Vertical Fiscal Externalities and Federal Tax-Transfers under Variable Factor Supplies

Author(s):  
Nikos Tsakiris ◽  
Panos Hatzipanayotou ◽  
Michael S Michael

Abstract Within a model of variable supply of capital due to international mobility and variable labor supply due to endogenous labor-leisure choice, we revisit the issues of vertical fiscal externalities, and of federal tax-transfers. Capital and labor taxes by federal and state governments finance the provision of federal and of state public consumption goods. When capital and labor are substitutes in production, we show that (i) the state’s optimal policy calls for capital and labor taxes, (ii) the vertical fiscal externality can be reversed from negative, implying inefficiently high noncooperative capital taxes, to positive, implying inefficiently low noncooperative capital taxes, and (iii) under centralized leadership the federal government replicates the second best optimum with a capital tax, and possibly, top-down transfers. (JEL codes: F18, F21, H21).

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-262
Author(s):  
Braham Dabscheck

This review article discusses MacLean’s study of the ideas of a group of economists and their embracing by an oligarchy of business groups to implement a Neoliberal agenda and its implications for American democracy. It mainly focuses on the Nobel Prize winning economist James McGill Buchanan and the industrialist Charles Koch. Business groups provided funds to Buchanan and others to train right-minded people in the precepts of Neoliberalism, established think tanks and institutes to disseminate their views, and ‘directed’ and/or provided advice and draft legislation for Republican politicians at both the state and federal level. Inspiration for how to achieve this Neoliberal ‘revolution’ can be found in Lenin’s 1902 What is to be Done?. The Neoliberal attack on government and statism is consistent with Orwell’s notion of doublethink. It constitutes a weakening of those parts of the state which are inimical to the interests of a wealthy oligarchy, the federal government and agencies/government departments who are viewed as imposing costs (taxes) on and interfering with (regulating) the actions of the oligarchy, and strengthening other parts such as state governments, the judiciary, at both the state (especially) and federal level and police forces to protect and advance their interests. JEL codes: B10, B22


2021 ◽  
pp. 002218562110082
Author(s):  
Eugene Schofield-Georgeson

In 2020, the Federal Morrison Liberal Government scrambled to respond to the effects of the international coronavirus pandemic on the Australian labour market in two key ways. First, through largescale social welfare and economic stimulus (the ‘JobKeeper’ scheme) and second, through significant proposed reform to employment laws as part of a pandemic recovery package (the ‘Omnibus Bill’). Where the first measure was administered by employers, the second was largely designed to suspend and/or redefine labour protections in the interests of employers. In this respect, the message from the Federal Government was clear: that the costs of pandemic recovery should be borne by workers at the discretion of employers. State Labor Governments, by contrast, enacted a range of industrial protections. These included the first Australia ‘wage theft’ or underpayment frameworks on behalf of both employees and contractors in the construction industry. On-trend with state industrial legislation over the past 4 years, these state governments continued to introduce industrial manslaughter offences, increased access to workers’ compensation, labour hire licensing schemes and portable long service leave.


1981 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 853-866 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Timberlake

This paper uses numismatic sources to estimate the volume of unaccounted currency issued during the middle two quarters of the nineteenth century. “Unaccounted currency” includes any currency issued by private business firms and by municipal and state governments. This money, unlike state bank notes and deposits and federal government currencies, was issued illegally, and not recorded in conventional statistical sources. Exact quantification, therefore, is next to impossible. The principal significance of this phenomenon is the credibility it gives to private competitive issues of money.


1980 ◽  
Vol 2 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 108-109
Author(s):  
Mark Kesselman

Acentral ingredient of democracy in the United States, according to Tocqueville, was local autonomy – yet the data presented by Professor Austin suggests a fundamental change in the United States since Tocquevilles time. Most local expenditures are now provided by the federal and state governments, most “local” programs are not local at all, for many (if not most) purposes the local government has become an extension of the federal government, and it is often replaced altogether by federally created field agencies (what the French call deconcentrated administration).


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Max M. Edling

In recent years a new Unionist interpretation of the American founding has presented the US Constitution as a compact of union between sovereign states, which allowed them to maintain interstate peace and to act in unison as a single nation vis-à-vis other nations in the international state-system. Such an understanding of the American founding argues that the Constitution created a bisected American state divided into a federal government in charge of international and intraunion affairs and state governments in charge of promoting socioeconomic development and maintaining civic rights. The introduction provides an overview of different interpretations of the founding and of the structure of the book.


Author(s):  
Jonathan P. Caulkins ◽  
Beau Kilmer ◽  
Mark A.R. Kleiman

Can a state legalize something that the federal government prohibits? The states retain a degree of sovereignty; the Constitution does not allow the federal government to order state governments to create any particular laws or to require state and local police to enforce federal...


Author(s):  
R. Kelso

Australia is a nation of 20 million citizens occupying approximately the same land mass as the continental U.S. More than 80% of the population lives in the state capitals where the majority of state and federal government offices and employees are based. The heavily populated areas on the Eastern seaboard, including all of the six state capitals have advanced ICT capability and infrastructure and Australians readily adopt new technologies. However, there is recognition of a digital divide which corresponds with the “great dividing” mountain range separating the sparsely populated arid interior from the populated coastal regions (Trebeck, 2000). A common theme in political commentary is that Australians are “over-governed” with three levels of government, federal, state, and local. Many of the citizens living in isolated regions would say “over-governed” and “underserviced.” Most of the state and local governments, “… have experienced difficulties in managing the relative dis-economies of scale associated with their small and often scattered populations.” Rural and isolated regions are the first to suffer cutbacks in government services in periods of economic stringency. (O’Faircheallaigh, Wanna, & Weller, 1999, p. 98). Australia has, in addition to the Commonwealth government in Canberra, two territory governments, six state governments, and about 700 local governments. All three levels of government, federal, state, and local, have employed ICTs to address the “tyranny of distance” (Blainey, 1967), a term modified and used for nearly 40 years to describe the isolation and disadvantage experienced by residents in remote and regional Australia. While the three levels of Australian governments have been working co-operatively since federation in 1901 with the federal government progressively increasing its power over that time, their agencies and departments generally maintain high levels of separation; the Queensland Government Agent Program is the exception.


Author(s):  
D. F. Norris

During the past 10 years or so, governments in the United States have rushed to adopt and implement electronic government or e-government (defined as the electronic delivery of governmental information and services 24 hours per day, seven days per week, see Norris, Fletcher, & Holden, 2001). Today, the federal government, all 50 state governments (and probably all departments within them), and the great majority of general purpose local governments of any size have official presences on the World Wide Web through which they deliver information and services and, increasingly, offer transactions. In this article, I examine the current state of the practice of e-government at the grassroots in the U.S.—that is, e-government among American local governments. In particular, I address the extent of local adoption of e-government, including the reasons for adoption, the relative sophistication of local e-government, and barriers to and initial impacts of e-government.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markie McBrayer ◽  
Patrick E. Shea ◽  
Justin H. Kirkland

AbstractThis study examines why credit rating agencies offered optimistic assessments of some US states during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Focusing on the creditworthiness of state governments, we argue that because states are procyclic spenders, growth in a state’s economy is actually harmful to that state’s ability to maintain its fiscal promises. As the federal government spends more heavily in a state, however, the procyclic tendencies of that state matter less to credit raters, and the negative effects of growth in a state’s economy diminish. We test our theory in two ways. We first model the Great Recession as an intervention, finding that states receiving less money from the federal government are more likely to experience increases in their credit scores following the crisis. We then test whether this pattern holds outside of the financial crisis for the years 1990–2006. We observe that increases in gross state product are negatively correlated with credit ratings when there are little to no changes in federal dollars flowing into a state.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 380-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Lewis

The United States has a complex patchwork of mineral ownership, where rights to oil and gas may be owned by the federal government, state governments, or private agents. I show why the policies imposed by one owner have theoretically ambiguous spillover effects on the drilling and production outcomes of neighboring plots of land. Exploiting a natural experiment in Wyoming with exogenous ownership assignment, I find significant spillovers: federal land close to state land has a lower probability of drilling than federal land far from state land. (JEL H82, L71, P14,Q35, Q38)


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