreciate the variety of relationships between policy and public services; the varied extent of discretion in different settings, and the range of concerns and ethical commitments in different public services. Compliance in policy implementation needs to be sensitive to different types of public services and the subsequent variety of commitments and concerns of street-level bureaucrats in those public services.


Author(s):  
Alastair Stark

This chapter explores agents who are influential in terms of inquiry lesson-learning but have not been examined before in inquiry literature. The key argument is that two types of agent—policy refiners and street-level bureaucrats—are important when it comes to the effectiveness of post-crisis lesson-learning. As they travel down from the central government level, street-level actors champion, reinterpret, and reject inquiry lessons, often because those lessons do not consider local capacities. Policy refiners, however, operate at the central level in the form of taskforces, implementation reviews, and policy evaluation processes. These refiners examine potentially problematic inquiry lessons in greater detail in order to determine whether and how they should be implemented. In doing so, these ‘mini-inquiries’ can reformulate or even abandon inquiry recommendations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 147892992110215
Author(s):  
Chunna Li ◽  
Jun Yang

The theory of street-level bureaucracy and its relevant data have proven the expected duties of the frontline staff of local government may be excessive but their time spent working remains quite low. Using data from participatory observations of street-level officials in a Chinese city, this study reveals the logic of this labour input paradox. Organizational climate incentive and promotional incentive jointly influence the time allocation of street-level bureaucrats. The organizational climate incentive reflects the weak incentive characteristic of the maintenance function of labour; promotional incentives have a strong impact on motivation, which is characteristic of the promotional function of labour. These findings reveal the costs of the New Public Management movement in an organization lacking an effective promotion mechanism and a positive organizational climate incentive. This is a snapshot of the dilemma faced by China’s public organization reforms, but it is also a problem other country must solve.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document