The Socialist Construction of Philately in the Early Soviet Era

1995 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 476-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Grant

The term totalitarian has often been used by scholars to characterize the Soviet Union's system of government, and in many studies the emphasis has fallen on assessing the degree of effectiveness of the ruling apparatus in exercising its total control over society. Whatever the actual condition of public life in the Soviet Union (USSR), a desire to use the totalitarian system undeniably existed; and regardless of the degree to which people were able to retain an autonomous private sphere, their lives were shaped by this urge to total control. The best examples of this come not from the realm of high politics but of mundane personal practices such as the pursuit of hobbies. During the period from 1921 to 1939, the Soviet government redefined the hobby of stamp collecting, socially reconstructing it in terms of the regime's values. In the process, the Soviet regime demonstrated its totalitarian goal in ways that had ramifications in everyday life, as can be seen in the state's relations with the philatelists and in the realm of hobbies. The fact that the government strictly controlled and circumscribed something as seemingly innocuous and insignificant as stamp collecting reveals how strongly the state aspired to have total control of society. More important, this urge sprang not from the top of the Soviet apparatus but, rather, from mid-level officials.

2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 36-48
Author(s):  
Y. Nisnevich

Today, corruption remains a challenge for most post-socialist states. Unfortunately, this social pandemic was by and large inherited by these countries from the Soviet regime. A lot of representatives of that regime, who actually were the instigators of corrupt practices while governing a state, managed to keep their posts in power even after the regime change. In this way the representatives of the old regime facilitated further spread of corrupt practices in new governments. The research, conducted in cooperation with Professor Peter Rozic (USA), indicates an interesting phenomenon: lustration (in other words, the purge of government officials once affiliated with the Communist system) is indeed an effective mechanism to do away with corrupt legacy of a previous government. In the majority of post-socialist states (except for Albania and Bulgaria), where lustration was carried out in one form or another, we can observe a cleanup of the Soviet times instigators' corrupt practices in public authorities. Interestingly enough, nowadays, the corruption situation in these countries is considerably better than in those were lustration was not conducted. However, it is worth noting that lustration per se is not the panacea for corruption, but it does help to create a fertile ground and serves as a springboard for further anti-corruption measures and reforms. Yet what we see in Slovenia is, in fact, an obvious deviation from this pattern. Lustration was not carried out here. Nonetheless, the country is among the best anti-corruption performers and can be compared with Estonia, where lustration took place. Today, Estonia is ranked by Transparency International’s CPI as a top performer among all other post-Soviet and post-socialist states. We, therefore, decided to look deeper into Slovenian anti-corruption efforts made by the new democratic government after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and to understand the reasons underlying its success in this field. Our research findings indicate that the first factor, which sets this situation apart, was filtering out the government authorities that could bring corrupt relationships or practices of the old Soviet regime, and replacing them with representatives of the nationally-oriented elites. This kind of purge, supposedly complemented by the factor of a small territorial and demographic size, created the advantageous conditions for corruption to be contained right from the start before it would become widespread. The second factor was following the GRECO recommendations to take institutional and legal anti-corruption measures during the process of accession to the European Union. Another defining characteristic of Slovenia is a relatively high quality of the political and good governance principles implementation inherent to the polyarchic democracy, which allows for corruption to be dealt with and kept at low levels through constant civil checks and balances over decisions and actions of authorities.


1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 212-213 ◽  

On September 23, 1955, Pakistan announced its formal adherence to the alliance formed on February 24 by Iraqand Turkey, and adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5 (Baghdad Pact). On October 11, the government of Iran announced its intention to adhere to the Pact; following parliamentary approval of the decision, Iran formallyadhered on November 3. Both before and after Iran's formal adherence to the Pact, the Soviet Union, according to press reports, protested strongly. In a note of October 12, the Soviet government declared that the accession of Iran was incompatible with the interests of consolidating peace and security in the near and middle east, and contradicted certain treaty obligations of Iran with respect to the Soviet Union. In a subsequent note, the Soviet Union repeated its protest, alleging that Iran's adherence to the Pact “inflicted serious damage” to relations between Iran and the Soviet Union, and that Iran would have to bear the full consequencesof joining. In a reply to the earlier Soviet note, Iran had declared that its object in adhering to the Pactwas the consolidation of peace and security in the middle east; the Pact was for defensive purposes, and Iran'sadherence should not mar Iranian-Soviet friendly relations, nor did it conflict with the terms of existing agreements between Iran and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, both the United States and United Kingdom had formally welcomed Iran's decision.


1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 584-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel H. Lew

In its reply to the identical notes sent by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on February 9, 1946, to the Chinese and Soviet Governments concerning the disposition of Japanese external assets, the Government of China stated that the claim of the Soviet Government “that all Japanese enterprises in the Chinese Northeastern Provinces which had rendered services to the Japanese Army were regarded by the Soviet Union as war booty of Soviet forces” is considered by the Chinese Government “as far exceeding the scope of war booty as generally recognized by international law and international usage.”


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 322-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodor Meron

An “exclusive preserve” of a state in the UN Secretariat is a post that is continuously filled by nationals of the same state. Virtually from the founding of the United Nations, the Secretariat has observed an “unofficial” practice of exclusive preserves for many senior posts held by nationals of several influential states, including the United States; but its most persistent advocate, and with regard to a particularly wide range of posts, has been the Soviet Union. In view of the past underrepresentation of Soviet nationals in the Secretariat, largely because the Soviet Government insisted that its nationals be recruited only on fixed-term contracts based on secondment from the Government and Soviet institutions, a considerable number of posts were set aside to be filled on a replacement basis. The occupants of those posts were selected by the Secretary-General from a very short list of candidates submitted by the Soviet Government. The object of this Editorial is to assess the impact of the new Soviet policy toward the UN Secretariat, recent General Assembly resolutions and the jurisprudence of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal on the practice of exclusive preserves.


2021 ◽  
pp. 100-126
Author(s):  
Aleksandr V. Zaytsev

The journal Slavyane was created by the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as an organ of internal and external political propaganda aimed at Russian-speaking Slavs. It reflected the pullback of Soviet foreign policy from proletarian internationalism. The policy of its editorial board towards Yugoslavia repeated the one of the Party, but sensitive subjects were avoided or covered with a delay on the pages of the journal. Josip Broz Tito as spokesman for the aspirations of Yugoslav peoples was extolle since 1943 while D. Mihajlović’s activities had not been covered until his condemnation in October 1943. The journal supported the government of the People’s Federative Republic of Yugoslavia until early 1948, condemned it since late 1949 to early 1953, kept silence on Yugoslavia for several months in 1948–1949, 1953–1954, 1956, 1957 and 1958. Each time such deliberate silence had been caused by the aggravation or, on the contrary, by attempts to break ice in relations between the Soviet Union and People’s Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) / the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia / the Union of Yugoslavian Communists. The only exception from the rule seems to be Issue 5/1953 of the journal which contains anti-Tito insults but they may be due to struggle on top of the Soviet government. Overall, the policy of the editorial board was marked by more caution and desire to cover up problems than the policy of Party newspapers.


Author(s):  
Olesia Rozovyk

The article, based on little-known sources, deals with the process of forming the policy of the Soviet government to solve such a problem as agrarian overpopulation of the USSR. The article presents data on overpopulation in some districts of the Ukrainian SSR, such as Kyiv, Chernihiv and Volyn districts, where such a phenomenon as scarcity of land and low-yielding soils was presented. An Emergency Resettlement Commission was established within the People’s Commissariat of Land Affairs by the decision of the Council of People’ Commissars (CPC). This Commission solved all issues related to the resettlement of peasants within the republic and abroad. Similar commissions were also formed in all provincial and county centers of the Ukrainian SSR. These commissions began active work on the registration of landless peasants and the search for vacant lands, primarily in the republic for their resettlement, beginning in the spring of 1921. Commissions were also carried out with the All-Russian (later All-Union) Resettlement Commission on the provision of land in uninhabited areas of the RSFSR, such as the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Far East, Kuban, Stavropol, North Caucasus to the settlers from Ukraine. In February 1923, the CPC of the Ukrainian SSR took measures to ensure the planned resettlement of the rural population of the republic in Ukraine and abroad. In the autumn of 1923, the VIII All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets approved the main directions of resettlement policy in the republic. It was reduced to the following measures: first – the resettlement of Ukrainians in the free lands of the Ukrainian SSR; second – resettlement, first of all, of the poor population, which included assistance in farming; third – the resettlement of part of the population from rural areas to cities; fourth – the resettlement of small peasant families in the All-Union Colonization Fund in the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Far East. In April 1924, CPC of the Soviet Union, supporting the resettlement movement, adopted a resolution “On the benefits of migrants”. It determined the level of material assistance to the families who settled in new lands. Thus, during 1921–1925, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the CPC of the Ukrainian SSR developed a program of resettlement of the Ukrainian population within its ethnic lands and the Union Colonization Fund. This was the first five-year cycle of resettlement policy of the government of the USSR, and in 1926 a new resettlement program was approved, designed first for seven and then for ten years.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019/1 ◽  
pp. 127-144
Author(s):  
Vladas Sirutavičius

decided to re-establish the tradition of song festivals and organize the first such festival in 1946; and to what extent the implementation of the said idea was successful. Analysis of the history of the first Soviet song festival and circumstances surrounding the preparation for the event is based on the little known or practically unknown documents kept in the archives of Lithuania and the Russian Federation. The government of Lithuania viewed the organization of the “first Soviet song festival” as a possibility to demonstrate its concern with Lithuanian folk culture, its development, and promotion. This kind of policy was intended to strengthen the legitimacy of the Soviet government and make it seem more “Lithuanian”. The fact that Lithuanian folk culture helped spread the new Soviet ideology also cannot be ignored. The song festival was not only amply decorated with Soviet symbols, attempts were made to couple the attributes of the Soviet culture with the values of folk culture. On the other hand, organizing the festival the leadership of Soviet Lithuania wanted to show that the Soviet political regime can be in “harmony” with Lithuanian ethno-culture and the new government was a natural successor of former ethnic traditions. However, alone, without the approval of the Lithuanian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the support from Moscow, the government of Lithuania was unable to organize the festival. This suggests that the leadership of the Soviet Union was rather tolerant to the manifestations of “national Communism” not only in the countries of Central Europe that fell under Moscow’s influence but also in Lithuanian SSR. Besides, the decision to organize the festival in Vilnius was not a random one. Crowds of singers that came to the city from all around Lithuania changed its national composition – Vilnius for once became more Lithuanian. This not only demonstrated the government’s aspiration to show off its “Lithuanian” nature but also its ambition to make Vilnius the centre of Lithuanian (Soviet) culture. Finally, the government of LSSR was satisfied with the organization and course of the festival and believed that it managed to achieve its goals and objectives. Probably the success of the first Soviet song festival resulted in them being organized periodically.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3/2) ◽  
pp. 161-174
Author(s):  
G. S. SHIROKALOVA

The article investigates the reasons for rejection of patriotism during  the preparation and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Among  them we distinguish the material and other possibilities of so-called  “offshore aristocracy” for the management of public opinion in order  to maintain their status through the destruction of sacred  relationship to the history and the state, which was inherent to the  Soviet mentality. The loss of spiritual base could lead to the  destruction of the Russian Federation according to the scenario of  the Soviet Union, that’s why the government - unable to find a new  national idea – had to appeal to the people’s exploit during the Great Patriotic War as a manifestation of the highest level of patriotism.  Since the beginning of the 2000`s, patriotic education becomes the  direction of public policy. Its effectiveness can be measured through  the empirically observable indicators of attitude to historical events  and modernity. The author believes that the historical memory is a  necessary, but insufficient condition for the patriotism formation. Patriotism of everyday life is the feature that brings social  stability to the state. The article presents the data of  sociological research of the youth’s attitudes to the Great Patriotic  War, which was conducted in Nizhniy Novgorod in 2015. The author  comes to the conclusion that as a result of wide-ranging preparation  to 70th anniversary of the Victory, the historical memory was  actualized. However, the question remains how long it will be  possible to maintain the historical identity in the face of increasing social and economic crisis.


Genetics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasily V Ptushenko

Abstract Genetics in the Soviet Union (USSR) achieved state-of-the-art results and had reached a peak of development by the mid-1930s due to the efforts of the scientific schools of several major figures, including Sergei Navashin, Nikolai Koltsov, Grigorii Levitsky, Yuri Filipchenko, Nikolai Vavilov, and Solomon Levit. Unfortunately, the Soviet government distrusted intellectually independent science and this led to state support for a fraudulent pseudoscientific concept widely known as Lysenkoism, which hugely damaged biology as a whole. Decades of dominance of the Lysenkoism had ruinous effects and the revival of biology in the USSR in the late 1950s–early 1960s was very difficult. In fact, this was realized to be a problem for Soviet science as a whole, and many mathematicians, physicists, chemists, and other scientists made efforts to rehabilitate genetics and to transfer biology to the “jurisdiction” of science from that of politics. The key events in the history of these attempts to pushback against state interference in science, and to promote the development of genetics and molecular biology, are described in this paper. These efforts included supportive letters to the authorities (e.g., the famous “Letter of three hundred”), (re)publishing articles and giving lectures on “forbidden” science, and organizing laboratories and departments for research in genetics and molecular biology under the cover of nuclear physics or of other projects respected by the government and Communist party leaders. The result was that major figures in the hard sciences played a major part in the revival of genetics and biology in the USSR.


Author(s):  
Mark Edele

This chapter turns to the present and explains the implications of the current study for the ongoing debate about the Soviet Union in the Second World War and in particular about the role of loyalty and disloyalty in the Soviet war effort. It argues that this study strengthens those who argue for a middle position: the majority of Soviet citizens were neither unquestioningly loyal to the Stalinist regime nor convinced resisters. The majority, instead, saw their interests as distinct from both the German and the Soviet regime. Nevertheless, ideology remains important if we want to understand why in the Soviet Union more resisted or collaborated than elsewhere in Europe and Asia.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document