9. Swing to the right, 1977–1995

Author(s):  
Michael Stanislawski

Menachem Begin became prime minister of Israel on June 20, 1977, with a clear goal: to implement as quickly and as extensively as possible the policies of Revisionist Zionism as articulated by his mentor and hero, Vladimir Jabotinsky. “Swing to the right: 1977–1995” outlines the key events in Israeli politics that led to a decisive swing to the right in Zionist ideology, including the 1978 peace treaty with Egypt that returned the Sinai Peninsula, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements with the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1993, and the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 by a member of the ultra-right-wing religious Zionist movement.

2021 ◽  
pp. 194016122110226
Author(s):  
Ayala Panievsky

As populist campaigns against the media become increasingly common around the world, it is ever more urgent to explore how journalists adopt and respond to them. Which strategies have journalists developed to maintain the public's trust, and what may be the implications for democracy? These questions are addressed using a thematic analysis of forty-five semistructured interviews with leading Israeli journalists who have been publicly targeted by Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. The article suggests that while most interviewees asserted that adherence to objective reporting was the best response to antimedia populism, many of them have in fact applied a “strategic bias” to their reporting, intentionally leaning to the Right in an attempt to refute the accusations of media bias to the Left. This strategy was shaped by interviewees' perceived helplessness versus Israel's Prime Minister and his extensive use of social media, a phenomenon called here “the influence of presumed media impotence.” Finally, this article points at the potential ramifications of strategic bias for journalism and democracy. Drawing on Hallin's Spheres theory, it claims that the strategic bias might advance Right-wing populism at present, while also narrowing the sphere of legitimate controversy—thus further restricting press freedom—in the future.


Author(s):  
Laurențiu Ștefan

In Romania, a highly segmented and extremely volatile party system has contributed to a predominance of coalition governments. Alternation in power by coalitions led by either left-wing or right-wing parties used to be a major feature of Romanian governments. Thus, until a short-lived grand coalition in 2009, ideologically homogeneous coalitions were the general practice. Since then, parties from the right and left of the political spectrum have learned to work together in government. Given the semi-presidential nature of the political regime and the exclusive power to nominate the prime minister, the Romanian president plays an important role in coalition formation. The president also plays a pivotal role by shadowing the prime minister and therefore influencing the governance of coalitions. She has the power to veto ministerial appointments and therefore she can also shape the cabinet line-up. Pre-election coalitions are a common feature, more than two-thirds of Romanian coalition governments have been predicated on such agreements. Coalition agreements dealt with both policy issues and coalition decision-making bodies and the governance mechanisms that have been in most cases enforced and complied with—until the break-up of the coalition and the downfall of the respective government. One very common decision-making body is the Coalition Committee, which has been backed on the operational level by an inner cabinet made up of the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers, which usually are the heads of the junior coalition parties.


Subject Poland’s isolation over EU labour reform. Significance "They will not break us," Prime Minister Beata Szydlo said in a recent interview for a right-wing weekly. She was referring to Poland’s opposition to EU migration policy and more generally to a broader set of issues that divide the right-wing government in Warsaw from its EU partners. Szydlo's belligerent rhetoric plays well with domestic audiences but conceals Poland’s inability to build alliances and protect its interests. These weaknesses have become apparent during recent talks on reforming the EU’s Posted Workers Directive. Impacts New regulations may erode the competitive advantage of Polish firms that regularly post workers to western EU member states. The Polish budget would lose posted workers’ social insurance contributions, a loss estimated as worth up to 275 million dollars a month. Poland’s reputation as a regional spokesman for the interests of CEE member states may be undermined.


2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. E. WILMER

This article considers the uncanny action by three Slovenian artists in 2007 to rename themselves Janez Janša, the name of the right-wing prime minister of Slovenia. It assesses specific performances by the artists, including the Slovene National Theatre, a postdramatic verbatim piece about a Roma family evicted from their homes by Janša's government in response to the mob action of Slovenian villagers. It also interrogates their performance event for the Transmediale Festival at the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin in 2008, first banned and then reinstated by the festival organizers, where they created a virtual signature of their new name on the memorial. Theoretically, the importance of naming and renaming as practised by the artists is examined in relation to concepts of subversive affirmation, the author-function in society and postdramatic theatre.


Author(s):  
Robbie Sabel

The 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty stipulated that the boundary was the “[r]ecognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine.” A disagreement arose between the Egyptian and Israeli surveyors as to the correct location of parts of the mandatory border, however. Egypt claimed that Israel was refraining from complete withdrawal from Sinai, and therefore refused to normalize relations with Israel. The issue also became one of internal Israel politics, with the right wing led by Yitzhak Shamir taking a hard line on the issue and the left-wing Labour Movement led by Shimon Peres being more willing to compromise. Egypt’s claim relied on existing pillars, and Israel relied on the 1906 agreement between Britain, as the administrator of Egypt, and the Ottoman Empire, which ruled Palestine. The majority award of the Tribunal held that it would decide the location of the pillars “as it was demarcated, consolidated, and commonly understood during the period of the Mandate,” which was “the critical period.” As to the site advanced by Egypt, the Award admitted that “there is no evidence with respect to the erection of this pillar in 1907–07 nor with regard to its existence in the following years”; however, “throughout the critical period until a time after 1967 there was a boundary pillar at the location which during this whole period was considered to be a boundary pillar.” “Where the States concerned have, over a period of more than fifty years, identified a marker as a boundary pillar and acted upon that basis, it is no longer open to one of the parties or to third states to challenge that long held assumption on the basis of an alleged error.” “The principle of the stability of boundaries, requires that boundary markers, long accepted as such by the States concerned, should be respected and not open to challenge indefinitely on the basis of error.” The dissenting opinion of Ruth Lapidoth held that that “Egypt and Great Britain adopted the boundary line of the 1906 Agreement, without reference to any changes on the ground which may have occurred subsequent to that Agreement.” According to Lapidoth, “The majority erroneously attributes stability to boundary markers whereas the principle of stability and permanence applies not to markers but to boundaries lawfully established and recognized.” Since the arbitrators were not authorized to choose a location for a pillar not advanced by the parties, the final pillar on the seashore was not determined and, after the arbitration was concluded, the parties negotiated its location.


2020 ◽  
pp. 019251212094891
Author(s):  
Anna Gwiazda

This article disentangles the complexity of right-wing populism and feminist politics using an original framework based on inputs (representative claims) and outputs (policies) to examine a Polish case. In 2015, the right-wing populist Law and Justice party (PiS) formed a single-party majority government led by a female prime minister after winning the elections. PiS is ideologically conservative, promotes traditional and national values and is supported by the Catholic Church. Additionally, it is hostile towards what it calls ‘gender-ideology’ and is reluctant to implement feminist policies. This article also reveals that PiS represents conservative women’s interests and advocates an aspect of conservative feminism, therefore possessing a duality in its claims and policies. Overall, this article draws inferences about the nexus between social conservatism, populism and feminism, and thus seeks to contribute to the scholarly literature by examining a timely issue against the backdrop of rising populism, illiberalism and anti-gender campaigns.


Significance One of the front-runners to replace Mattarella is Prime Minister Mario Draghi, who recently gave a strong indication that he intends to run. However, if Draghi is elected president, there does not appear to be an alternative government which could guarantee political stability and make progress on Italy’s crucial reform agenda. Impacts A situation where there is no strong alternative to Draghi’s leadership may boost the electoral appeal of the far-right Brothers of Italy. The return of political instability would diminish Italy’s leverage in the EU regarding important issues such as foreign and fiscal policy. Unless the right-wing parties perform poorly, it is unlikely that Draghi would be elected as prime minister after the next election.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-60
Author(s):  
Yechiam Weitz

This article examines the major changes in the Israeli political arena, on both the left and right, in the two years before the 1967 War. The shift was marked by the establishment in 1965 of the right-wing Gahal (the Herut-Liberal bloc) and of the Labor Alignment, the semi-merger of Israel’s two main left-wing parties, Mapai and Ahdut HaAvodah. Some dissatisfied Mapai members broke away from the Alignment and formed a new party, Rafi, under the leadership of David Ben-Gurion. They did not gain nearly enough Knesset seats to take power in the November 1965 election, but Rafi did become part of the emergency national unity government that was formed in June 1967, due largely to the weak position of Levi Eshkol as prime minister. This enabled Rafi’s Moshe Dayan to assume the minister of defense position on the eve of the Six-Day War, which began on 5 June 1967.


1983 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentine J. Belfiglio

There is a cancer in the body politic of South Africa that may not be cured in the foreseeable future but cannot be ignored. The Prime Minister, Pieter Willem Botha, is currently attempting to again support for a modified form of apartheid or multinational development. More land and resources must be assigned to Blacks, and a great deal more capital and recurrent funds must be spent if the Homelands are to be built up and made viable and attractive. Meanwhile, some concessions to Indians and Coloureds are being made to get them to acquiesce to a modified system of government and administration. They have not, however, satisfied Blacks, who want nothing less than majority rule, and the constitutional changes are strongly opposed by the right-wing faction of the ruling National Party. This short article will review prevailing attitudes and recommendations concerning current developments in South Africa, and then offer a possible solution to the seemingly insolvable dilemma.


Significance This has put Salvini under pressure, though it has not weakened his support for Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s government of national unity. Support for Draghi suggests the League is becoming a more moderate party, which could help FdI consolidate support on the far right ahead of the next election, currently scheduled for 2023. Impacts The prospects of an amalgamation between the League and Forza Italia are strong, and would boost the former’s centrist credentials. While Five Star Movement support for Draghi is unreliable, its MPs do not want a general election as many of them would lose their seats. An unforeseen crisis, such as an uncontrollable wave of illegal migrants, would play into the hands of the right-wing parties.


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