The pushback against state interference in science: how Lysenkoism tried to suppress Genetics and how it was eventually defeated

Genetics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasily V Ptushenko

Abstract Genetics in the Soviet Union (USSR) achieved state-of-the-art results and had reached a peak of development by the mid-1930s due to the efforts of the scientific schools of several major figures, including Sergei Navashin, Nikolai Koltsov, Grigorii Levitsky, Yuri Filipchenko, Nikolai Vavilov, and Solomon Levit. Unfortunately, the Soviet government distrusted intellectually independent science and this led to state support for a fraudulent pseudoscientific concept widely known as Lysenkoism, which hugely damaged biology as a whole. Decades of dominance of the Lysenkoism had ruinous effects and the revival of biology in the USSR in the late 1950s–early 1960s was very difficult. In fact, this was realized to be a problem for Soviet science as a whole, and many mathematicians, physicists, chemists, and other scientists made efforts to rehabilitate genetics and to transfer biology to the “jurisdiction” of science from that of politics. The key events in the history of these attempts to pushback against state interference in science, and to promote the development of genetics and molecular biology, are described in this paper. These efforts included supportive letters to the authorities (e.g., the famous “Letter of three hundred”), (re)publishing articles and giving lectures on “forbidden” science, and organizing laboratories and departments for research in genetics and molecular biology under the cover of nuclear physics or of other projects respected by the government and Communist party leaders. The result was that major figures in the hard sciences played a major part in the revival of genetics and biology in the USSR.

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019/1 ◽  
pp. 127-144
Author(s):  
Vladas Sirutavičius

decided to re-establish the tradition of song festivals and organize the first such festival in 1946; and to what extent the implementation of the said idea was successful. Analysis of the history of the first Soviet song festival and circumstances surrounding the preparation for the event is based on the little known or practically unknown documents kept in the archives of Lithuania and the Russian Federation. The government of Lithuania viewed the organization of the “first Soviet song festival” as a possibility to demonstrate its concern with Lithuanian folk culture, its development, and promotion. This kind of policy was intended to strengthen the legitimacy of the Soviet government and make it seem more “Lithuanian”. The fact that Lithuanian folk culture helped spread the new Soviet ideology also cannot be ignored. The song festival was not only amply decorated with Soviet symbols, attempts were made to couple the attributes of the Soviet culture with the values of folk culture. On the other hand, organizing the festival the leadership of Soviet Lithuania wanted to show that the Soviet political regime can be in “harmony” with Lithuanian ethno-culture and the new government was a natural successor of former ethnic traditions. However, alone, without the approval of the Lithuanian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the support from Moscow, the government of Lithuania was unable to organize the festival. This suggests that the leadership of the Soviet Union was rather tolerant to the manifestations of “national Communism” not only in the countries of Central Europe that fell under Moscow’s influence but also in Lithuanian SSR. Besides, the decision to organize the festival in Vilnius was not a random one. Crowds of singers that came to the city from all around Lithuania changed its national composition – Vilnius for once became more Lithuanian. This not only demonstrated the government’s aspiration to show off its “Lithuanian” nature but also its ambition to make Vilnius the centre of Lithuanian (Soviet) culture. Finally, the government of LSSR was satisfied with the organization and course of the festival and believed that it managed to achieve its goals and objectives. Probably the success of the first Soviet song festival resulted in them being organized periodically.


Author(s):  
Ekaterina Leonidovna Timshina

The dissolution of the Soviet Union is one of the key events in the history of Russia. The USSR ceased to exist, which prompted the beginning of the history of modern Russia. The political parties of the Russian Federation have formed the own historical memory of the event, as well as offered the original approaches towards the collapse of the USSR. The author analyzes the perspective of modern parties on the crisis of the Soviet model, their attitude towards the dissolution of the USSR, as well as assessment of the historical figures of that period. The official documents of the most popular political parties, as well as speeches and publications of their leaders served as the sources for this research. Although all political parties perceive the collapse of the Soviet Union as a tragic event that could have been avoided, there are different opinions on the causes. The three groups of factors that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union are determined: economic problems; administrative crisis due to political errors of the government; and international conspiracy. The communist organizations mostly adhere to the latter one. The historical politics of the parties is dominated by an extremely critical attitude towards the central historical figures of the Soviet era. The members of the State Emergency Committee receive limited support in the historical narratives of the Communist Party, and such is given to the President of the USSR in liberal publications. The parties drew parallels between the present time and the period of Perestroika. The conclusion is made on the need to overcome (or prevent) the gap between the government and society, keep confidence of the citizens in the government in order to avoid the recurrence of devastating events.


Inner Asia ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Brophy

AbstractUp till now, the problem of Uyghur identity construction has been studied from an almost exclusively anthropological perspective. Little Western research has been done on the history of the Uyghur community in the Soviet Union during the period of national delimitation, and the process by which a re-invented ‘Uyghur’ identity was fostered among settled Turkicspeakers of East Turkestani origin. In this paper I have set out to trace some of the key events and debates which formed part of that process. In doing so I provide evidence that challenges certain aspects of the standard account of this period, in particular the role of the 1921 Tashkent conference. In 1921 the term ‘Uyghur’ was not used an ethnic designation, but as an umbrella term for various peoples with family roots in Eastern Turkestan. It was not until several years later that the term took its place beside other ethnonyms in the Soviet Union, provoking debate and opposition in the Soviet Uyghur press. This paper is largely based on the recently republished writings of leading Uyghur activists and journalists from the 1920s, and focuses on the role of the Uyghur Communist Abdulla Rozibaqiev. My paper attempts to demonstrate the importance of basing the study of Uyghur history on Uyghur language sources, rather than Russian or Chinese materials alone.


1963 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-364
Author(s):  
John Day ◽  
Frank Bealey ◽  
Justin Grossman ◽  
Allen Potter ◽  
Edgar Thomas ◽  
...  

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Margolin

In late 1939, USSR in Construction, the Soviet propaganda magazine, published a special issue on the Stalin Collective Farm in the Ukraine. The inside front cover of the magazine contained an anonymous paean to socialist farming, attributing its success to the foresight and support of Joseph Stalin, the nation's leader. On the page flanking the euphoric opening text was a near full-page portrait of Comrade Stalin composed of multi-hued grains including millet, alfalfa, and poppy. Grain, or the absence thereof, was fundamental to the development of collective farms in the Soviet Union. By early 1929, government pressure to form large state-run farms had increased and Stalin declared war on the kulaks, or rich peasants. The kulaks responded by killing their livestock, destroying their crops, and demolishing their homesteads. Nonetheless, collectivization, backed by the Party apparatus, continued relentlessly. Needless to say, none of the resistance to collectivized agriculture was evident in USSR in Construction's depiction of life on the Stalin Collective Farm. At the end of the issue, the apparent happiness and prosperity of the workers were attributed to the virtues of socialism. In the later 1930s, with the inauguration of Stalin's "cult of personality," the nation was consistently equated with Stalin himself, hence the choice of his profile for the composite grain portrait. The seamlessness with which a multitude of grains could become a composite portrait of the nation's leader shows how successfully the Soviet government was able to rewrite the history of agricultural collectivization. The pain, loss, and resistance of the small landowners was successfully obliterated and replaced by a new narrative in which collective farm workers prospered and found happiness within a political system that was now synonymous with the beneficence of a single individual, Joseph Stalin.


2021 ◽  
pp. 213-239
Author(s):  
Aleksander Głogowski

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MILITARY AND CIVIL UNDERGROUND IN THE VILNIUS REGION IN 1939-1941 The first years of the occupation of the Vilnius Region were an unusual period in terms of the history of the Polish Underground State and the Polish armed resistance movement. This area was occupied after September 17, 1939 by the Soviet Union, but part of it was transferred to the Republic of Lithuania, along with which it was re-incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Lithuanian occupation was a considerable challenge both for the Polish authorities in exile and for the inhabitants of the Vilnius Region. Meeting such a challenge required certain diplomatic talents (not to worsen the situation of Poles living in this area) as well as knowledge of the relations in the area, which was a problem for the Polish authorities in France, and especially in Great Britain. The Polish inhabitants of the Vilnius Region considered the legal status of their land to be illegal occupation, while the Lithuanians claimed that thanks to a new agreement with the USSR, the period of occupation of these lands by Poles ended. These opinions, together with the mutual resentments and stereotypes flourishing for nearly 20 years, made the peaceful coexistence of two nations difficult, or even impossible. The government of the Republic of Poland tried to prevent the attempts to start an anti-Lithuanian uprising, not wanting to provoke the other two occupiers into military intervention. To this stage, it sought an intermediate solution between the abandonment of any conspiracy (which carried the threat of forming armed groups beyond the control of the legal Polish authorities) and its development on a scale known, for example, from the German or Soviet occupation. The Vilnius Region was to become the personnel and organisational base for the latter. The dilemma was resolved without Polish participation at the time of the annexation of the Republic of Lithuania by the Soviets. Then the second period of the Soviet occupation began, characterised by much greater brutality than the first one, with mass arrests, executions and deportations. The policy of repression primarily affected the pre-war military staff and their families, who were the natural base for the resistance movement of the intelligentsia. Fortunately, this process ended at the time of the German aggression against the USSR. Those that survived the period of the “second Soviet invasion” could in the new conditions continue their underground activities and prepare for an armed uprising in the circumstances and in the manner indicated by the Home Army Headquarters and the Polish Government in London.


1995 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 476-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Grant

The term totalitarian has often been used by scholars to characterize the Soviet Union's system of government, and in many studies the emphasis has fallen on assessing the degree of effectiveness of the ruling apparatus in exercising its total control over society. Whatever the actual condition of public life in the Soviet Union (USSR), a desire to use the totalitarian system undeniably existed; and regardless of the degree to which people were able to retain an autonomous private sphere, their lives were shaped by this urge to total control. The best examples of this come not from the realm of high politics but of mundane personal practices such as the pursuit of hobbies. During the period from 1921 to 1939, the Soviet government redefined the hobby of stamp collecting, socially reconstructing it in terms of the regime's values. In the process, the Soviet regime demonstrated its totalitarian goal in ways that had ramifications in everyday life, as can be seen in the state's relations with the philatelists and in the realm of hobbies. The fact that the government strictly controlled and circumscribed something as seemingly innocuous and insignificant as stamp collecting reveals how strongly the state aspired to have total control of society. More important, this urge sprang not from the top of the Soviet apparatus but, rather, from mid-level officials.


1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 212-213 ◽  

On September 23, 1955, Pakistan announced its formal adherence to the alliance formed on February 24 by Iraqand Turkey, and adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5 (Baghdad Pact). On October 11, the government of Iran announced its intention to adhere to the Pact; following parliamentary approval of the decision, Iran formallyadhered on November 3. Both before and after Iran's formal adherence to the Pact, the Soviet Union, according to press reports, protested strongly. In a note of October 12, the Soviet government declared that the accession of Iran was incompatible with the interests of consolidating peace and security in the near and middle east, and contradicted certain treaty obligations of Iran with respect to the Soviet Union. In a subsequent note, the Soviet Union repeated its protest, alleging that Iran's adherence to the Pact “inflicted serious damage” to relations between Iran and the Soviet Union, and that Iran would have to bear the full consequencesof joining. In a reply to the earlier Soviet note, Iran had declared that its object in adhering to the Pactwas the consolidation of peace and security in the middle east; the Pact was for defensive purposes, and Iran'sadherence should not mar Iranian-Soviet friendly relations, nor did it conflict with the terms of existing agreements between Iran and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, both the United States and United Kingdom had formally welcomed Iran's decision.


Author(s):  
Simon Miles

In a narrative-redefining approach, this book dramatically alters how we look at the beginning of the end of the Cold War. Tracking key events in US–Soviet relations across the years between 1980 and 1985, the book shows that covert engagement gave way to overt conversation as both superpowers determined that open diplomacy was the best means of furthering their own, primarily competitive, goals. The book details the history of these dramatic years, as President Ronald Reagan consistently applied a disciplined carrot-and-stick approach, reaching out to Moscow while at the same time excoriating the Soviet system and building up US military capabilities. The received wisdom in diplomatic circles is that the beginning of the end of the Cold War came from changing policy preferences and that President Reagan, in particular, opted for a more conciliatory and less bellicose diplomatic approach. In reality, the book demonstrates, Reagan and ranking officials in the National Security Council had determined that the United States enjoyed a strategic margin of error that permitted it to engage Moscow overtly. As US grand strategy developed, so did that of the Soviet Union. This book covers five critical years of Cold War history when Soviet leaders tried to reduce tensions between the two nations in order to gain economic breathing room and, to ensure domestic political stability, prioritize expenditures on butter over those on guns. The book shifts the focus of Cold War historians away from exclusive attention on Washington by focusing on the years of back-channel communiqués and internal strategy debates in Moscow as well as Prague and East Berlin.


1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 584-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel H. Lew

In its reply to the identical notes sent by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on February 9, 1946, to the Chinese and Soviet Governments concerning the disposition of Japanese external assets, the Government of China stated that the claim of the Soviet Government “that all Japanese enterprises in the Chinese Northeastern Provinces which had rendered services to the Japanese Army were regarded by the Soviet Union as war booty of Soviet forces” is considered by the Chinese Government “as far exceeding the scope of war booty as generally recognized by international law and international usage.”


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