Demobilization Challenges After Armed Conflict

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margit Bussmann
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Military Power ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Peace Agreements ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Alternative Means ◽  
Decisive Victory ◽  
Security Guarantees ◽  
Commitment Problems

Demobilization of ex-combatants is a major obstacle in the transition to a stable postconflict society. The combatants must be convinced to abandon the armed confrontation and hand over their weapons in light of security concerns and a lack of alternative means of income. The challenges to overcoming the commitment problem differ in terms of numbers of combatants who must be demobilized for conflicts that end in a decisive victory and conflicts that reach a military stalemate. Peace agreements can offer several solutions for overcoming the parties’ commitment problems, but often the implementation of the provisions is incomplete. Third parties can offer to monitor an agreement and provide security guarantees. International actors increasingly assist with demobilization and reintegration programs for former combatants and help to overcome security-related concerns and economic challenges. Another solution offered is military power-sharing arrangements and the integration of rebel fighters into the national military. These measures are intended to reduce the pool for potential recruitment for existing or new rebel groups. If ex-combatants are left without means of income to support themselves and their families, the risk is higher that they will remobilize and conflict will recur. Reintegration in the civilian labor market, however, is often difficult in the weak economies of war-affected countries.

scholarly journals The Prevalence of Power-Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace

2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna K. Jarstad
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Data Collection ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Good News ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Peace Agreements ◽  
Negative Effect

Why are some elections followed by armed conflict, while others are not? This article begins to explore this question by mapping the prevalence of power-sharing agreements and patterns of post-election peace in states shattered by civil war. While democracy builds on the notion of free political competition and uncertain electoral outcomes, power-sharing reduces the uncertainty by ensuring political power for certain groups. Nevertheless, new data presented in this article – the Post-Accord Elections (PAE) data collection – shows that the issues of peace, power-sharing and democracy have become intertwined as the vast majority of contemporary peace agreements provide for both power-sharing and elections. First, in contrast to previous research which has suggested that power-sharing is a tool for ending violence, this study shows that conflict often continues after an agreement has been signed, even if it includes provisions for power-sharing. Second, this investigation shows no evidence of power-sharing facilitating the holding of elections. On the contrary, it is more common that elections are held following a peace process without power-sharing. Third, a period of power-sharing ahead of the elections does not seem to provide for postelection peace. Rather, such elections are similarly dangerous as post-accord elections held without a period of power-sharing. The good news is that power-sharing does not seem to have a negative effect on post-election peace.

Bargaining Models of War and the Stability of Peace in Post-Conflict Societies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margit Bussmann
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Security Guarantees ◽  
Commitment Problems

A major challenge for countries that emerge from civil war is the stabilization of the post-conflict order in a way that fighting does not break out again. Recent empirical and theoretical work on the resolution of civil wars and on the duration of peace strongly rely on the bargaining framework of war emphasizing information asymmetries and commitment problems as main reasons for why in some states civil wars recur repeatedly, whereas in other societies a conflict ends and a transition to a peaceful society is successful. The length of peace spells depends partly on information about the distribution of power that became available during the conflict, captured by the duration and intensity of the fighting as well as the type of conflict ending. Information problems are more relevant at earlier stages and with regard to the initiation of negotiations. In finding bargaining deals and securing their implementation, the conflict parties have to overcome commitment problems. The literature has investigated in more detail third-party security guarantees and power-sharing arrangements as mechanisms to get conflict parties to credibly commit to and adhere to a negotiated agreement. Recently, empirical research moved beyond the conclusion of peace agreements to the study of their implementation. Particular challenges for a peaceful order are the demobilization of ex-combatants, which is aggravated by time-inconsistency problems, the timing of elections, and the redistribution of economic resources. Finally, solutions become more difficult in multiparty conflicts and if the armed groups are fragmented.

Distributional effects of political power-sharing arrangements and their negative consequences for post-agreement stability

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-132
Author(s):  
Kazuhiro Obayashi
Keyword(s):  
Power Sharing ◽  
The Political ◽  
Alternative Theory ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Distributional Effects ◽  
Peace Agreements ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
And Shifts ◽  
Peace Duration

Most of the previous studies of power-sharing arrangements (PSAs) find the political PSA to be ineffective in stabilizing post-agreement peace. These studies argue that the political PSA is a signal that is not costly enough to moderate the information asymmetry or commitment problem among the signatories. In this article, I develop an alternative theory of the political PSA that identifies its “negative” effect on post-agreement stability by highlighting two issues that have attracted little attention in the previous studies, i.e. distributional effects of the political PSA and shifts in the bargaining power among the signatories. To assess the validity of the theory, I first conduct a logistic regression analysis of inclusion of political PSA provisions in peace agreements, and then conduct a survival analysis of post-agreement peace duration.

Khartoum will resist committing to power sharing

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
South Sudan ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
The West ◽  
Blue Nile ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Government ◽  
South Kordofan

Significance Since South Sudan seceded in 2011, Khartoum has confronted conflict on three fronts. Armed conflict escalated in Blue Nile and South Kordofan in mid-2011, while clashes between pro- and anti-government forces and outbreaks of inter-communal fighting have plagued Darfur and West Kordofan. Impacts Ongoing conflict will dash hopes of Sudan's removal from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Reports about fighting and atrocities in areas to which the government restricts access will further strain relations with the West. Khartoum will continue to pressure Juba against providing support to any rebel groups in Sudan. The government will step up its call that AU-UN peacekeepers withdraw from Darfur.

scholarly journals The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and Beyond

2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 11-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chandra Lekha Sriram ◽  
Marie-Joëlle Zahar
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Human Security ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Short Term ◽  
State Legitimacy ◽  
Peace Agreements

The purpose of international conflict-resolution efforts is, in the short term, to bring an end to violent armed conflict, and, in the medium to longer term, to prevent the revival of conflict. However, at least one of the mechanisms often utilised in conflict resolution and peace agreements, power-sharing, may not only prove problematic in early negotiation and implementation, but may potentially be at odds with the longer-term goal of preventing resurgence of conflict. Why might this be the case? Longer-term peacebuilding seeks to prevent conflict in part by building strong and sustainable states. Such states should be able to avoid reverting to armed conflict because they would be more responsive to grievances and more effective in dealing with violent dissent. However, power-sharing arrangements may undermine such efforts by placing in power individuals and groups not fully committed to, or unable to take part in, governance for the benefit of the entire populace; in part because it necessarily places in power those who have engaged in significant violence to achieve their ends. This is likely to create less democratic states, although we do not insist that democracy is or should be the only goal of peacebuilders. Rather, we suggest that power-sharing arrangements may tend not only towards undemocratic states, but towards states which are not responsive to the needs of the citizenry for security in ways which may undermine human security and state legitimacy.

scholarly journals Children in Armed Conflict: A Human Rights Crisis in Somalia

Global Jurist ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Santino Jr. Fulo Regilme ◽  
Elisabetta Spoldi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Children's Rights ◽  
Children’S Rights ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
False Sense ◽  
Alternative Sources

Abstract Despite the consolidated body of public international law on children’s rights and armed conflict, why do armed rebel groups and state forces deploy children in armed conflict, particularly in Somalia? First, due to the lack of alternative sources of income and livelihood beyond armed conflict, children join the army due to coercive recruitment by commanders of armed groups. Their participation in armed conflict generates a fleeting and false sense of material security and belongingness in a group. Second, many Somali children were born in an environment of existential violence and material insecurity that normalized and routinized violence, thereby motivating them to view enlistment in armed conflict as morally permissible and necessary for existential survival.

scholarly journals Making and Keeping Promises: Regime Type and Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Agreements

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-204
Author(s):  
Anna Jarstad ◽  
Desirée Nilsson
Keyword(s):  
Power Sharing ◽  
Regime Type ◽  
Peace Agreements

scholarly journals Reputation, concessions, and territorial civil war

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (5) ◽  
pp. 671-686 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nils-Christian Bormann ◽  
Burcu Savun
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Territorial Disputes ◽  
Territorial Conflicts ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Future Demands ◽  
Reputation Building

Barbara Walter’s application of reputation theory to self-determination movements has advanced our understanding of why many separatist movements result in armed conflict. Walter has shown that governments of multi-ethnic societies often respond to territorial disputes with violence to deter similar future demands by other ethnic groups. When governments grant territorial accommodation to one ethnic group, they encourage other ethnic groups to seek similar concessions. However, a number of recent empirical studies casts doubt on the validity of Walter’s argument. We address recent challenges to the efficacy of reputation building in the context of territorial conflicts by delineating the precise scope conditions of reputation theory. First, we argue that only concessions granted after fighting should trigger additional conflict onsets. Second, the demonstration effects should particularly apply to groups with grievances against the state. We then test the observable implications of our conditional argument for political power-sharing concessions. Using a global sample of ethnic groups in 120 states between 1946 and 2013, we find support for our arguments. Our theoretical framework enables us to identify the conditions under which different types of governmental concessions are likely to trigger future conflicts, and thus has important implications for conflict resolution.

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