Manchurian Booty and International Law

1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 584-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel H. Lew
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Government

In its reply to the identical notes sent by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on February 9, 1946, to the Chinese and Soviet Governments concerning the disposition of Japanese external assets, the Government of China stated that the claim of the Soviet Government “that all Japanese enterprises in the Chinese Northeastern Provinces which had rendered services to the Japanese Army were regarded by the Soviet Union as war booty of Soviet forces” is considered by the Chinese Government “as far exceeding the scope of war booty as generally recognized by international law and international usage.”

The Socialist Construction of Philately in the Early Soviet Era

1995 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 476-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Grant
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Everyday Life ◽  
Public Life ◽  
Actual Condition ◽  
Private Sphere ◽  
Soviet Regime ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Total Control ◽  
The Government

The term totalitarian has often been used by scholars to characterize the Soviet Union's system of government, and in many studies the emphasis has fallen on assessing the degree of effectiveness of the ruling apparatus in exercising its total control over society. Whatever the actual condition of public life in the Soviet Union (USSR), a desire to use the totalitarian system undeniably existed; and regardless of the degree to which people were able to retain an autonomous private sphere, their lives were shaped by this urge to total control. The best examples of this come not from the realm of high politics but of mundane personal practices such as the pursuit of hobbies. During the period from 1921 to 1939, the Soviet government redefined the hobby of stamp collecting, socially reconstructing it in terms of the regime's values. In the process, the Soviet regime demonstrated its totalitarian goal in ways that had ramifications in everyday life, as can be seen in the state's relations with the philatelists and in the realm of hobbies. The fact that the government strictly controlled and circumscribed something as seemingly innocuous and insignificant as stamp collecting reveals how strongly the state aspired to have total control of society. More important, this urge sprang not from the top of the Soviet apparatus but, rather, from mid-level officials.

Baghdad Pact

1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 212-213 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Middle East ◽  
The United States ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Government

On September 23, 1955, Pakistan announced its formal adherence to the alliance formed on February 24 by Iraqand Turkey, and adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5 (Baghdad Pact). On October 11, the government of Iran announced its intention to adhere to the Pact; following parliamentary approval of the decision, Iran formallyadhered on November 3. Both before and after Iran's formal adherence to the Pact, the Soviet Union, according to press reports, protested strongly. In a note of October 12, the Soviet government declared that the accession of Iran was incompatible with the interests of consolidating peace and security in the near and middle east, and contradicted certain treaty obligations of Iran with respect to the Soviet Union. In a subsequent note, the Soviet Union repeated its protest, alleging that Iran's adherence to the Pact “inflicted serious damage” to relations between Iran and the Soviet Union, and that Iran would have to bear the full consequencesof joining. In a reply to the earlier Soviet note, Iran had declared that its object in adhering to the Pactwas the consolidation of peace and security in the middle east; the Pact was for defensive purposes, and Iran'sadherence should not mar Iranian-Soviet friendly relations, nor did it conflict with the terms of existing agreements between Iran and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, both the United States and United Kingdom had formally welcomed Iran's decision.

“Exclusive Preserves” and the New Soviet Policy Toward the Un Secretariat

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 322-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodor Meron
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
United Nations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
Soviet Policy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

An “exclusive preserve” of a state in the UN Secretariat is a post that is continuously filled by nationals of the same state. Virtually from the founding of the United Nations, the Secretariat has observed an “unofficial” practice of exclusive preserves for many senior posts held by nationals of several influential states, including the United States; but its most persistent advocate, and with regard to a particularly wide range of posts, has been the Soviet Union. In view of the past underrepresentation of Soviet nationals in the Secretariat, largely because the Soviet Government insisted that its nationals be recruited only on fixed-term contracts based on secondment from the Government and Soviet institutions, a considerable number of posts were set aside to be filled on a replacement basis. The occupants of those posts were selected by the Secretary-General from a very short list of candidates submitted by the Soviet Government. The object of this Editorial is to assess the impact of the new Soviet policy toward the UN Secretariat, recent General Assembly resolutions and the jurisprudence of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal on the practice of exclusive preserves.

scholarly journals Yugoslavia on the pages of the journal Slavyane (1942–1958)

2021 ◽  
pp. 100-126
Author(s):  
Aleksandr V. Zaytsev
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The One ◽  
Cover Up

The journal Slavyane was created by the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as an organ of internal and external political propaganda aimed at Russian-speaking Slavs. It reflected the pullback of Soviet foreign policy from proletarian internationalism. The policy of its editorial board towards Yugoslavia repeated the one of the Party, but sensitive subjects were avoided or covered with a delay on the pages of the journal. Josip Broz Tito as spokesman for the aspirations of Yugoslav peoples was extolle since 1943 while D. Mihajlović’s activities had not been covered until his condemnation in October 1943. The journal supported the government of the People’s Federative Republic of Yugoslavia until early 1948, condemned it since late 1949 to early 1953, kept silence on Yugoslavia for several months in 1948–1949, 1953–1954, 1956, 1957 and 1958. Each time such deliberate silence had been caused by the aggravation or, on the contrary, by attempts to break ice in relations between the Soviet Union and People’s Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) / the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia / the Union of Yugoslavian Communists. The only exception from the rule seems to be Issue 5/1953 of the journal which contains anti-Tito insults but they may be due to struggle on top of the Soviet government. Overall, the policy of the editorial board was marked by more caution and desire to cover up problems than the policy of Party newspapers.

scholarly journals SOVIET RESETTLEMENT’S PROGRAM FOR THE UKRAINIAN PEASANCE IN 1921–1925

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 67-72
Author(s):  
Olesia Rozovyk
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Rural Areas ◽  
Far East ◽  
North Caucasus ◽  
The Urals ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
The Far East ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government

The article, based on little-known sources, deals with the process of forming the policy of the Soviet government to solve such a problem as agrarian overpopulation of the USSR. The article presents data on overpopulation in some districts of the Ukrainian SSR, such as Kyiv, Chernihiv and Volyn districts, where such a phenomenon as scarcity of land and low-yielding soils was presented. An Emergency Resettlement Commission was established within the People’s Commissariat of Land Affairs by the decision of the Council of People’ Commissars (CPC). This Commission solved all issues related to the resettlement of peasants within the republic and abroad. Similar commissions were also formed in all provincial and county centers of the Ukrainian SSR. These commissions began active work on the registration of landless peasants and the search for vacant lands, primarily in the republic for their resettlement, beginning in the spring of 1921. Commissions were also carried out with the All-Russian (later All-Union) Resettlement Commission on the provision of land in uninhabited areas of the RSFSR, such as the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Far East, Kuban, Stavropol, North Caucasus to the settlers from Ukraine. In February 1923, the CPC of the Ukrainian SSR took measures to ensure the planned resettlement of the rural population of the republic in Ukraine and abroad. In the autumn of 1923, the VIII All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets approved the main directions of resettlement policy in the republic. It was reduced to the following measures: first – the resettlement of Ukrainians in the free lands of the Ukrainian SSR; second – resettlement, first of all, of the poor population, which included assistance in farming; third – the resettlement of part of the population from rural areas to cities; fourth – the resettlement of small peasant families in the All-Union Colonization Fund in the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Far East. In April 1924, CPC of the Soviet Union, supporting the resettlement movement, adopted a resolution “On the benefits of migrants”. It determined the level of material assistance to the families who settled in new lands. Thus, during 1921–1925, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the CPC of the Ukrainian SSR developed a program of resettlement of the Ukrainian population within its ethnic lands and the Union Colonization Fund. This was the first five-year cycle of resettlement policy of the government of the USSR, and in 1926 a new resettlement program was approved, designed first for seven and then for ten years.

The U.S.S.R. and International Organizations

1942 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Prince
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
Russian Government ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
Soviet Russia

It is of interest to the student of international affairs to examine the relationships of Soviet Russia with international organizations, both public and private, and of the policies governing those relationships. The study aims to find out why the Soviet Government has joined some international unions, affiliated with certain groups, and has refused to cooperate with others. What has been the Soviet Government’s policy in entering into multipartite conventions; why has it become a successor to some international agreements that were ratified by the Imperial Russian Government and rejected or abrogated others; and to what extent is the Soviet Union guided by generally accepted principles of international law in its foreign policies as evidenced by its participation in international organizations?

scholarly journals The German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939. Its Meaning and Significance

2021 ◽  
pp. 35-46
Author(s):  
А.Ф. Агарев ◽  
В.П. Курышкин
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Security System ◽  
Collective Security ◽  
World War ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Military

Все 1930-е годы Советский Союз прилагал значительные усилия для создания системы коллективной безопасности в Европе и заслона на пути гитлеровской агрессии, но правящие круги Великобритании, Франции и Италии, подписав с Германией позорное Мюнхенское соглашение, свели их на нет. Неудачей закончились и переговоры военных представителей Англии, Франции и СССР, проходившие в Москве в августе 1939 года. Западные партнеры затягивали эти переговоры, одновременно пытаясь за спиной СССР договориться с Берлином. Дальнейшее затягивание бесплодных переговоров грозило нашей стране опасностью оказаться перед угрозой войны с объединенным фронтом западных стран. В своих намерениях создать систему коллективной безопасности в Европе советское правительство столкнулось с саботажем правящих кругов Англии и Франции и было вынуждено дать согласие на приезд в Москву фон Риббентропа для ведения переговоров о заключении Пакта о ненападении. Германский министр, в отличие от англо-французских переговорщиков, имел полномочия для подписания необходимых документов. 23 августа 1939 года он и В. М. Молотов подписали Пакт о ненападении. На принятие такого решения оказала влияние и угроза войны на два фронта: в это время на востоке, в районе реки Халхин-Гол, шли ожесточенные бои, которые могли перерасти в полномасштабную войну с Японией. Договор о ненападении между Германией и СССР дал возможность выиграть время для укрепления обороны страны и ослабил единство агрессивного фашистско-милитаристского блока. С нападением Германии на Польшу и началом Второй мировой войны договор не связан. Не нарушал он и норм международного права. During the 1930s, the Soviet Union did its best to build a collective security system in Europe in order to prevent the spread of the Nazi menace. However, the ruling circles of Great Britain, France and Italy nullified the efforts by signing the ignoble Munich Agreement. The military negotiations between England, France and the USSR that were held in Moscow in August 1939 were a dismal failure. The western partners delayed the negotiations trying to reach an agreement with Berlin behind the back of the Soviet Union. Further delay threatened to put Russia in a position when it had to oppose a united western front. Trying to build a collective security system in Europe, the Soviet government had to handle the sabotage campaign launched by the ruling circles of England and France and had to accept the arrival of the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact. Unlike British and French ministers, the German minister was authorised to sign such documents. On 23 August 1939, J. von Ribbentrop and V. M. Molotov signed the non-aggression pact. The decision was taken under a two-front military threat (there were outbursts of fierce fighting near the Khalkhin-Gol river, which could escalate into a full-scale confrontation with Japan. The German-Soviet non-aggression pact gave the USSR a chance to enhance its defence and diminished the aggressive efforts of fascist militarists. The pact cannot be treated as violation of international law. It is in no way related to the German invasion of Poland preceding World War II.

scholarly journals Stalinizmas ir etnokultūros institucionalizavimas. Pirmoji Dainų šventė sovietinėje Lietuvoje 1946 m.

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019/1 ◽  
pp. 127-144
Author(s):  
Vladas Sirutavičius
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Folk Culture ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
Soviet Culture ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Government ◽  
Soviet Ideology

decided to re-establish the tradition of song festivals and organize the first such festival in 1946; and to what extent the implementation of the said idea was successful. Analysis of the history of the first Soviet song festival and circumstances surrounding the preparation for the event is based on the little known or practically unknown documents kept in the archives of Lithuania and the Russian Federation. The government of Lithuania viewed the organization of the “first Soviet song festival” as a possibility to demonstrate its concern with Lithuanian folk culture, its development, and promotion. This kind of policy was intended to strengthen the legitimacy of the Soviet government and make it seem more “Lithuanian”. The fact that Lithuanian folk culture helped spread the new Soviet ideology also cannot be ignored. The song festival was not only amply decorated with Soviet symbols, attempts were made to couple the attributes of the Soviet culture with the values of folk culture. On the other hand, organizing the festival the leadership of Soviet Lithuania wanted to show that the Soviet political regime can be in “harmony” with Lithuanian ethno-culture and the new government was a natural successor of former ethnic traditions. However, alone, without the approval of the Lithuanian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the support from Moscow, the government of Lithuania was unable to organize the festival. This suggests that the leadership of the Soviet Union was rather tolerant to the manifestations of “national Communism” not only in the countries of Central Europe that fell under Moscow’s influence but also in Lithuanian SSR. Besides, the decision to organize the festival in Vilnius was not a random one. Crowds of singers that came to the city from all around Lithuania changed its national composition – Vilnius for once became more Lithuanian. This not only demonstrated the government’s aspiration to show off its “Lithuanian” nature but also its ambition to make Vilnius the centre of Lithuanian (Soviet) culture. Finally, the government of LSSR was satisfied with the organization and course of the festival and believed that it managed to achieve its goals and objectives. Probably the success of the first Soviet song festival resulted in them being organized periodically.

The pushback against state interference in science: how Lysenkoism tried to suppress Genetics and how it was eventually defeated

Genetics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasily V Ptushenko
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Molecular Biology ◽  
Nuclear Physics ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Government ◽  
Key Events ◽  
State Interference

Abstract Genetics in the Soviet Union (USSR) achieved state-of-the-art results and had reached a peak of development by the mid-1930s due to the efforts of the scientific schools of several major figures, including Sergei Navashin, Nikolai Koltsov, Grigorii Levitsky, Yuri Filipchenko, Nikolai Vavilov, and Solomon Levit. Unfortunately, the Soviet government distrusted intellectually independent science and this led to state support for a fraudulent pseudoscientific concept widely known as Lysenkoism, which hugely damaged biology as a whole. Decades of dominance of the Lysenkoism had ruinous effects and the revival of biology in the USSR in the late 1950s–early 1960s was very difficult. In fact, this was realized to be a problem for Soviet science as a whole, and many mathematicians, physicists, chemists, and other scientists made efforts to rehabilitate genetics and to transfer biology to the “jurisdiction” of science from that of politics. The key events in the history of these attempts to pushback against state interference in science, and to promote the development of genetics and molecular biology, are described in this paper. These efforts included supportive letters to the authorities (e.g., the famous “Letter of three hundred”), (re)publishing articles and giving lectures on “forbidden” science, and organizing laboratories and departments for research in genetics and molecular biology under the cover of nuclear physics or of other projects respected by the government and Communist party leaders. The result was that major figures in the hard sciences played a major part in the revival of genetics and biology in the USSR.

Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea

2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-413
Author(s):  
Rizal Abdul Kadir
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Caspian Sea ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
The Caspian Sea ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The United Nations

After twenty-two years of negotiations, in Aktau on August 12, 2018, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, and Turkmenistan signed the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. The preamble of the Convention stipulates, among other things, that the Convention, made up of twenty-four articles, was agreed on by the five states based on principles and norms of the Charter of the United Nations and International Law. The enclosed Caspian Sea is bordered by Iran, Russia, and three states that were established following dissolution of the Soviet Union, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.

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